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Drawing on conceptual metaphor theory and John Bender and David E. Wellbery‘s description 
of rhetoricality, I offer a reconceptualization of literature as a conceptual metaphorization of the 
experience of the cognitive concept of LIFE.  I demonstrate the value of such a rhetoricized 
reconceptualization of literature and literary study by applying them to four American 
autobiographies written after 1970: Bill Clinton‘s My Life, James Frey‘s A Million Little Pieces, 
Audre Lorde‘s Zami, and Walter Dean Myers‘ Autobiography of my Dead Brother.  I also 
speculate about what a rhetoricized English studies in contemporary American higher education 
– one that sees (what Pierre Bourdieu describes as) heteronomy rather than autonomy as its 





I am indebted to the following individuals for their unflagging support of me and this 
project: Eva and Leland Maxwell, for my inspiration; Juanita and James Williams, for showing 
me what WORK really means; Marsha, Emmit, and Erica Williams, for putting up with me; 
Joseph Braun, for the past year; Drs. Amy J. Devitt and Frank Farmer, for their leadership, 
guidance, direction, support, and good cheer, among other equally important things; Drs. Giselle 
Anatol and Philip Barnard, for helping me find the ways to say what I wanted to say; Dr. Sonya 
Lancaster, for her mentorship and encouragement; and Josh Edler, Danny Witzofsky, Lennelle 
Gilpin, Darian Wigfall, Sarah and Dustin Crowley, and my other St. Louis and Kansas City 
friends, for supporting me even in my absence.  I am also indebted to the collegiality and support 
of my students, my fellow graduate students, and the graduate faculty in the Department of 
English at the University of Kansas.   
It has been my honor to be the final dissertation student of my director and mentor, Dr. 
James Hartman.  He has been like an oracle in his foresight, like Solomon in his wisdom, a 
sphinx in couching revelations in wordplay, and a Zen master in weathering all my crises with 
calm and laughter.  Dr. Hartman has been the ideal mentor and friend for a young scholar trying 
to find her way in the world.  Because words cannot express the thanks and appreciation that I 
wish to convey to him, this dissertation must metonymize them instead. 
v 
 
Table of Contents 
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 
Chapter 1 ......................................................................................................................................... 4 
Part 1 – False Autonomy and the Rhetoricization of English Studies ........................................ 4 
1.1 The Literary Field, Literary Studies, and False Autonomy .................................................. 4 
1.1.1 ―Fields‖ of Human Action and Interaction .................................................................... 8 
1.1.2 The Field of Cultural Production ................................................................................... 9 
1.1.3 Structural Transformations of the French Aesthetic and Literary Fields .................... 13 
1.2 Aesthetics and the False Autonomy of English (Literary) Studies ..................................... 19 
1.2.1 A Brief Genealogy of the Autonomization of English ―Literature‖ ............................ 20 
1.2.2 English in the Modern University ................................................................................ 24 
1.2.3 The Creation of the Subfield of English Literary Studies ............................................ 28 
1.2.4 Implications of Specialization and Autonomization for English Departments ........... 34 
1.3 Rhetoricality and the Rhetoricization of English Studies ................................................... 39 
1.4 A Return to Rhetoric via Rhetoricality ............................................................................... 47 
Part 2: Case Studies in Field Troubles ...................................................................................... 52 
1.5 The Spellings Report and the MLA‘s Retort ...................................................................... 52 
1.6 Residual Autonomy in the Disciplinary Rejection of Cultural Studies .............................. 55 
1.7 Rhetoricality, a New Resolution ......................................................................................... 59 
Chapter 2 – The Metaphor of Literature (or Literature as a Metaphoric Process) ....................... 60 
2.1 A Brief History of Metaphor Theory .................................................................................. 66 
2.1.1 Aristotle‘s Theory of Metaphor and Its Problematic Semantics .................................. 66 
2.1.2 Interanimation and Interaction Theories of Metaphor ................................................. 75 
2.1.3 Ricoeur‘s Tension Theory............................................................................................ 82 
2.2 The Contemporary Moment: Conceptual Metaphor Theory .............................................. 85 
2.3 Literature as a Metaphor for LIFE ...................................................................................... 91 
2.3.1 A Theory of the Literary Metaphor Process ................................................................ 91 
2.3.2 Variations on a Theory of Literature as a Metaphoric Process .................................... 97 
2.3.3 Interdisciplinarity, Rhetoricality, and an Improved Theory of Literature ................. 101 
Chapter 3 – Truth, Concepts, and Autobiography ...................................................................... 106 
3.1 Lyndon B. Johnson and the Fallacy of Literary Non-Reality ........................................... 107 
3.2 Categories and/of Experiential Reality ............................................................................. 109 
3.2.1 The Insufficiencies of Objectivist Accounts of Truth ................................................ 109 
3.2.2 Truth, Reality, and Experience .................................................................................. 112 
3.2.3 Metaphor and Experiential Reality ............................................................................ 116 
3.3 Literary Reality ................................................................................................................. 119 
3.3.1 Interaction between LIFE and STORY ...................................................................... 119 
3.3.2 The Metaphoric Nature of Literary Comprehension ................................................. 122 
3.4 Autobiographical Experiences of LIFE ............................................................................ 127 
3.4.1 Autobiographical Prototype Effects ........................................................................... 127 
3.4.2 Reading Autobiography as a Metaphorization of LIFE ............................................. 131 
3.4.3 A Brief Genealogy of Post-1970 American Autobiography...................................... 133 
3.4.4 Case Study One: Bill Clinton‘s Contemporary Paragon of Autobiography .............. 136 
3.4.5 Case Study Two: The Opposing Paragon: James Frey‘s A Million Little Pieces ...... 142 
vi 
 
3.4.6 Case Study Three: Disidentification in Audre Lorde‘s Zami .................................... 147 
3.4.7 Case Study Four: Fictionalized and Marginalized, for Children: Walter Dean Myers‘ 
Autobiography of My Dead Brother ................................................................................... 152 
3.5 The Rhetoricality of Literary Metaphorization of LIFE ................................................... 157 
Chapter 4 – Rhetoricality in Today‘s Literary and English Studies ........................................... 159 
4.1 A Rhetorician‘s Perspective .............................................................................................. 159 
4.2 Rhetoricizing Literature and Literary Studies................................................................... 164 
4.2.1 Residual Conceptualizations of Literature ................................................................. 164 
4.2.2 Rhetoricized Conceptualizations of Literature .......................................................... 166 
4.2.3 Locating Rhetoricization in Literary Studies ............................................................. 171 
4.3 Rhetoricizing English Studies ........................................................................................... 183 
4.3.1 Locating Rhetoricization in English Studies.............................................................. 183 
4.4 Rhetoricality as an Answer to Present and Future Questions ........................................... 190 
Afterword – Literature as a Conceptual Blend? ......................................................................... 193 






The question of whether English studies in higher education is in a crisis may be too 
well-worn to be of interest to most English studies scholars, occupied as they are with teaching, 
scholarship, and administration work.  But scholars in the humanities cannot afford to ignore or 
dismiss the changes going on around them in higher education.  As one of the largest and most 
culturally-influential fields of study in the humanities, English studies has the unique opportunity 
to demonstrate for policymakers, students, administrators, and fellow academicians the 
legitimacy of humanistic study.  To do so, I argue, requires that English studies as a discipline 
eschew the tendency to autonomize itself from other disciplinary and institutional bodies in 
academia.  Instead, English studies, including its subdisciplines, should embrace an attitude of 
―rhetoricality,‖ which John Bender and David E. Wellbery describe as ―the fundamental category 
of every inquiry that seeks to describe the nature of discursive action and exchange‖ (26).  In 
what follows, I present a definition of literature via conceptual metaphor theory as an important 
step toward fully adopting a disciplinary disposition of rhetoricality, or ―rhetoricizing‖ English 
studies in American academia. 
In the first chapter, I draw upon the work of Pierre Bourdieu, Terry Eagleton, and Gerald 
Graff, among others, in arguing that English studies has cast itself as autonomous from its 
institutional and intellectual context in academia.  As Bourdieu clarifies, no field of human 
production – including the production of abstract phenomena such as values and knowledge – 
can ever actually be autonomous from its historical and social context(s).  Rather, English studies 
like all other human activity is heteronomously affected by various contextual influences, such as 
economics, politics, and culture.  As case studies of the residual troubles of the struggle for an 
impossible autonomy in English studies, I present two case studies: the official reactions of the 
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MLA to the Spellings Report, and a recent article in Profession, which reveals the 
intradisciplinary struggles for autonomy within English studies, and the official reactions of the 
MLA to the Spellings Report. 
The second chapter presents a rhetoricized definition of literature as a conceptual 
metaphorization of the experience of lived human life.  According to conceptual metaphor 
theory, metaphor is more accurately understood as a mode of thought and cognition than a type 
of linguistic figure or expression.  In conceptual metaphor theory, the statement, ―My schedule is 
getting full,‖ would be a linguistic expression of a tacit conceptual metaphor, TIME IS A 
CONTAINER.  I argue that the work of (Western) literary and rhetorical theorists since Aristotle 
characterized literature as a discursive form that metaphorizes a reader‘s experience of LIFE, or 
lived human experience, with the concept LIFE as it is depicted in the literary text.  That is, as 
we read a work that, for various contextual reasons, we think of as ―literature,‖ we measure 
whether and how the LIFE depicted in the work of literature is and is not our own experience and 
knowledge of LIFE.  If we take the findings of conceptual metaphor theory seriously, then we 
can better understand and explain how literature comes to be influential for how readers of 
literature, individually and culturally, conceptualize LIFE. 
In a third chapter, I analyze four American autobiographies written after 1970 to 
demonstrate the usefulness of this reconceptualization of literature for fulfilling the principles of 
rhetoricization in English studies.  I examine the conceptualizations of the experience of LIFE 
presented in Bill Clinton‘s My Life, James Frey‘s A Million Little Pieces, Walter Dean Myers‘ 
Autobiography of My Dead Brother, and Audre Lorde‘s Zami, exploring opportunities to expand 
our interdisciplinary knowledge about the ways that human beings use language to construct 
themselves and their realities.  Following Paul Ricoeur‘s tension theory of metaphor, by which 
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metaphor is defined as the assertion that something is something that it is not, I examine the 
moments at which readers may be unlikely or unwelcome to recognize that their experiences of 
LIFE are the same as those of the autobiographer.  Some autobiographies, like Clinton‘s My Life 
and Frey‘s A Million Little Pieces, maintain and reinforce conceptualizations of LIFE that are 
prototypical for the genre of autobiography and suggest that the kind of LIFE they depict is the 
kind of LIFE that readers should want or expect their own LIFE experiences to be.  Other 
autobiographies such as Myers‘ Autobiography of My Dead Brother and Lorde‘s Zami operate 
on their readers culturally, cognitively, aesthetically, and linguistically to challenge mainstream 
notions of what LIFE is or should be.  Because of its rhetoricized, interdisciplinary nature, this 
approach to literature could be helpful for validating the study of literature, rhetoric, and 
language for scientists, social scientists, fellow humanities scholars, higher education 
policymakers, and the general public. 
In a fourth chapter, I explore the ways that this rhetoricization can ameliorate the 
institutional and intellectual problems in English studies outlined in the first chapter.  In 
particular, I explain what a rhetoricization of literary and English studies can help us articulate 
our value within today‘s structures of higher education scholarship.  A rhetoricized field of 
English studies would be open to cooperating across disciplinary and institutional lines to pursue 
the mission of university research – the development and refinement of a body of knowledge that 
is universally available and useful to all interested parties.  As an alternative to autonomization, 
English studies could demonstrate that it has something to contribute to and gain from other 
disciplines and is therefore integral to the institutional structure of higher education. 
I am indebted to the following individuals for their unflagging support of me and this 
project: Eva and Leland Maxwell, for my inspiration; Juanita and Floyd Williams, for showing 
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me what WORK really means; Marsha, Emmit, and Erica Williams, for letting me be me and 
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the University of Kansas.  It has been my honor to be the final dissertation student of my director 
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Chapter 1 
 
Part 1 – False Autonomy and the Rhetoricization of English Studies 
 
1.1 The Literary Field, Literary Studies, and False Autonomy 
 
The present crisis in the field of literary studies is at root a crisis in the definition of the subject 
itself. 
Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction 
 
And I agree to that, or in so far 
As I can see no way out but through – 




Is there a ―crisis in the field of literary studies,‖ as Terry Eagleton claimed
1
 in Literary 
Theory: An Introduction (186)?  The answer to that question depends on the nature of the ―crisis‖ 
about which one inquires.  Eagleton, writing in the Conclusion to the 2008 anniversary edition of 
that book, seems to have in mind various crises: the trouble with justifying the existence of the 
study of literature in higher education; the economic woes attendant to both the existence and the 
justification of literary studies in higher education; and a clarification of what exactly proponents 
of literary studies in higher education claim to be ―literature,‖ the object of ―literary studies,‖ and 
the objective of ―literary studies‖ if it is not the study of some clearly-defined ―literary‖ object. 
Is there a crisis in the field of English studies?  This is a quite different question, though 
its answers also have to do with some of the variations of ―crises‖ that Eagleton addresses, 
namely, the clarification of, purpose for, and justification of the study of ―English‖ in academia.  
The question makes all the difference: the clarification, justification, and objectives of ―literary 
studies‖ today seem particularly fraught with difficulty in the post-canon academy (which is 
itself living in a canon-friendly world, as the selection of Grapes of Wrath for Oprah‘s book club 
some years ago or the segregation of ―Classics‖ or ―Literature‖ from general ―Fiction‖ at any 
local bookstore may suggest), but the study of ―English‖ may seem less problematic if it is 
thought to include some rather practical writing, communication, and analysis skills that our 
present economic situation, taxpayers, and our students demand.   
Asking the latter question – ―Is there a crisis in the field of English studies?‖ – draws 
attention to a particular, if not new, set of crises that face English departments today, ones that 
have to do with balancing disciplinary and institutional autonomy and cooperation.  On a 
university level, this question could suggest that English studies not only has a right to exist, it 
                                                 
1
 The 2008 Anniversary Edition of Literary Theory includes this quotation, but it was first included in Eagleton‘s 
1996 revised edition. 
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has a right to exist even in a troubled state or even when it doesn‘t know what ―English studies‖ 
is or why it is or what it‘s supposed to be doing.  Within English departments, this question at 
least points to a spirit of cooperation and interdependence that the former question does not.  But 
it still suggests that English studies, as a discipline and an institutional body, is without a clear 
object and objective, which indicates that any of the subdisciplines
2
 housed in ―English‖ 
departments may or may not actually be concerned with or actually working toward any common 
objects or objectives. 
In fact, the latter question indicates more clearly the nature of the problems of 
contemporary English studies as a discipline and its institutional incarnations in English (or 
Languages and Literature, or Comparative Literature and Writing, etc.) departments.  What 
scholars in English studies have is failure to communicate, both with each other and with the 
academic and non-academic world around us, about some of the issues most fundamental to our 
existence.  This failure has resulted in a crisis: we cannot answer the question ―Is English studies 
in crisis?‖ without being able to answer the question ―What is English studies?‖, and at the 
moment, we‘re incapable of satisfactorily answering either question.  While Bruce McComiskey 
and others are right to say that English studies is perpetually in a new ―crisis,‖
3
  the present crisis 
is real, and our reaction to it has the potential either to act as a vote of no confidence in the study 
of ―English,‖ whatever it might mean, in higher education, or to bring reconciliation to the 
subdisciplines of English studies and thereby, perhaps, clarify and justify its existence in the 
                                                 
2
 I will from here on use ―subdiscipline‖ to refer areas of scholarship that are generally contained in a larger 
umbrella discipline.  In English studies, these might include English literary studies, linguistics, rhetoric and 
composition, technical writing, and creative writing.  But I realize that not all of these disciplines necessarily and in 
all contexts see themselves are related to each other in this manner.  Likewise, the terms ―subfield‖ and 
―subinstitution‖ should here imply membership within a superordinate field or institution, respectively. 
3
 For a summary of the debate about whether English studies is suffering from a crisis, what the nature of that crisis 
might be, and whether we‘ve been in a state of constant ―crisis‖ since the earliest formal studies of English language 
and literature, see McComiskey‘s Introduction to English Studies (1-66). 
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university.  If done successfully, this reconciliation and the partnership in creating a universal 
body of knowledge in the context of the university might pave the way for the humanities in 
general to understand and better argue for their own existence in that context.  The stakes of this 
crisis, which is admittedly only one of the many concerns that face English studies today, are 
quite high.   
As regards these present troubles, to quote Frost, ―I can see no way out but through‖ our 
disciplinary and institutional history.  In this chapter, I construct a brief and admittedly reductive 
sketch of that history using Pierre Bourdieu‘s field theory and his explication of that theory in 
terms of the structural transformation of the French literary field.  Bourdieu‘s account of that 
field‘s transformation over time and specifically its division into an academic-aesthetic subfield 
and a mass-market subfield is homologous
4
 with the development and structure of the Anglo-
American field of English literature and literary studies from at least the late eighteenth-century 
unto today.  Like the French literary academic field, the Anglo-American field of academic 
literary studies has derived from the field of English literature, in which literature has historically 
been defined and privileged according to a pure aesthetic that understood literature as 
autonomous from the context of its creation and important for its own sake.  As a consequence of 
this genealogy, the academic study of English has considered its objects and objectives to be 
autonomous from any outside influence; it has considered itself worthy for its own sake.   
                                                 
4
 Bourdieu uses ―homology‖ in much the same sense that other sociologists and historical-materialists (as well as 
biologists and mathematicians) use it: to denote a structural correspondence or similarity between two distinct 
systems or phenomena.  For Bourdieu, a homology might exist in either or both a structural position or structured 
system in a field (see Field 87-9).  To say (as Bourdieu does, as I will summarize later) that the restricted production 
principle is homologous to the large-scale production principle in their respective hierarchies of power (autonomy 
and heteronomy, respectively) is to say that both production principles drive the system of production in the field of 
aesthetics and subfield of literature according to two distinct but related principles of power hierarchization that 
partly govern the structure of both fields. 
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The present crisis in English studies clearly follows from this false sense of autonomy 
and self-importance: across our history and even quite recently, as the case studies that conclude 
this chapter reveal, the justifications that English studies offers for its existence suggest that we 
know not what we do nor why we (or anyone else) should do it.  Even the notion that we should 
offer a justification for our existence may seem distasteful to English studies academicians.  But 
the path to disciplinary and institutional cooperation in our university context, if we still desire to 
reside therein, lies in the clarification and justification of our objects and objectives, and the 
lesson of history that Bourdieu explicates helps to light that path.  
History can only take us so far in understanding the dissonances within our field.  From 
there, we must recognize that the distinct subdisciplines within English departments are only 
relatively autonomous, one having no right to disciplinary or institutional privilege over another.  
Then we must act accordingly, rejecting a false autonomy and self-imposed isolation from other 
disciplines and academic and social institutions.  What English studies needs isn‘t so much a 
revolution as it is a new resolution: it needs to adopt the institutional disposition and disciplinary, 
critical-analytic approach that David E. Bender and John Wellbery call ―rhetoricality.‖  Readers 
here should find rhetoricality familiar, given the tenor of English studies today.  But the case 
studies in the second part of this chapter – an analysis of the Modern Language Association‘s 
response to the Spellings Report and a recent article in the journal Profession about English 
studies‘ changing disciplinary focus – reveal just how important it is for contemporary English 
studies to confront its history honestly and to rhetoricize its disciplinary and institutional 
structure. 




We can conceptualize a ―field,‖ as Bourdieu uses the term, as a three-dimensional sphere 
rather than the two-dimensional area that the word ―field‖ might initially suggest.
5
  Fields in this 
sense consist of constantly-shifting constellations (Field 23) of capital, people, (and their 
relationships of and between) time/history, power, and positions.  People vie against each other 
for capital and positions of relative power or importance in the field.  Capital, the means of 
power in the field, is divided into three categories.  Economic capital empowers its beholders 
with financial and material wealth.  Symbolic capital is determined by some combination of a 
person‘s generally-recognized importance in the field and his or her relative expertise regarding 
the field‘s objects, functions, and purposes.  Types and expressions of symbolic capital include 
prestige, honor, and fame.  Finally, cultural capital derives from cultural knowledge or 
competencies as well as legitimated or field-sanctioned dispositions toward the field‘s objects, 
functions, and purposes.  Power, then, is whatever force people use to acquire more capital or to 
attain a more advantageous position within a field (Bourdieu and Wacquant 76).  The matrix of 
relationships that connect capital and people together in history and power differentials forms 
what Bourdieu calls the habitus, ―the set of dispositions, reflexes, and forms of behavior that 
people acquire through acting in society‖ (Siisiainen 19). 
1.1.2 The Field of Cultural Production 
 
―Field,‖ as Bourdieu uses the term, can be used to describe quite abstract structures of 
human action and interaction such as economics, politics, and power.  The field of power, like 
those of economics and  politics, demonstrates the necessary interrelatedness of fields, 
particularly at the level of general, abstract structures of interaction.  Power influences all fields 
since, Bourdieu explains, it ―is the space of relations of force between agents or between 
                                                 
5
 I am indebted to Dr. Philip Barnard for sharing with me this illuminating three-dimensional reconceptualization of 
Bourdieu‘s notion of ―field.‖ 
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institutions having in common the possession of the capital necessary to occupy the dominant 
positions in different fields (notably economic or cultural)‖ (Rules 215).  The fact that such far-
reaching, abstract systems of power, economics, or politics overlap with potentially all other 
distinct fields is of vital significance for Bourdieu‘s characterization of the ―field of cultural 
production,‖ which is ―the system of objective relations between these agents or institutions and 
the site of the struggles for the monopoly of power to consecrate, in which the value of the works 
of art and belief in that value are continuously generated‖ (Field 78).  The significance, as his 
history of the fields of aesthetics and literature show, is of two kinds: first, it indicates that no 
field can ever be entirely autonomous from all other fields.  Second, it reminds us in the Western 
world that there is what Bourdieu would call an ―objective‖ or undeniably real relationship 
between power and culture that art and artists cannot escape.   
The specific constituents of the field of cultural production include people interested or 
invested in the production and consumption of cultural products.  Such cultural products include 
any artifacts, works, and ideas that impact the ways that people create, represent, and systematize 
their social practices.  Economic capital, of course, is exchanged in this field anytime these 
cultural artifacts are exchanged, such as when we purchase theater tickets or when a magazine 
publisher pays a music critic for writing a review.  It is assumed that legitimate participants in 
the cultural field – the ―consumers capable of recognizing the work of art as such‖ (Rules 229) – 
already possess sufficient cultural capital, which in this field is that capacity of recognition, to 
have even gained entry into the field.  But the primary form of capital in the cultural field is 
symbolic capital: ―For the author, the critic, the art dealer, the publisher or theatre manager,‖ 
Bourdieu writes,  
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the only legitimate accumulation [of capital] consists in making a name for oneself, a 
known, recognized name, a capital of consecration or persons (through publication, 
exhibition, etc.) and therefore to give value, and to appropriate the profits from this 
operation. (Rules 75) 
Even the production and exchange of symbolic as opposed to economic or cultural capital 
involves power relations – the exertion of force in the service of acquiring the ―recognized 
name‖ or field-specific ―consecration.‖   
Bourdieu‘s accounts (particularly in Distinction and The Field of Cultural Production) of 
the historical changes in the cultural field focus on the changes in the spheres of aesthetics and 
literature rather than other culturally-influential fields like religion or politics.  Bourdieu 
characterizes the aesthetic and literary fields
6
 within the field of cultural production as the ―space 
of literary or artistic position-takings, i.e., the structured set of the manifestations of the social 
agents involved in the field – literary or artistic works, of course, but also political acts or 
pronouncements, manifestos or polemics, etc.‖ and include ―the space of literary or artistic 
positions defined by possession of a determinate quantity of specific capital (recognition)‖ and a 
position in the field appropriate to that capital (Field 30, original emphasis).  Bourdieu selects 




                                                 
6
Bourdieu sometimes uses the terms ―literary and artistic field‖ or variations thereof interchangeably with ―field of 
cultural production.‖  But there is a certain distinction, even if only that which is to be made between a 
superordinate category and its subordinates. 
7
 This is the name which Bourdieu has given his sociological method, which he describes at length in Distinction, 
The Field of Cultural Production, and Homo Academicus.  In fact, Homo Acdemicus largely consists of a meta-
analysis of Bourdieu‘s own position in the field of academics and how his disciplinary objects and methods have 
been affected by his context.  Socio-analysis, as described in Homo Academicus, is neither utterly objectivist nor 
subjectivist in its stance toward what is knowable; it adheres neither to the scientism of structuralism nor to the 
nihilism implied by some post-structuralist/deconstructionist theories.  Instead, Bourdieu writes, ―far from 
destroying its own foundations when it brings to light the social determinants which the logic of the fields of 
production brings to bear on all cultural products, sociology claims an epistemological privilege: that conferred by 
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Few areas more clearly demonstrate the heuristic efficacy of relational thinking than that 
of art and literature.  Constructing an object such as the literary field requires and enables 
us to make a radical break with the substantialist mode of thought (as Ernst Cassirer calls 
it) which tends to foreground the individual, or the visible interactions between 
individuals, at the expense of the structural relations – invisible, or visible only through 
their effects – between social positions that are both occupied and manipulated by social 
agents which may be isolated individuals, groups, or institutions. … To take as one‘s 
subject of study the literary or artistic field of a given period and society (the field of 
Florentine painting in the quattrocento or the field of French literature in the Second 
Empire) is to set the history of art and literature a task which it never completely 
performs, because it fails to take it on explicitly.  (Field 29) 
Here, Bourdieu clarifies his objective: by analyzing the very real, interconnected relationships of 
history, capital, people, and positions in these fields whose participants see themselves as 
―derealized‖ (30) or autonomous from their circumstances, Bourdieu can prove that such 
isolation or decontextualization never actually exists and that any complete understanding of a 
given human phenomenon requires an analysis that takes into account the range of relationships 
that the notion of a ―field‖ brings to bear.   
My purpose in using both Bourdieu‘s field theory and his history of the French fields of 
aesthetics and literature reverses Bourdieu‘s objectives.  I wish to use the same understanding of 
fields as structured structures (Language 164) of human action, but its explication is not my 
primary objective.  Rather, the useful concept of ―field‖ will prove to be the fortunate byproduct 
of the history that I draw from Bourdieu of the French aesthetic and literary fields‘ structural 
                                                                                                                                                             
the fact of being able to reinvest in scientific practice its own scientific gains, in the form of a sociological increase 
in epistemological vigilance‖ (Homo Academicus xii-xiii). 
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transformations from the late eighteenth-century through the twentieth-century.  The historical, 
economic, and cultural transformations that introduced the pure aesthetic and a false autonomy to 
prominence in these two fields are homologous to those that resulted in similar structural 
transformations in the Anglo-American literary field and field of literary studies.  Explicating 
those homologies as well as their implications for English studies in American higher education 
today is my objective here. 
1.1.3 Structural Transformations of the French Aesthetic and Literary Fields 
 
Bourdieu points to the economic and social pressures on the youngest members of the 
aristocracy in the early nineteenth-century as a primary force that moved the field of cultural 
production toward a pure aesthetic.  Industrialized capitalism began its domination of the 
economic field in the nineteenth-century, empowering ―industrialists and businessmen of 
colossal fortunes … [who] were self-made men, uncultured parvenus ready to make both the 
power of money and a vision of the world profoundly hostile to intellectual things‖ (Rules 48).  
Children of some aristocratic families found themselves at a unique disadvantage.  Given their 
habitus – their disposition and will to retain or to acquire more of a specific sort of capital and 
more advantageous positions than they inherited – these aristocratic youth found no satisfaction 
in abdicating their positions of power by taking industrial or trade jobs and thereby entering the 
bourgeoisie.  
This left a generation of youth from relatively wealthy and powerful families in a difficult 
situation, economically and culturally speaking.  Their families saw to it that they received the 
highest possible education, partly as a way to protect their monopoly on cultural and symbolic 
capital.  In their education, these youth were ―nourished in the humanities and in rhetoric but 
deprived of the financial means and the social protection indispensable for taking advantage of 
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their degrees‖ (Rules 55).  From this demographic of French youth emerged the bohemians at the 
end of the eighteenth-century, a ―society of writers and artists in which scribblers and daubers 
predominate, at least numerically, has something extraordinary about it, something without 
precedent‖ (Rules 55).  These youth rejected the industrial and trade jobs available to them in a 
lower position of power but they also rejected the futile battle for any of the shrinking 
aristocracy‘s remaining power.  Instead, the bohemians felt the influence of the Romanticists‘ 
desire for an existence free from the corrupting effects of industrialized or denaturalized life.  
Their ideal world would subsist on the self-sustaining exchange of symbolic capital that artists 
create and provide for each other; this world would be at once independent of the economic and 
cultural capital that the bourgeoisie and aristocracy retained and also communal rather than the 
individualist isolation often valorized in Romanticism (Rules 55).  
The new economic model of industrialized capitalism offered a common ground to both 
bohemians and the bourgeoisie for a time since both parties rejected the cultural and economic 
power of the aristocracy.  In the new class-power structure, the ―relationship between cultural 
producers and the dominant class no longer retain[ed] what might have characterized it in 
previous centuries, whether that means direct dependence on a financial backer,‖ approbation 
from aristocratic salons and clubs, or the patronage of the monarch or appointed officials who set 
policy regarding censorship, copyright, and access to symbolic and economic capital by way of 
―appointment to academies and institutes‖ (Rules 49-50).  Now, artists had to eke out their own 
living by selling their products to people of sufficient economic capital and interest in art, a 
process that the bourgeoisie invested in as an affordable way to wrest power from the powerful 
via cultural capital. 
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At this point, a crisis in the structure of power arose in the aesthetic and literary fields.  
Power in fields operates according to principles of heteronomy and autonomy, Bourdieu writes.  
Heteronomous power is created via the interrelated value of capital, people, and positions across 
multiple fields; it is the principle by which economic capital is created and recognized, since the 
attribution of monetary value to a non-monetary object or service requires that the field of 
economics overlap into another field.  Autonomous power is power created in a self-contained 
system, a force exerted against itself for itself.  This power is usually exerted in a struggle for the 
symbolic capital that, too, is created in a closed system and exchanged for other symbolic capital.  
The encroachment of the bourgeoning bourgeoisie on the interests of the bohemians and the 
historical, economic, and social factors that led to that encroachment ―are no doubt one of the 
major determinants (or at least a precondition) of the process of autonomization of the literary 
and artistic fields and the correlative transformation of the relation between the world of art and 
literature and the political world‖ (Rules 55).   
The bohemians attempted to extricate themselves from being measured by the same 
heteronomous metrics of success that they rejected ―such as book sales, number of theatrical 
performances, etc. or honors, appointments, etc.‖ (Field 38).  Instead, they declared themselves 
wholly autonomous from any external field in which success would be measured by ―the degree 
of recognition accorded by those who recognize no other criterion of legitimacy than recognition 
by those whom they recognize‖ (Field 38), while any economic success or cultural notoriety 
would signal an indenture to ―the new masters of the economy‖ (Rules 59).  The starving artist or 
posthumously-esteemed artist became the new standard of success, one that turned the principle 
of heteronomous power on its head.  
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The autonomy espoused by the bohemians, of course, was always a false autonomy.  
Money was still required for necessities such as food, art supplies, studio space, and the 
exchange of art itself.  But the struggle for autonomy had three important effects: the ―production 
of belief‖ as the principle of valuation for symbolic capital; the reinforcement of what Bourdieu 
calls, following Kant‘s use of the term, the ―pure aesthetic‖; and the division in the field of 
literature between the large-scale, commercial production of literature and the restricted-scale, 
autonomous production of literary art.  For the aesthetic and literary fields of the nineteenth-
century, absolute autonomy was the currency rather than the reality of power in the fields: an 
artist or art object was valued for being seen as actually autonomous, under the ―pure‖ influence 
of art.  In this system, people are asked to believe that the value of art is original and inherent and 
therefore authentic and authoritative.  In reality, such value is established by people with 
sufficient symbolic capital to justify such valuation and to have others believe in it.  What 
becomes more important is the authoring of authentication rather than the authoring of art 
because only the former indicates that one has sufficient symbolic power to determine what is 
and is not worthy of authentication. 
This closed system of belief in consecration suggests that art, like producers and 
consumers, really can or should be autonomous – decontextualized, disinterested, having no 
other purpose than itself.  The pure aesthetic provided a complement to this autonomy since both 
assume that the fields in which they operate are or can be absolutely isolated from other fields.  
―The invention of the pure gaze,‖ Bourdieu writes, ―is brought about in the very movement of 
the field towards autonomy.  In effect, the assertion of the autonomy of the principles of 
production and evaluation of the work of art is inseparable from the assertion of the autonomy of 
the producer, that is, of the field of production‖ (Rules 299).  Within this aesthetics, value can 
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only be attributed to art objects qua art – autonomous from any heteronomously-oriented system 
of economic or cultural capital – by ―apprehending the work of art as it demands to be 
apprehended (in itself and for itself, as form not as function)‖ (Rules 288).   
A fervent belief in the autonomy of art caused artists to reject any outside investment or 
interest in the fields of aesthetics and literature.  Bourdieu points to the protests of Flaubert, 
Baudelaire, and Champfleury – artists who 
gradually invent what will be called ―art for art‘s sake‖ (and at the same time, the norms 
of the literary field) have in common with social art and with realism the fact that they, 
too, are violently opposed to the bourgeoisie and bourgeois art: their cult of form and 
impersonal neutrality makes them appear as the defenders of an ―immoral‖ definition of 
art, especially when those such as Flaubert seem to place their formal research in the 
service of a debasing of the bourgeois world.  (Rules 75, emphasis added) 
The collaboration with the bourgeoisie that gave this pure, autonomous aesthetic its popularity 
and relative power in society came to an end when consecrated members of the aesthetic and 
literary fields realized the hazards of maintaining any heteronomous relationships.  The pure 
aesthetic and art-for-art‘s-sake movement disposed of social responsibility so that it could better 
police access to art, demanding that art be approached as a sort of religious fetish rather than an 
object with any connections to the actual world.    
In the literary field
8
 particularly, this rejection of bourgeois interests and social 
connection in favor of an absolute (however false) autonomy based on a pure aesthetic divided 
the field according to two principles of production – large-scale and restricted (Rules 113).  
                                                 
8
 The same sort of change also occurred in the field of aesthetics more broadly speaking, but insofar as this change 
has to do with these particular literary genres, I will restrict my comments here to the literary field.  Readers who 
would like more detail regarding the nature of this shift for the field of aesthetics more broadly may wish to consult 
The Field of Cultural Production 37-46. 
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Before the pure aesthetic, the standards of literary success set in seventeenth century French 
culture were heteronomously interrelated with those of the economic field and thus with large-
scale production.  In this structure, the genres of literature that promised the largest profit were 
the most highly-valued; theater was most highly valued, followed by the novel and then poetry, 
which could potentially survive with no market (Rules 114-5).  But by the 1880s in French 
literary circles, ―there develops a more autonomous sector – or, if you will, an avant-garde.  Each 
of the genres [theater, the novel, and poetry] tends to cleave into a research sector and a 
commercial sector, two markets between which one must be wary of establishing a clear 
boundary, since they are merely two poles defined in and by their antagonistic relationship‖ 
(Rules 120).  Poetry, the literary art form ―Consecrated as the art par excellence by the romantic 
tradition,‖ assumed the position of highest value in this hierarchy since its success lay in its 
continued ability ―to attract a large number of writers, even if it is almost totally devoid of a 
market,‖ while the novel remained centermost, balanced by its potentially aesthetic and 
―mercantile‖ uses, followed by the most profitable and mass-marketable genre, theater (Rules 
114).   
The larger structure of the literary field mirrored this duality, cleaving into a 
―commercial‖ side that was structured by heteronomous power relations and oriented toward 
large-scale production by the unconsecrated consumer, and another side that saw itself as the 
autonomous realm of restricted access to fetishized art products.  Literary studies as the 
―research sector‖ of the literary field, according to Bourdieu, derived from the aesthetically-
oriented, autonomous area of the field.  This derivation, Bourdieu writes, partly explains why 
literary critics  
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pass over in silence the question of the historical and social conditions of possibility of 
this experience; they exclude, in effect, the analysis of the conditions under which works 
considered as worthy of the aesthetic gaze were produced and constituted as such; and 
equally, they ignore the question of the conditions under which the aesthetic disposition 
they call for is produced … and continually reproduced in the course of time.  (Rules 
285-6, original emphasis)  
In essence, the literary field reproduced itself when it bifurcated into the field of academic 
literary criticism and scholarship.  Literary scholars and critics came to see themselves as 
autonomous within their own academic context, just as artists saw themselves as autonomous in 
their socio-economic context, by virtue of their participation in the production and reproduction 
of (knowledge about) pure, autonomous art.  And when enrollment increased in institutions of 
higher education at the end of the nineteenth-century and beginning of the twentieth-century, 
academic literary critics and scholars helped to disseminate the tastes of the falsely autonomous 
side of the field to their students.   
1.2 Aesthetics and the False Autonomy of English (Literary) Studies  
 
Even today, we witness the same problems of a false autonomy of the literary field and 
literary studies in the fields of English literature and English literary studies as they developed in 
the United Kingdom and in the United States.  We see it at work anytime English studies 
scholars refuse to answer calls for program assessment and then lament the riches of science 
departments.  But we also see it in the genealogy of these fields, which is homologous both in 
terms of history and structural development to that of the French literary field and the field of 
French literary studies.  These fields consist of the same types of important people (writers, 
professors, publishers, consumers of both mainstream and esoteric literary products, etc.), 
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products (genres, productions, specialized knowledge, profits, etc.), principles of power 
(heteronomous versus autonomous), principles of production (large-scale versus restricted), 
capital exchanged (primarily symbolic), and some of the same historical events (industrialized 
capitalism, empowerment of the bourgeoisie, etc.) that changed the fields of economics and 
power in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
Just as the prominence and privilege of autonomized aesthetics developed relatively 
recently in the history of the French literary field, the prominence and privilege of autonomized 
aesthetics in the English literary field and the dominance of literature in English higher education 
are relatively recent developments.  In the Anglo-American world, these developments derive 
from some of the same large-scale or global heteronomous structural transformations in the 
fields of economics, power, and class relations that Bourdieu claims are the primary causes of 
the transformations of the French cultural, aesthetic, and literary fields.  But the transformations 
in the Anglo-American literary field resulted in the rise of a specifically Romanticist, as opposed 
to bohemian, brand of pure aestheticism and literary privilege as it was popularized by the 
bourgeoisie, like the bohemians‘ pure aesthetic as it changed into the art-for-art‘s-sake 
movement.  In this section, I will trace these transformations in the Anglo-American literary and 
academic literary fields, focusing in particular on the influence that the falsely autonomous 
Romanticist conceptualization of literature has had on the self-defeating intellectual-disciplinary 
and institutional autonomy that English studies pursues even today. 
1.2.1 A Brief Genealogy of the Autonomization of English “Literature”  
 
The etymology of the word ―literature,‖ as insightfully explicated by Raymond Williams 
and corroborated by the OED, lays bare this shift toward aestheticization and autonomization of 





century as a word that denoted awareness or familiarization with ―polite or 
humane learning‖ and the books that contributed this variety of learning.  Williams remarks that 
―learning‖ of this sort in the Anglophone world before the Renaissance would have had to do 
with a proficiency in rhetoric and grammar, which located ―literature‖ within the provenance of 
rhetoric from its first use in English (47).  It took another four-hundred years – in 1779, 
according to the OED – before ―literature‖ would come to mean (the body of) esteemed writing, 
which Williams claims is a shift from defining the literary process to the product (47).  Tellingly, 
a note in the OED‘s entry for the third sense of ―literature‖ – the sense that denotes a more 
―restricted‖ body of written works ―which has claim to consideration on the grounds of beauty or 
form or emotional effect‖ – explains that ―This sense is of very recent origin in both Eng[lish] 
and Fr[ench].‖  Indeed, the origin of this denotation coincides with the moment in history – the 
mid- to late- nineteenth-century– at which the aesthetic and literary fields solidified their claims 
to autonomy and cleft the fields according to new principles of production; the duality within the 
fields necessitated a new ―literature‖ to set apart products of restricted access and products made 
for large-scale consumption.    
In Literary Theory, Eagleton‘s account of the historical influences that moved the Anglo-
American field of literature toward a pure aesthetics and false autonomy begins with 
Romanticism.  ―It was, in fact,‖ Eagleton writes, ―only with what we now call the ‗Romantic 
period‘ that our own definitions of literature began to develop.  The modern sense of the word 
‗literature‘ only really gets under way in the nineteenth century‖ (16).  Like the French 
bohemians, British and American Romanticists saw art and literature as a way to counter 
changes in the fields of economics and power, but whereas the bohemians saw art and literature 
as a vehicle through which they could achieve autonomy from any social system structured 
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heteronomously by economic and cultural capital, the Romanticists saw art and literature as a 
corrective for a system corrupted by the influences of industrialism, capitalism, and 
utilitarianism.  ―At the center of aesthetic theory at the turn of the eighteenth-century,‖ Eagleton 
observes, ―is the semi-mystical doctrine of the symbol.  For Romanticism, indeed, the symbol 
becomes the panacea for all problems‖ (19).  In their symbolic capacities, art and literature 
unified material experience and higher, purer spiritual truths and made them accessible to human 
beings who are trapped in a material world and searching (whether they know it or not) for a 
spiritual transformation.  Literature could be in the world and not of it, working to save the world 
from its own context.   
British Romanticists in particular, Eagleton suggests, thought of literature as imaginative 
rather than efficiently uniform, spontaneous rather than manufactured, transcendental or spiritual 
rather than material or empirical, and individual rather than mass-produced yet simultaneously 
universal rather than historical; imbued with these characteristics, literature possessed the 
capacity ―to transform society in the name of those energies and values which art embodies‖ (16-
7).  This estimation of literature is evident in William Blake‘s explanation of his blend of 
spirituality and art, in the first chapter of Jerusalem: ―I must Create a system or be enslaved by 
another Man‘s.‖  And Samuel Taylor Coleridge and William Wordsworth similarly used poetry – 
for them, an otherworldly medium – to express political reactions to the French Revolution.  But 
insofar as Romanticism understood art and literature as decontextualized and autonomous, 
Romanticism, like bohemianism, could not sustain a social and political agenda in perpetuity.  
Bourdieu‘s history of the bohemians and other consecrated members of the fields of aesthetics 
and literature who followed them reveals that it was never possible to extricate art, artists, or the 
rest of humanity from the allegedly corrupt condition of our material existence since both human 
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beings and the world we exist in are necessarily material.  There is no complete transcendence 
from heteronomy to a pure autonomy – every level of an aesthetic or literary experience is 
influenced by a matrix of fields at the moment of both its creation and consumption.   
Because all human activity is inherently heteronomous, it was foolhardy for both the 
Romanticists and the bohemians to undertake the futile task of escaping the forces that shaped 
them by merely trying to ignore those forces, as Coleridge‘s and Wordsworth‘s reactions to the 
materials condition of war should make clear.  In fact, part of the reason that Romanticism 
gained popularity in the nineteenth-century is that art and literature is a matrix of heteronomous 
forces from the fields of power, economics, and class relations.  In this matrix, art and literature 
―[became] a commodity like anything else, and the Romantic artist little more than a minor 
commodity producer; for all his rhetorical claim to be ‗representative‘ of humankind, to speak 
with the voice of the people and utter eternal verities, he existed more on the margins of a society 
which was not inclined to pay high wages to prophets‖ (Eagleton 18).  To preserve the ―absolute 
spiritual truth‖ of art from these corrupting influences, Romanticists were ―driven back into the 
solitariness of [their] own creative mind[s],‖ disclaiming their connection to their social or moral 
context, as the bohemians had similarly done (Eagleton 19).  Autonomy became the raison d’etre 
of the Romantic literary field from the late eighteenth through the early nineteenth-century: as 
Eagleton notes, the literary field at this moment thought that ―The whole point of ‗creative‘ 
writing was that it was gloriously useless, an ‗end in itself,‘ loftily removed from any sordid 
social purpose‖ (18).  Accordingly, any attempt at critical analysis of texts by those who lacked 
sufficient symbolic capital seemed ―almost as blasphemous as seeking to analyze the Holy 
Trinity‖ (Eagleton 19). 
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But during Victorianism, morality was returned to the Romanticists‘ variety of pure 
aesthetics.  Art and literature were thereby converted into a literally religious force.  Eagleton 
finds that literature filled the vacuum left by religion in the mid-nineteenth-century, both when 
science eroded the need for a supernatural explanation of the natural world and when changes in 
the economic order revealed that centuries-old structures of power, cultural tradition, and social 
mores weren‘t divinely set outside the range of humanity‘s influence.  ―This was particularly 
worrying for the Victorian ruling class,‖ Eagleton writes, ―because religion is for all kinds of 
reasons an extremely effective form of ideological control‖ (20).  Where religion failed to 
moralize, pacify, unify (particularly along national lines), and homogenize the masses, literature 
could succeed even more subtly than religion ever did.  Not coincidentally, then, the metaphor of 
literature-as-religion that Bourdieu uses to describe the faith in art and consecration of artists that 
characterized the French field of literature at the end of the nineteenth-century becomes quite 
literal in the Anglo-American field of literature.  Witness, for example, the complete conceptual 
conflation of religion and literature in the words of Matthew Arnold, who in his 1873 book 
Literature and Dogma writes, ―[I]n truth, the word ‗God‘ is used in most cases as by no means a 
term of science or exact knowledge, but a term of poetry and eloquence, a term thrown out, so to 
speak, at a not fully grasped object of the speaker's consciousness — a literary term, in short‖ 
(12 original emphasis). 
1.2.2 English in the Modern University 
 
It was not by coincidence that at the same time, institutions of higher education 
introduced the study of English into their curricula.  Whereas the monarchy in Britain and the 
aristocracy in both the United States and the United Kingdom used religion to impose a top-
down reinforcement of the socio-economic status quo, the study of English in colleges and 
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universities was intended as a concession to the changing socio-economic times.  Up to the 
Victorian period, students in Britain‘s and America‘s most prestigious institutions of higher 
learning studied Latin and Greek language and literature but not their vernacular English.  
English, as a ―modern‖ language, carried no high-cultural significance, no cultural capital won 
by the rigorous study allegedly required by the Classical languages.  Women constituted one new 
demographic for whom colleges introduced English courses.  This foray into English, however, 
wasn‘t always an exercise in equality.  Gerald Graff reports in Professing Literature that the new 
American ―women‘s colleges founded after the Civil War challenged the assumption that 
women‘s minds were incapable of rigorous intellectual tasks … [but the] more ornamental the 
conception of women a college entertained the more likely that that college featured modern 
languages and literatures‖ because ―the modern languages and literatures were considered mere 
social accomplishments [and] were looked upon as feminine preoccupations‖ (37-8).   
In addition to the women‘s colleges such as Vassar and Wellesley, new institutions of 
higher education emerged at the turn of the nineteenth-century to serve another new 
demographic – members of the expanding bourgeoisie.  As in France at roughly the same 
historical moment, the children of newly-affluent working-class families found themselves in a 
position to seek an education that would acculturate them to the standards of high culture 
previously set by the aristocracy – and consequently increase their cultural capital – at the same 
time that it prepared them for a trade-based profession and the opportunity to multiply their 
families‘ economic capital.  Students in these new colleges and universities – such as the Morrill 
Act land-grant universities in America, the British Mechanics‘ Institutes, and other British 
―nonsectarian and nonresidential institutions‖ including the Universities of Manchester, 
Liverpool, Leeds, and Newcastle in Britain (Ferreira-Buckley and Horner 195) – had no need for 
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Latin and Greek.  Instead, they studied rhetoric and composition in their vernacular English 
―since proficiency in writing English was now considered an indispensable component in 
education‖ and for economic and cultural success (Ferreira-Buckley and Horner 195). 
But the point worth iterating here is Raymond Williams‘s.  ―Literature,‖ in the sense of 
highly-valued art products, had no home in the earliest curricula of English higher education.  
Rather, an Education in English centered on matters of rhetoric and composition – proficiency in 
―literary‖ processes, both oral and written, following a Classical rhetorical pedagogy.  But as 
institutions of higher education abandoned the Classical languages in favor of the vernacular 
during the mid-nineteenth-century, the teaching of written literacy trumped oratorical literacy.  
The primary cause for this shift, Elizabethada A. Wright and S. Michael Halloran write, was the 
change in society‘s uses for education vis-à-vis the industrial, capitalistic economy (223).  What 
followed, Wright and Halloran observe, was ―a new emphasis, both in the colleges and in society 
at large, on belles letters – poetry, fiction, drama, essay – that had occupied a less prominent 
place in the older oratorical culture‖ (223).  In this context, as Robert Connors notes, writing 
proved more important than oratory, so students found themselves writing term papers and 
research papers instead of learning taxonomies of figures and strategies for delivering speeches 
(210-56).   
Rhetoric, however, did not occupy the seat of privilege in American higher education for 
long.  As enrollment increased in the late nineteenth-century, colleges used entrance exams to 
separate out unprepared students and to preserve the cultural and economic capital of those who 
were accustomed to possessing it.  James A. Berlin points to the establishment in 1874 of 
Harvard‘s entrance exam as ―the first step in replacing the classical languages and the curriculum 
based on them‖ as well as ―ensur[ing] that the new open university would not become too open‖ 
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(Rhetoric 23).  Similar entrance exams became more common among elite colleges and 
universities, and rhetoric and composition instruction became synonymous with remediation 
(Rhetoric 24; see also Soliday, The Politics of Remediation).  Not coincidentally, in 1876, Johns 
Hopkins appointed Harvard professor Francis James Child as its Boylston Professor of Rhetoric 
by promising him the opportunity to pursue his literary and philological studies, thereby securing 
their ―first specialist in literature who was without responsibility for teaching freshmen‖ 
(Rhetoric 23).  Rhetoric, as the province of either the mundane drudgery of teaching freshmen or 
the pointless endeavor of studying (and teaching) taxonomies of oratorical tropes, ―petrified in a 
positivistic‖ and utilitarian ―configuration while [the] poetic continued to develop and grow‖ 
(Rhetoric 25).    
Philology took a similar turn from significance in the university first, then English 
departments.  Graff, quoting Wilhelm Grimm, reports that in the German university system 
philology had come to mean ―not only linguistics but ‗the whole study of the history of 
cultures‘‖ (Professing 69).  But Anglo-American universities‘ shift from a German university 
model to a system of departments presented philology with what ultimately proved to be 
insurmountable problems.  To some, it seemed too general for the new university, belonging to 
no particular discipline or department and yet potentially belonging to all of them.  To English 
studies scholars in particular, philology‘s attention to grammar, composition, and context aligned 
it with rhetoric, and so ―philologists were suddenly being asked to shoulder general education 
responsibilities that to many of them, trained as professional research men, seemed no part of 
their proper business‖ (Professing 79).  At the end of the nineteenth-century, philology could 
often be found in its own department, institutionally autonomous from more aesthetically- and 
28 
 
spiritually-oriented literary studies where it could be left to more scientific textual analysis and 
research. 
1.2.3 The Creation of the Subfield of English Literary Studies 
 
For the same reasons and at the same time that rhetoric‘s power and prestige in the 
modern university waned and philology separated into its own departments in the university, 
literature came to prominence in English departments.  At first, English literature was a 
convenient version, as Eagleton asserts, of ―the poor man‘s Classics – a way of providing a 
cheapish ‗liberal‘ education for those beyond the charmed circles‖ of aristocratic education (23).  
But because literature had, by the end of the nineteenth-century, come to be synonymous with 
Romanticist notions of an autonomized aesthetic object, it proved to be a useful tool both for 
unifying the narrative of common person‘s experiences and giving them order in a world without 
religion and for certifying the workforce of the industrial-capitalist economic system.  It is 
significant that just as the French literary field split into subfields oriented toward heteronomous 
power and large-scale production and consumption of literature, on one hand, and toward falsely 
autonomous aesthetic-academic production and consumption of literature on the other, the 
English literary field also split such that a falsely autonomous subfield oriented toward pure 
aesthetics distinguished itself and came to prominence, and that its appearance in academia 
derived from this falsely autonomous aesthetically-oriented subfield. 
Naturally, the study of English literature wasn‘t immediately popular among all 
consecrated members of the English literary field or of the field of higher education.  It took 
World War I to validate the study of an English canon on the basis of patriotism and the need for 
a socially-unifying faith in something outside the realm of reality.  When ―Neither the Christian 
religion in any of its varieties, nor positive science, nor humane culture proved self-evidently 
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capable of making sense out of the entire range of knowledge and opinion,‖ literature seemed 
capable of straddling both the ―real‖ and the metaphysical, the human(e) and the spiritual and 
thus capable of making sense of an apparently senseless world (Veysey, qtd in Graff, Professing 
60).  The rise of the field of literary study was not only rapid but decisive.  ―In the early 1920s,‖ 
Eagleton explains, ―it was desperately unclear why English was worth studying at all; by the 
early 1930s it had become a question of why it was worthy wasting your time on anything else‖ 
(27).  While the search for spiritual or transcendent truths in literature undoubtedly had its roots 
in Romanticism, after the 1930s Romanticism had come to be synonymous with foolhardy 
optimism in the inherent goodness of humanity.  In this context, poets including T.S. Eliot and 
the Imagists presented a new aesthetics that dismissed the seemingly naïve or superstitious parts 
of Romanticism and valued literature that used concrete depictions of reality that would have 
primitive, psychological connections to the collective unconscious (Eagleton 35).  The 
fingerprint of Romanticism is still clear here in the subfield of English literary studies, despite 
the best efforts of Eliot and his cohort to distance this aesthetic, psychic transcendence from the 
religious, spiritual transcendence of the Romanticism of Wordsworth and Whitman. 
If Eliot and his cohort presented a post-World War I, post-Romantic aesthetics and 
concomitant adjustment to the literary status quo, the Leavises introduced a complementary 
method of study – ―practical criticism‖ – during the 1930s that restructured the intersection of 
the literary field and the field of higher education.  ―Practical criticism meant a method which 
spurned belle-lettristic waffle and was properly unafraid to take the text apart,‖ Eagleton finds 
(37).  In this respect, practical criticism preserved some of the empiricism and research 
credentials of that erstwhile discipline, philology, which by the 1930s ceased to exist qua 
philology, its practitioners having departed variously for the new social science disciplines of 
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anthropology and linguistics (Andresen 200).  However, practical criticism ―also assumed that 
you could judge literary ‗greatness‘ and ‗centrality‘ by bringing a focused attentiveness to bear 
on poems or pieces of prose isolated from their cultural and historical contexts‖ (Eagleton 37).  
Just as Eliot rejected the explicitly individualist strains of Romanticism while retaining its hope 
in a transcendent universal order (the ―Tradition,‖ to use Eliot‘s idiom), the advocates of 
practical criticism broke with the Romanticists‘ aversion to the blasphemy of careful textual 
analysis while maintaining a Romanticist faith in the mysterious unity of literary texts.  In fact, 
both practical criticism and its cousin, ―close reading,‖ underscored the Romanticized sense of 
literature‘s autonomy from its context in a matrix of overlapping fields and ―encouraged the 
illusion that any piece of language, ‗literary‘ or not, can be adequately studied or even 
understood in isolation.  It was,‖ Eagleton continues, ―the beginning of a ‗reification‘ of the 
literary work, the treatment of it as an object in itself‖ (38).   
Practical criticism was popularized in America in the form of New Criticism, in which 
aesthetics and literary critical and scholarly method are paradoxically conjoined: a literary text is 
at once ―functional‖ in that it ―‘correspond[s] in some sense to reality itself,‖ but the only way to 
understand that reality is to analyze the work in isolation, ignoring or dismissing its contextual 
relationship to the reality surrounding it (Eagleton 41).  Ironically, the New Critics were very 
much the products of their own historical and academic context: their promotion of ―literature‖ 
from a metaphysical phenomenon to an objective instantiation of ―reality‖ that must be studied 
(not just apprehended or appreciated) empirically on these grounds squares with the pragmatic, 
post-war climate of higher education in the first half of the twentieth-century.  The young French 
bohemians of the mid-nineteenth-century received a primarily humanistic education, having no 
desire to descend from their positions of inherited affluence into the trades.  But Americans who 
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entered college in the early twentieth-century enrolled with the expectation that their education 
would prepare them for both cultural and economic success.  Men returning from war went to 
college to secure jobs, and the women who had entered the workplace in their stead went to 
college to maintain the economic and cultural capital they‘d gained in the meantime.  For a 
while, New Criticism provided these groups of students with both science and faith – the 
existence of a systematically-discernible ―reality‖ in literary texts, and a belief in this 
characterization of literature that is untested, given that literature is external to any context and 
frame of understanding.   By the late 1950s in America, New Criticism had mostly run its course, 
but it had done its part to entrench a mysticized autonomy of both literature and literary study in 
a strange blend of Romanticism and scientific pragmatism.   
Northrop Frye‘s Anatomy of Criticism (1957), exemplifies the shifts in the field of 
literary studies subsequent to this disciplinary division.  The critical approach that Frye proposed 
was still a rather duplicitous mix of ―science‖ and Romanticist aesthetics: on the one hand, 
Frye‘s critical method consisted of a rigorously systematic approach to textual analysis that 
mirrored Classical rhetorical approaches, despite the fact that Frye distanced this method from 
the systems of psychoanalytic and Marxist criticism that he considered external impositions on 
the literary experience.  On the other hand, Frye preserved the mystery of the literary object by 
asserting that literature possesses an inherent quality that an external perspective such as 
Freudianism and Marxism can‘t account for.  And as Eagleton notes, Frye went a step further 
than ―New Criticism [which] finds in literature a substitute history [by insisting] that literature is 
an ‗autonomous verbal structure‘ quite cut off from any reference beyond itself,‖ transcending 
beyond any possible history (80).  While systematic, then, this approach clearly departs from the 
empiricist bent of New Criticism and embraces ―the liberal humanist tradition of Arnold, 
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desiring, as [Frye] says, ‗society as free, classless and urbane,‘‖ saved by its careful attention to 
the ―mighty mythological system‖ that held together the Tradition (Eagleton 81-2).   
Frye‘s systematized critical method presaged the turn in English literary studies to 
structuralism beginning in the late 1960s through the 1970s.  Structuralism provided literary 
scholars with a way to retain the pragmatic analysis of clearly defined systems while still 
implicating literature in specific systems using non-literary critical-analytic methods like 
psychoanalysis and Marxism, which Frye denounced for their remoteness to the literary object 
qua literature.  But finding and analyzing self-sustaining systems and structures became the 
raison d’être of this strain of literary study and, consequently, it often went too far in effacing 
the individual language user in a closed semiotic system.  Over time, literary scholarship 
entrenched itself in deeper and deeper areas of specialization such that a critic could analyze 
literature only in the framework of her chosen area of specialization (psychoanalysis, historical-
materialism, etc.) away from the influence and interests of outsiders to the academic literary 
field.  Ultimately, despite the fact that structuralism took the religiosity and mythology out of 
literature, it nevertheless allowed literature and literary studies a degree of mystification insofar 
as it situated both literature and the study of literature in homologously autonomous positions 
vis-à-vis other cultural phenomena and other fields of study. 
Post-structuralism and deconstructionism challenged the myth perpetuated in 
structuralism that literature and people operating within the fields of literature and literary 
studies could actually be autonomous or decontextualized.  To the contrary, as Derrida claimed, 
structures that are understood to exist in isolation from all other phenomena cannot but be 
understood in the same way that one understands the metaphysical – by a faith in that which 
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cannot be seen and may not actually exist.
9
  In fact, the task that the earliest post-structuralists in 
Europe set for themselves in the 1960s was to reveal the interrelatedness of all human knowledge 
and action and, consequently, that such activity is neither eternal nor universal but contextualized 
in a discernible genealogy of historical events.  Unfortunately, post-strucuralism in America 
came to be synonymous with a sort of epistemological atheism or agnosticism.  The Yale school 
of deconstruction, whose ranks included Paul de Man and J. Hillis Miller, took their post-
structuralist method beyond observing the constructed nature of ―reality,‖ exposing all 
constructions as being based in a never-ending string of self-referential, tautological, and 
meaningless signifiers.   
Back in Europe, cultural studies put post-structuralism to a higher purpose than nihilism.  
The British scholars Richard Hoggart, Stuart Hall, and Raymond Williams led the cultural 
studies movement from the mid-1960s, basing it in historical-materialist research of the 
interaction between economics, culture, and society; by the 1970s, the work of Antonio Gramsci 
and Michel Foucault expanded the scope of what cultural studies and various cultural theories 
could treat (Storey 3).  Cultural studies led to cultural theories that postulate systems in order to 
help us understand and explain human activity in its historical, social, and material contexts.  
Clearly, such attempts bear the marks of structuralism, but as Eagleton remarks, ―The task of 
cultural theory, broadly conceived, was to take apart the received wisdom of the traditional 
                                                 
9
 Among other places that Derrida makes this assertion, his essay ―White Mythology‖ makes this point using 
metaphor as its example.  The meaning of ―dead‖ metaphors – those that do not readily appear to be metaphors, like 
―table leg‖ or ―Let me be blunt‖ – appears to come from no context, to transcend all contexts.  The meaning and the 
metaphysics are based, then, in a ―white‖ or effaced context, a non-context.  Some forms of knowledge also appear 
to have no context, Derrida explains, as when ―white‖ and ―male‖ stand as the default categories of personhood in 
our culture.  Thus, Derrida claims, to believe that something that is a product of human action or thought is without 
grounding in some discernible context is to mythologize it, to think of it the same way one might think of God or 
heaven or angels.  
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humanities,‖ to build knowledge about why and how culture matters based on careful research 
instead of mere tradition (207).   
Despite arguments to the contrary, English studies today exists in this cultural studies 
context.  Our English departments are generally staffed with specialists in one or more varieties 
of cultural theories such as feminist theory, post-colonial theory, and eco-criticism, as well as an 
area of textual emphasis such as a literary movement or period.  English studies will not be post-
cultural until specializations in these areas of culture theory are no longer in fashion.  In fact, 
there‘s no reason to lament cultural studies proper: even Michael Berubé, who has been critical 
of cultural studies, says he ―still [has] hope that the history of cultural studies might matter to the 
university – and to the world beyond it,‖ despite what he finds to be its turn toward pop-culture 
critique (―What‘s the Matter‖).  It is an improvement over the agnosticism of Yale-brand 
deconstructionism and the various shortcomings of decontextualized and decontextualizing 
structuralism since it takes all cultural phenomena – aesthetic and scientific, interpretive and 
empirical – as the means to understanding the larger phenomena of ―culture‖ itself.   
1.2.4 Implications of Specialization and Autonomization for English Departments 
 
The academic genealogy of cultural studies is significant.  As a critical-analytic approach 
to scholarship, it inherited the university‘s structure and purpose – to draw from distinct bodies 
of knowledge that are only relatively autonomous from each other in order to refine a more 
general and generally-useful body of knowledge.  But the lesson of our cultural studies moment 
has been that it would be a mistake to assume that a discipline‘s intellectual and methodological 
framework – even in its ideal form –necessarily correlates harmoniously to its institutional 
embodiment.  After all, despite the fact that English departments largely operate according to the 
premises and objectives of cultural studies, we often operate institutionally according to the 
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premises and objectives of the Romanticist roots of literary studies, anachronistically vying for 
autonomy from institutions that wield influence on the academic and cultural fields in which our 
discipline resides.  Undoubtedly, some of the conclusions drawn in cultural studies research have 
impacted mass culture, but much of it remains esoteric to anyone uninitiated to the jargon of the 
given cultural theory.  Specialization itself, however, isn‘t necessarily the problem ; after all, 
specialization is the way that knowledge is refined in the university.  Specialization becomes 
problematic when it is equated with absolute autonomy.   
This, unfortunately, has been the tendency of English studies scholars.  Within the field 
of English studies, the dissonance between the intellectual disposition of any discipline and the 
discipline‘s institutional existence is evidenced in the inertia that pushes the subdisciplines of 
English – such as creative writing, rhetoric and composition, and literary studies – toward 
specialization.  Whereas professors of literature in the first English departments had quite general 
degrees, today‘s PhD in literature usually carries some form official-institutional or discipline-
recognized specialization in a time period, literary movement, area of literary theory, and area of 
cultural theory.  One need but look at the jobs advertised with the Modern Language Association 
to find proof of this sort of official sanctioning of (what can sometimes seem like an infinite 
regress of) specialization.   
Disciplinary specialization was, perhaps, inevitable given the history of English studies.  
It has been one of the means by which new and experienced scholars in the field could declare at 
least a relative degree of autonomy from other (sub)disciplines.  For example, in English studies, 
literary scholars do not possess the specialized knowledge of composition theory that their 
colleagues in rhetoric and composition do, and their right to comment on composition theory and 
its implementation in curricula is limited by that relative lack of expertise; similarly, the right of 
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rhetoric and composition scholars to an opinion regarding the research and teaching of literature 
is limited.  Disciplinary specialization also encourages scholars within the same subdiscipline to 
expand or deepen a specific body of knowledge: someone who studies nineteenth-century British 
literature might specialize in feminist theory while another scholar of nineteenth-century British 
literature specializes in psychoanalysis.  Both scholars will have overlapping disciplinary 
knowledge and interests but may have quite different institutional value or use depending on the 
popularity of or need for those particular bodies of knowledge at any given moment in any given 
institution.  
But the existence of subdisciplines and specializations presents problems for the 
institutional structure and functions of the field of English studies insofar as they become the 
positions in the field from which people struggle for control over the various forms of economic, 
cultural, and symbolic capital exchanged within English studies and from English studies to 
other fields.  Take, for another example, the differences among a Bachelor of Arts, a Master of 
Arts, and a Master of Fine Arts.  In the discipline of English studies, the most general degree is 
the BA.  Though some undergraduate programs allow students to pursue certificates of 
specialization in one of English studies‘ subdisciplines, specialization becomes more important 
at the master‘s level.  At that point, a distinction is made between creative writing and the other 
more research-oriented areas of the field, subdividing the field along the lines Bourdieu observed 
– the aesthetic/creative versus the academic/research.  Of course, this is not because research or 
academic work is inherently less ―creative.‖  It is because from the first instantiation of a 
specialized study of literature in higher education, during the height of Romanticist and Victorian 
notions of literature, ―literary‖ implied ―creative‖ or ―imaginative.‖  The study of English 
literature was at first heretical but with time became more practical, systematic, and therefore 
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mundane; the literary object and the creation of literary objects was always so different in kind 
as to warrant special distinction in the field‘s institutional structure.  When an English 
department that houses an MFA program as well as (at least) a more general BA and (probably) 
an MA in literature or (perhaps) rhetoric and composition or linguistics draws up its budget or 
decides how many graduate students in any of those subdisciplines to admit, it is forced to 
confront the fact that our sometimes quite oppositional disciplinary beliefs about our common 
subjects – language, discourse, literature – impact the choices we make about how to do business 
together within our institutional system.  
Put in Bourdieu‘s terms, the field of English studies is structured in part by a division 
between literature and non-literature studies that is homologous not only to the tension between 
English and other academic disciplines but also to the tension between the allegedly autonomous 
literary field and those fields from which it has historically declared its autonomy, the fields of 
economics and power.  The field of literature and literary studies has historically been seen and 
seen itself as struggling against more culturally and economically powerful fields and forces 
external to its own structure.  This is the root of the field‘s estrangement from the sciences and 
trades, which were more highly-valued by the bourgeoisie.  And yet, this proves to be a false 
autonomy as should be clear, given the presence of literary studies and creative writing in the 
institutions of higher education that trained new generations of the bourgeoisie for success in the 
economic marketplace.  The (academic) literary field has struggled against the economically-
motivated education system.  English departments still privilege (the study of) literary uses of 
English above non-literary uses of English while simultaneously asserting their value in a system 
of higher education that is monetarily and intellectually invested in the refinement of a universal, 
useful body of knowledge.   
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The privilege of literary studies is, in some respects, ironic.  The more culturally, 
economically, and symbolically powerful subdiscipline in English studies is literary studies, 
against which the non-literary subdisciplines vie for economic, cultural, and symbolic capital.  
Like the bohemians and the aesthetic and literary fields the bohemians reshaped, the non-literary 
subdisciplines see themselves as disempowered in a power structure that channels the inertia of 
power and other relationships in the field in literary studies‘ favor.  When these subdisciplines 
seek out autonomy, as the bohemians and the French fields of aesthetics and literature did, the 
larger field of English studies fractures into a seemingly infinite regress of further-autonomizing 
subdisciplinary specializations, expanding the disciplinary and institutional space between 
scholars in different areas of the field.  In such circumstances, traversing these divides requires 
large amounts of energy (consider how rare it is to see a conference at which linguists, rhetoric 
and compositionists, and literary scholars – let alone other hard and social sciences – are equally 
represented).  In general, these sorts of intradisciplinary divisions and fractures have the potential 
to make English departments appear internally disorganized, disparate, devoid of a clear purpose 
and maybe even openly contentious, which may also discourage other disciplines and 
institutional bodies from extending overtures for partnership and cooperation to English studies 
right now, when we need them most.
10
 
If literary studies recognizes and accepts this irony – if literature were no longer protected 
by an aura of history, myth, and other-worldliness, and if literary studies actually operated on 
premises of cultural studies by opening the field of English to a more general study of English 
language use in the service of understanding how and why human beings act in the world as we 
do – then the disciplines within English studies could work together more harmoniously to find a 
                                                 
10
 By ―partnership‖ I do not mean ―servitude.‖  A fuller explanation of this sort of ideal relationship must be delayed 
until chapter four.  
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common  and clearer purpose, object, and objective.  Such intradisciplinarity could also set an 
example for an attitude of interdisciplinarity and institutional cooperation in the humanities and 
across other disciplines in higher education.  To this end, I suggest a new transformation of the 
existing structure of power in English studies, a turn to a rhetoricized structure that can bridge 
the humanistic and scientific, the aesthetic and pragmatic, the institutional and disciplinary in 
ways that preserve their distinctions while promoting more productive collaborations both within 
and outside the university. 
1.3 Rhetoricality and the Rhetoricization of English Studies 
 
Given my calls for increased and improved intradisciplinarity, a call for a rhetoriczation 
may strike some readers as blatantly and needlessly partisan.  Why not call for a ―linguicization‖ 
or a ―literarization‖ of our field, or why use any seemingly partisan term at all?  ―Rhetoric,‖ 
admittedly, is a loaded word, and not just in an academic context.  For most of its early life in the 
ancient Western world, rhetoric enjoyed the value and prestige that comes with its usefulness in 
matters of lawmaking, governance, litigation, and generating public influence.  Aristotle 
described rhetoric as the art of knowing the available means of persuasion in any given situation.  
In this way, Aristotle differentiated rhetorical discourse from literary discourse.  Wilbur S. 
Howell clarifies the nature of this differentiation: Aristotle formulates rhetoric as non-mimetic 
discourse used in persuasion and literature as mimetic discourse whose objective is to be 
pleasing and achieve some literary effect (e.g., catharsis).  But as Howell argues, Aristotle did 
not intend to suggest that rhetoric and literature are mutually exclusive.  Howell points out that 
for Aristotle the use of a ―fable within an oration is of course a mimetic discourse within the 
context of nonmimetic verbal procedures, and it has to be considered, not as the independent 
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mimesis which it was designed to be, but as a mimesis controlled by nonmimetic influences‖ 
(60).   
For hundreds of years after Aristotle, however, rhetoric remained quite separate from 
what we might now call ―literary‖ discourse.  In the 1
st
 century BCE, Cicero issued treatises on 
the uses of rhetoric in law and the improvement of the individual and the state, and Quintillian 
taught that rhetoric is present in the effective use of speech by a moral and well-rounded man.  
One can see similarities between this rhetoric and the explicitly political strain of cultural studies 
of the 1960s and 1970s.  But rhetoric did not always enjoy such high esteem in Western thought.  
One of its first devaluations came from St. Augustine, once a teacher of rhetoric, who distrusted 
language‘s capacity to communicate truth and consequently considered rhetoric to be a 
corrupting influence on the transmission of meaning as God intended it.  During the medieval 
ages, rhetoric was synonymous with the taxonomization of figures and devices.  In the sixteenth 
century, Ramus continued in this trajectory, removing from rhetoric two of the five areas it 
governed over since the time of Aristotle – invention and arrangement – thus reducing rhetoric to 
matters of the style in which helpful details and evidence are delivered in a text.  The primary 
purpose of rhetoric, this implied, was to catalogue the possibilities of linguistic ornamentation.  
A brief revival of Classical rhetoric during the Renaissance returned some social, 
cultural, and intellectual value to rhetoric.  S. Michael Halloran explains that ―Renaissance 
figures such as Petrarch, Erasmus, and Francis Bacon virtually reincarnated the Classical ideal of 
a culture so publicly knowable that it could be embodied in a single man,‖ namely, the rhetor of 
Classical rhetorical fame (622).  But in short order, the Enlightenment put ―scientific reasoning‖ 
in the place of importance occupied by rhetoric in the Renaissance.  During the Enlightenment, a 
new rationale for degrading rhetoric emerged.  Whereas Augustine complained that rhetoric 
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distorted meaning as God intended for it to be communicated, Enlightenment theorists saw 
rhetoric as the unnecessary ornamentation or distortion of language through which reality would 
otherwise be directly and clearly transcribed.  Philosopher and minister George Campbell, for 
example, wrote in the late eighteenth-century that rhetoric and science both rely on logic, but 
whereas science is argument by conviction of unimpeachable reality, rhetoric is argument by 
persuasion that need not and sometimes cannot sustain a clear connection to the realm of the 
empirical.  The stylistic embellishments that are inevitable in rhetoric, Campbell forewarned, 
should be kept in check when discoursing on things empirical. 
In the context of the modern university, rhetoric found itself caught in an unfortunate 
paradox.  Rhetorical education was necessary for university curricula, both as a nod to the 
Classics and to train the newly-empowered bourgeoisie for the workforce.  The decline of 
rhetoric in higher education, both disciplinarily and institutionally, came when the bourgeoisie 
recognized the appeal of the Romanticist notion of autonomy and turned to literature for spiritual 
and social homogenization during the Victorian age.  Rhetoric‘s historical association with 
taxonomies, superficiality, constraining formalism, and pragmatism made it distasteful for 
literary scholars who subscribed to the aesthetics of Romanticism and who would come to 
positions of power within the field of English literary studies.  As Bourdieu‘s history of the 
French literary field predicts, it was at the same time – the late nineteenth-century – that the 
study of English solidified into a distinct institutional body in the university that it began to 
express the intellectual traits of the aesthetic area of the literary field, namely, a concern with 
creative, imaginative, non-pragmatic texts and the esoteric, unteachable techniques that produce 
them.  This is the disciplinary disposition that made it possible for the Boylston Chair of 
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Rhetoric to be occupied by a professor of literature who recused himself from any undergraduate 
composition teaching obligation. 
One might wonder why or how rhetoric has managed to survive as long as it has within 
the institutional and disciplinary fold of a literature-centered English studies.  Berlin reports that 
by 1920, the MLA had ―decided that its main interest was in scholarship and in scholarship only‖ 
(Rhetoric 32).  By renewing its own commitment to literature and literary research, the MLA 
saddled the rhetoricians in English departments with the stigma of cultural insignificance and the 
burden of educating those students who were deemed remedial by virtue of their performance on 
written entrance exams.  In English departments, ―rhetoric‖ and ―composition‖ seemed to be 
synonymous despite the fact that rhetoric already also existed in other disciplines and 
departments such as Classics or philosophy.  One reason that rhetoric survived in English 
departments in this diminished and disempowered capacity is that, compared to literary study 
and criticism, rhetoric seemed more appropriate to the task of training students in the quotidian, 
pragmatic communication skills that were necessary for success in the heteronomous world 
beyond the English department.  But once rhetoric was yoked to composition pedagogy, rhetoric 
proved to be a helpful foil for literary studies as a demonstration of ―the unique and privileged 
nature of poetic texts, it has been necessary to insist on a contrasting set of devalorized texts‖ 
(Berlin, Rhetoric 28); specifically, Susan Miller observes, it meant that ―literary authorship could 
be openly compared to the inadequacies of popular writing and especially to inadequate student 
authorship‖ (54-5).  Paradoxically, the criteria by which students were evaluated in entrance 
exams and in their freshman writing courses – usually by students‘ ability to adhere to grammar 
and style conventions – did not reflect the ostensibly more important criteria by which students 
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would be evaluated in the rest of their English coursework – insightfulness regarding literary 
criticism or research.   
The discrepancy in entrance-qualifying criteria and the criteria by which student success 
was assessed in English undergraduate curricula should not be shocking considering the ongoing 
changes in disciplinary and professional interests.  ―With the narrowing of faculty interests that 
accompanied the adoption of the research ideal [in the modern university]‖ in the 1930s and 
1940s, Crowley explains, ―it became increasingly difficult to find full-time faculty who were 
willing to teach general or introductory courses‖ (118).  It was, after all, that professors of 
English literature began to call for a disciplinary autonomy that reflected the autonomy of their 
subject, as maintained by New Criticism.  Graff, quoting John Crowe Ransom, remarks that 
when ―it was assumed that there were ‗aesthetic or characteristic values of literature‘ that could 
be isolated from other values, it had to follow … that an autonomous literature department was 
naturally more desirable than one which would see literature as inseparable from history, 
philosophy, psychology, and social thought‖ (Professing 148).  The English department, 
including rhetoric and composition, came to be this ―literature department.‖  But the convenient 
contradiction for contemporary English departments is that despite the power and privilege of 
literature, the first-year writing course is the bread and butter of the ―literature department.‖  
Because first-year writing courses have been required in universities to help students who are 
trying to get ahead in the undeniably heteronomous ―real‖ world
11
 as well as to police access to 
                                                 
11
 I think it is the difference between heteronomy and a false autonomy that our students (and even we) refer to when 
they speak of the non-academic ―real world.‖  Admittedly, the university is not a representative microcosm or 
example of any specific non-academic social group, and so it will always be different from the ―real world‖ that is 
its context.  But to say that a field is not a metaphoric microcosm of its social context is not to say that the field itself 
isn‘t heteronomous.  The university is influenced by power differentials having to do with money, politics, history, 
religion, culture, etc.  When students say that English or any other class won‘t matter for them in the ―real world,‖ 
perhaps they are doing nothing more than recognizing our self-imposed exclusivity. 
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economic and cultural capital, English departments have glutted themselves on the economic 
capital that a sizable captive audience of tuition-paying students guarantees.   
During the 1940s through the 1960s, the most pragmatic areas of English, including non-
literary composition and public speaking, demonstrated their power in the university by carving 
out space for distinct communications departments (Berlin, Rhetoric 92-119).  But this sort of 
autonomization was not enough to distinguish composition and writing literacy from literature 
either disciplinarily or institutionally.  ―[B]y 1950,‖ Crowley notes, ―American universities with 
graduate programs had begun to rely on graduate students to staff the required first-year 
composition course‖ (119).  Tenure-track faculty in English departments had come to expect not 
only that the lower-level classes would be taught by lower-level instructors but that their 
graduate and undergraduate student population would be maintained based on the requirement 
that undergraduates take a course that new classes of graduate students would be allowed to 
teach.  Universities then benefitted from cheap labor and, thanks to the inclusion of composition 
curricula within a literary department, the appearance of simultaneously improving both 
students‘ writing literacy and their cultural literacy. 
Given this inhospitable environment, it should come as no surprise that rhetoric and 
composition has sometimes sought its own disciplinary and institutional autonomy.  The 
National Council of Teachers of English was established in 1911, but it wasn‘t until 1947 and the 
establishment of the Conference on College Composition and Communication that scholars in 
the fields of composition and communication began to organize and professionalize.  Despite the 
unfortunate shift in labor practices that Crowley summarizes, the end of the 1950s saw a renewed 
respect for rhetoric in the university.  Berlin notes several of the causes of this renewal: the 
significance of the discipline‘s roots in Aristotelian humanism, the expansion of writing and 
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communication studies across the disciplines, and interest in media and international 
communications (115-37).  Since the 1960s, rhetoric and composition as a discipline – whether 
its scholars are found in English or Communication departments – have developed a nuanced and 
extensive body of knowledge about how and why people communicate in a variety of media but 
with a special focus on writing.  For nearly three decades, the primary concern of scholarship in 
rhetoric and composition has been the social, cultural, and ideological implications of 
compositional and rhetorical choices; more recently, the field has led the way in studying and 
theorizing new and digital media communication and its socio-rhetorical implications.   
Rhetoric and composition, then, is much more than the study and teaching of 
grammatical correctness or formulaic writing.  But it has been difficult for scholars in this field 
to gain the respect due to this discipline because of the historical prominence and privilege of 
literary studies that rhetoric and composition must struggle as long as it is institutionally housed 
in English departments.  Crowley clarifies this sentiment, remarking that 
Many who choose composition instruction as their life‘s work also do so in part because 
they desire to serve the university community by helping students to write better.  They 
find encouragement in the universal requirement in composition, which seems to imply 
that universities understand and support the importance of writing instruction.  Once they 
are embarked on this career, however, they discover that teachers of the universally 
recognized course are underpaid, overworked, and treated with disdain. (119-20) 
What‘s more, everyone involved in the system of higher education from education 
administration to students and taxpayers have been taught for over a century now that the 
objective of composition classes should be to teach students to perfect grammar and style rather 
than compositional and rhetorical flexibility.  No one seems to want to hear what compositionists 
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have to say about their subject; they just want to know why Johnny can‘t write and whose fault 
that is. 
This nineteenth-century model of composition also exists in our institutional structure to 
the extent that graduate students in literature and adjunct instructors who may or may not have 
any disciplinary interest in rhetoric composition are hired to teach courses for which rhetoric and 
composition scholars are better trained.  It exists by virtue of the fact that English departments 
are still ―literature departments,‖ at least in terms of the ratio of literature to rhetoric and 
composition or linguistics or creative writing or technical writing scholars are concerned.  It 
exists in curricular structures, as well, since composition classes are typically those through 
which students must pass before they can advance to upper-level literature classes, and since 
tenured and tenure-track faculty rarely teach introductory composition courses, even when their 
graduate classes don‘t fill and the burden goes to pools of adjunct employees with fewer or no 
benefits and no promise of long-term employment. 
Because rhetoric and composition scholars often find English departments to be 
inhospitable, and because they also have inherited a tendency toward autonomy from the history 
and structure of the academic field in which they exist, some rhetoric and composition scholars 
have executed various moves toward autonomizing themselves from literary studies.  In 1993, 
Gary Tate and Erika Lindemann debated in the pages of College English about whether literature 
has a place in the teaching of writing and rhetorical acuity.  Partly in response to those debates, 
Crowley suggests another way to remove the discipline‘s yoke of indentured service to literature-
heavy English departments: abolish the first-year composition requirement (19-29, 250-65).  
Many rhetoric and composition programs – including those at the University of Colorado-
Boulder, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Washington State University,  Syracuse 
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University, and the University of Texas-Austin, just to name a few – have separated from 
English into their own departments.  With this sort of autonomy comes the opportunity to expand 
the discipline into subdisciplines, and depending on whether a rhetoric and composition scholar‘s 
work lies more in the development of theory as opposed to the application of theory to teaching 
or to writing-in-context, individual scholars may declare themselves more rhetorically-oriented 
or more composition-oriented (Horner and Lu 293-308).  Not surprisingly, as this move toward 
autonomy develops with time, research in rhetoric and composition scholarship within the past 
decade ―addresses the possible fissuring of the relationship between rhetoric and composition 
explicitly‖ (Horner and Lu 295). 
Of course, such moves toward autonomy recall the words of Ransom: ―Strategy requires 
now, I should think, that criticism receive its own charter of rights and function independently‖ 
(qtd. in Graff, Professing 148).  It seems that rhetoric and composition is doomed to repeat the 
disciplinary and institutional strategy of literary studies – of seeing opportunities to assert 
independence when cooperation may be more beneficial for clarifying and justifying the study of 
―English‖ in any form.   
1.4 A Return to Rhetoric via Rhetoricality 
 
I diverge into the history of this contention between rhetoric, rhetoric and composition, 
and literary studies in English departments to highlight the disciplinary and institutional troubles 
wrought of the field‘s bent toward a false autonomy that was appropriated from the aesthetics 
developed by Romanticists and sanctioned by the bourgeoisie via higher education curricula.  
But this history should also indicate that ―rhetoric‖ belongs to a variety of historical moments, 
fields, disciplines, and institutions.  A call for a return to ―rhetoric‖ would be nearly nonsensical 
by itself; it would at least require a clarification about which ―rhetoric.‖  And yet, that call for a 
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return to rhetoric in English studies long predates my present work, and it has come from all 
areas of the field of English studies.  At the end of Literary Theory, Eagleton cites rhetoric as 
―probably the oldest form of ‗literary criticism‘‖ (179) and argues that the best way to secure a 
spot for the study of literature in a system of higher education that is increasingly hostile to the 
humanities is to refashion literary departments into rhetorical literature departments that focus 
not on literature but on ―education in the various theories and methods of cultural analysis‖ 
(186).   
Similarly, the cognitive linguist Mark Turner asserts in his book Reading Minds that a 
modern cognitive rhetoric that isn‘t concerned with taxonomies as much as with the study of 
human communicative activity can be helpful for explaining literary texts on three levels: of 
―local phrasing,‖ such as with isolated metaphors; of an entire literary work (or, one imagines, a 
set of works); and of our very concept of literature by demystifying literature and 
conceptualizing it not as a metaphysical or spiritual entity but as a ―conversation‖ or some other 
sort of interpersonal communication.  Eagleton echoes Turner‘s appeal for a reconceptualization 
of the literary object: ―The present crisis in the field of literary studies is at root a crisis in the 
definition of the subject itself‖ (186).   
And from rhetoric and composition, Berlin argues for a redefinition of and return to 
rhetoric in the ―postmodern‖ university.  ―The work of English studies‖ specifically, Berlin 
writes, ―is to examine the discursive practices involved in generating both‖ literary and more 
seemingly pragmatic or practical discourse (Rhetorics 94).  Following the interdisciplinary 
model of cultural studies, English classes should, Berlin asserts, ―provide methods for revealing 
the semiotic codes enacted in the production and interpretation of texts, codes that cut across the 
aesthetic, the economic and the political, and the philosophical and scientific, enabling students 
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to engage critically in the variety of reading and writing practices required of them‖ in a 
heteronomous world (Rhetorics 94-5). 
Against the false autonomy propagated by the fields of aesthetics and literature and 
against the mischaracterization of rhetoric, the call issued by John Bender and David E. Wellbery 
for ―rhetoricality‖ resonates with the appeals issued by Eagleton, Turner, and Berlin for a more 
productive, rhetorical approach to the business of English departments.  Rhetoricality can be 
thought of as ―the fundamental category of every inquiry that seeks to describe the nature of 
discursive action and exchange‖ (26).  The moment for the turn to rhetoricality is now, Bender 
and Wellbery claim, since  
modernist cultural tendencies have created, then, the conditions for a renaissance of 
rhetoric, which today is asserting itself in all fields of intellectual endeavor and cultural 
production.  But the new rhetoric is no longer that of the Classical tradition; it is attuned 
to the specific structures of modernist culture; its fundamental categories are markedly 
new.  Rhetoric today is neither a unified doctrine nor a coherent set of discursive 
practices.  Rather, it is a transdisciplinary field of practice and intellectual concern, a field 
that draws on conceptual resources of a radically heterogeneous nature and does not 
assume the stable shape of a system or method of education.  The rhetoric that … 
increasingly asserts itself, shares with its classical predecessor little more than a name.  
(25) 
This rhetorical inquiry rejects the Romanticist faith in the possibility of autonomous or 
decontextualized subjectivity and the connection to the decontextualized ―literary‖ object that is 
typically associated with it.  Rhetoricality also rejects the Enlightenment faith in the possibility 
of scientific objectivity.  As a critical-analytic scholarly approach, rhetoricality also critiques the 
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liberal notion that people are capable of self-effacement in civic contexts, acknowledges the 
polyglottal nature of human communication, and recognizes the importance of print and non-
print communication in the construction of reality and human activity (22-5).   
Much of these dispositions toward knowledge, Bender and Wellbery claim, already exist 
in the disciplines of ―modern knowledge itself‖ – the sciences, modern linguistics, 
psychoanalysis, mass communication, pragmatics, and philosophy
12
 and literary criticism
13
 (35-
9).  Even New Criticism ―may be considered, for example, as a nostalgic attempt to fuse the 
organicist presumptions of Romantic aesthetics with the formal, figural analysis characteristic of 
classical rhetoric,‖ which was more amenable to the pragmatics of the early twentieth-century 
Anglo-American world (35).  But rhetoricality differs from a ―rhetorical‖ analysis that reduces 
rhetoric to a matter of figures and tropes.  As a critical-analytic mode of rhetorical analysis, it is 
more accurately described as a disposition whose fundamental premise is that language and its 
various uses are significant for more than their own sake.  From the position of rhetoricality, ―the 
difference between the contained, localized irony of the new critic and the deep-structural irony 
of Derrida or de Man, irony is no longer a figure of speech of an educated habit of mind; it is the 
fundamental condition of language production‖ (36).  Like irony, literature is no longer thought 
to be autonomous or mysterious:  
Poetry is no longer a privileged kind of discourse but a specific case illustrating the 
general instance of language itself.  In the structuralist – and now poststructuralist – 
frame of reference, every human endeavor, including fundamental social and cultural 
institutions, must be understood as discursively constituted and therefore subject to the 
foundational irony disclosed by analyses such as Derrida‘s. (36) 
                                                 
12
 See Bender and Wellbery 27-35. 
13
 See Bender and Wellbery 35-9. 
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It follows that since ―literature‖ is not fundamentally different from any other cultural 
phenomenon in this rhetoricality – due no more disciplinary power than any other humanistic 
discipline – it must be recognized as subordinate to and therefore heteronomously structured 
inside the study of language writ large. 
A full rhetoricization of English studies would involve four steps.  First, English studies 
must expand its interdisciplinarity by seeking scholarly partnership with the sciences, social 
sciences, and other humanities disciplines as well as among the subdisciplines within English 
studies.  Interdisciplinarity does not require that the disciplines within and external to English 
studies abandon their specialized objects, areas, and methods of study
14
, but it does require that 
they see those specializations not as autonomous but as important only in a larger context of 
creating knowledge about human beings and their experiences of the world around them.  A 
rhetoricization of the study of English requires that scholars of English see the structure of their 
studies as essentially recursive, ―as a strategy of argument and inquiry‖ (37), which applies to a 
wider variety of texts and occasions than just what may be considered ―literary‖ in the narrow 
sense of texts set apart from other texts or from their own contexts on the basis of aesthetic 
privilege.  Finally, a rhetoricized English studies recognizes that humans construct and are 
themselves constructed using symbols that imperfectly and recursively reflect and influence 
―reality‖ as they experience it.   
None of these four principles are new ideas in English studies.  They are, however, more 
difficult to find in practice, particularly in terms of the institutional and disciplinary relationships 
between literary studies and linguistics and rhetoric and composition.  It is true that not all 
                                                 
14
 That is, interdisciplinarity doesn‘t mean that all disciplines have equal right to direct another discipline‘s priorities 
in teaching and research, though it does mean that all disciplines should have some interest in the knowledge created 
and refined in other disciplines.  And it doesn‘t mean that all disciplines are equally relevant for each other in every 
conceivable respect.   
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literary scholars see themselves as more important or valuable than their colleagues in other 
subdisciplines of English, and it is true that not every institution of higher education sees 
literature as more important or valuable than is warranted, but the following examples make 
clear that English studies has not yet lived up to its potential and that a rhetoricization of the field 
can liberate the field from the constraints of its own history. 
Part 2: Case Studies in Field Troubles 
 
1.5 The Spellings Report and the MLA’s Retort 
 
In September of 2006, the Commission on the Future of Higher Education released its 
report, formally titled ―A Test of Leadership: Charting the Future of U.S. Higher Education‖ but 
more commonly known as the Spellings Report.  The report infamously gave only passing 
attention to the humanities‘ capacity to improve higher education in the areas of access, 
affordability, quality of instruction, and accountability to the sources of funding for higher 
education, particularly ―students, tax payers, and donors‖ (xi).  Improvements in these areas, the 
report stated, will prepare us for ―tomorrow‘s world [in which] a nation‘s wealth will derive from 
its capacity to educate, attract, and retain citizens who are able to work smarter and learn faster – 
making educational achievement ever more important both for individuals and for society writ 
large‖ (xii).   
Of the humanities scholars in American institutions of higher education who even read 
the Spellings Report, many no doubt bristled at the report‘s characterization of the purpose of 
(improvements to) higher education in such pragmatic and capitalistic terms.  But what was 
perhaps more disturbing, at least to scholars in the discipline of literary studies, was that the 
government had ignored them.  This was a sort of de facto admission of the autonomy of literary 
studies, but one that appeared to be a Pyhrric victory for literary studies.  Even from the earliest 
53 
 
moments of the Renaissance, artists and their patrons (or perhaps to their patrons) plead the case 
for recognizing the importance of the arts for individuals and society: Sir Philip Sidney argued in 
his 1595 Apology for Poetry that the study of literature is valuable because literature combines 
aesthetic pleasure with history and ethics, which for Sidney proved that literature is the best 
source of all humanistic study and enlightenment.  The MLA‘s rationale for the study of 
language and literature, as expressed in a 2008 white paper released with the Teagle Foundation, 
also argues that literary study is an invaluable way to equip students with historical, cross-
cultural, information, and technology skills, including the ability ―to apply moral reasoning to 
ethical problems‖ (3).  The only difference between Sidney‘s justification and the justification 
expressed in the MLA‘s white paper is the pleasure one gets from reading literature, which is 
absent from the white paper. 
But perhaps it is the MLA‘s 2006 reaction to the Spellings Report that indicates the 
struggle of English departments to clearly articulate our value in academia.  ―In principle,‖ the 
MLA‘s official statement reads, ―it is hard to disagree with the argument that colleges should be 
held publicly accountable for the quality of education they provide and that careful assessment of 
what our students learn is a reasonable means of demonstrating such accountability.‖  But, as 
then-vice president of MLA Gerald Graff later remarked, many in both the MLA and English 
departments in general remarked that assessment of any sort would impinge on the rights of 
English departments to set their own standards and objectives (Jaschik).  Neither the official 
reaction to the Spellings Report nor the later white paper articulate specific plans for assessing 
English studies degree programs, the quality of instruction, or program accountability to students 
and various other funding sources.  In fact, the white paper never even uses the word 
―assessment,‖ though it is one of the key terms of the Report‘s plan.  Such attempts to dismiss 
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the requests and interests of the students, taxpayers, and policymakers regarding English studies 
are often presented by English studies scholars as genuine attempts to respond to or ―enter into 
dialogue with‖ those parties.  But clearly, no détente is possible when the conditions of talks – 
such as the need for assessment – aren‘t recognized by both parties.   
Furthermore, we cannot forget that the MLA does not speak for all of the subdisciplines 
within English studies.  Literary studies, rhetoric and composition studies, linguistics, creative 
writing, technical writing, and various other disciplines that are sometimes housed in English 
departments vie for the same symbolic and cultural capital that can buy them the funding and 
prestige that guarantees their survival.  This struggle often leads each respective subdiscipline to 
separate itself further and further from the others.  This is part of the reason that the documents 
released by the MLA in response to the Spellings Report do not use the words ―rhetoric,‖ 
―linguistics,‖ or ―creative writing.‖  By omitting these subdisciplines from a plea for relevance, 
the MLA‘s statements reflect English departments‘ ongoing struggle for intradisciplinary and 
intradepartmental autonomy.    
Furthermore, neither the Conference on College Communication and Composition, which 
represents rhetoric and composition studies, nor its parent organization, the National Council of 
Teachers of English, issued official reactions to the Spellings Report, though many of their 
official statements already addressed some of the report‘s concerns.  The Linguistic Society of 
America and the American Association for Applied Linguistics also either held their peace or 
ignored the Spellings report.  Because the MLA enjoys considerably more symbolic capital than 
the professional organizations that represent other English studies disciplines, these are separate 
and unequal responses that perpetuate a struggle for an autonomy within and outside of English 
departments that is based on a privileging of literature that English studies scholars allegedly 
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rejected over forty years ago.  And yet, since post-structuralism and cultural studies demystified 
the literary object and validated the expansion of what could be considered appropriate subjects 
of inquiry in the field of English, very little about the institutional, professional structure of the 
study of literature, rhetoric and composition, and English as a language has changed.  Perhaps 
the most significant change is that English studies professes an awareness of the heteronomy of 
the cultural and aesthetic artifacts that it studies but fears admitting the extent of its own 
disciplinary and institutional heteronomy lest it cede any of the cultural, symbolic, or economic 
power that it now enjoys. 
1.6 Residual Autonomy in the Disciplinary Rejection of Cultural Studies 
 
Unfortunately, embracing the full extent of the disciplinary and institutional heteronomy 
of all the scholarship currently housed in English departments is precisely what English studies 
must do to retain those forms of capital.  Or, rather, in order for the subdisciplines of English 
studies (and, indeed, all humanistic scholarship) to actually produce worthwhile knowledge 
about why and how human beings do what we do, they must recognize and work the full extent 
of their disciplinary and institutional heteronomy.  The methods and premises of what Bender 
and Wellbery call ―modernism‖ and that characterize the best parts of post-structuralism and 
cultural studies often required that academics reflexively examine their own positionality as 
creators and communicators of simultaneously universal (by virtue of its context and use in the 
university and the world external to the university) and specific (as in specialized) knowledge.  
Perhaps this is why the easy dismissal of cultural studies seems so unfortunate: what has been 
and could be our most productive epistemological framework in academia has of late fallen out 
of fashion even with some literary scholars. 
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One need not look long or hard to find some English studies scholar ringing cultural 
studies‘ death knell.  In lieu of a larger study of publications in the past decade, I will here 
examine one such recent intonation of the departure of cultural studies from English departments 
that comes from the MLA‘s own scholarly journal about the work of English studies scholarship, 
Profession.  William B. Warner and Clifford Siskin write in the 2008 issue that what English 
studies ought to be doing now is ―Stopping Cultural Studies.‖  Rather facetiously, they 
summarize cultural studies‘ purposes as ―Theorize!,‖ ―Politicize Knowledge Work!,‖ 
―Historicize!,‖ and ―Go Beyond the Literary!‖ (95-8).  Among the criticisms levied by Warner 
and Siskin are the use of cultural studies in the new historicism (in the fashion of Frederic 
Jameson
15
) as a way to justify literary criticism as ―political allegory‖ or as history itself (98).  
The authors also note that cultural studies has failed in its original mission, as dictated by its 
English progenitors, to instigate political activism and change since an explicitly political agenda 
would endanger the reliability of research conclusions.  And cultural studies also fails in its 
political aspirations because it is often simply a fashionable way for English studies scholars, as 
historian Dena Goodman says, ―to seize the political high ground and assert your [English 
studies scholars‘] priority in defining ethical values‖ (qtd. in Warner and Siskin 101).  The result, 
Warner and Siskin suggest, is a cultural studies that generates cultural theory for theory‘s sake 
rather than any actual ―emancipatory politics‖ (101). 
But ultimately, "culture is the problem with cultural studies‖ for Warner and Siskin (104).  
They note that the term ―culture‖ is by turns quite general – denoting the organic process by 
which social action forms and changes society – and relatively more specific – denoting ―in 
                                                 
15
 Warner and Siskin claim that Jameson‘s use of history as ―the ultimate ground and untranscendable limit of our 
understanding in general‖ made ―textual interpretations in particular‖ (qtd. in Warner and Siskin 97) as well as 
literary criticism significant only insofar as it was simultaneously the practice of history.   
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[Raymond] Williams‘s words, ‗the works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic 
activity‖ (102).  To Warner and Siskin, the first sense of ―culture‖ is ―indifferent‖ in that it 
―applies to all literatures and societies equally‖ (102).  This sense orients English studies toward 
interdisciplinary contributions to a generalized body of knowledge.  The second sense, however, 
encourages our conceptualization of cultures within cultures, and it pushes scholars toward 
increasingly specialized research in whatever increasingly specific culture they elect to study.  
―To do cultural studies,‖ Warner and Siskin write, ―you have to walk the line‖ between the 
general and the specialized (103).   
While this should be the sort of balance that any discipline in a university or college 
system of knowledge creation and distribution cannot avoid and ought to embrace, it poses a 
problem for Warner and Siskin.  In order ―to do what cultural studies is supposed to do‖ for 
English studies scholars, which is ―change literary studies‖ (104), English departments must, the 
authors write later, ―stop cultural studies [and] reclaim what made our enterprise valuable in the 
first place‖ (106).  English studies scholars are to be in ―the business of mediating society‘s 
relation to the dominant technologies for reading and writing‖ (105).  That is, we are to be 
specialists of the ―relation‖ between ―literature‖ (rather than ―Literature,‖ they explain) and 
―society,‖ but we are to do this without the cultural theories or approaches that cultural studies 
makes available.  And whereas in a cultural studies approach to knowledge about society as well 
as the institutionalized ways that such knowledge is created and used – an approach in which 
English departments would be one of many specialized subdisciplines or subinstitutions working 
together to form knowledge that is generally useful outside the narrowed ―business‖ of any one 
discipline – a non-cultural-studies approach, for Warner and Siskin, implies disciplinary 
specialization contra generalization. 
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On many counts, this is a muddled (at best) rationale for English studies‘ departure from 
a cultural studies approach.  It may be true that some scholarship at least appears to have no 
greater purpose than to generate theory for theory‘s sake, but jettisoning ―theory‖ from literary 
studies specifically or English studies more generally is akin to throwing the baby out with the 
bathwater.  Theory is present in academic work whether we want it or not.  As Eagleton notes, 
―Hostility to theory usually means an opposition to other people‘s theories and an oblivion of 
one‘s own‖ (xii).  Perhaps theory, like faith, is known by its actions, and action – specifically the 
―chang[ing of] literature‖ – is what Warner and Siskin ask for.  But without some guiding 
principles by which one understands such phenomena as ―literature,‖ ―change,‖ and ―theory,‖ as 
well as why changes to ―literature‖ are desirable objectives over changes to other social or 
cultural phenomena, how can Warner and Siskin claim to posses the understanding requisite for 
making any assertions about them?   
Furthermore, it may also be true that an explicitly political agenda in cultural studies 
research complicates both the purposes and the results of academic research, but it is also true, as 
Warner and Siskin summarize, that cultural studies – in literary studies, no less – has provided 
many progressive, democratic changes to society, not just literature.  These include the 
deconstruction of the canon and the inclusion of women and people of color and colonized 
nations into both the literary canon and the (academic) literary professions.  And while we 
certainly can think of such revolutions as ―social‖ rather than ―cultural,‖ to substitute one for the 
other, as the authors do in addressing what they find to be the calling of English studies, does not 
account for the differences between the two terms.  Indeed, ―culture‖ is a term made vague by 
common and imprecise use, but so is ―society.‖  The solution is not to play a shell game with the 
meaning implied by these terms, nor is it to construct universal, rigid definitions for them.  The 
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solution is to be reasonable and clear when using these words, particularly when splitting hairs 
with them. 
Most irksome to me as a rhetoric and composition scholar is the equation throughout the 
article of English studies and English departments with literary studies.  The authors find the 
study of ―culture‖ as insufficient for getting English studies to its goal of ―mediating society‘s 
relation to the dominant technologies for reading and writing‖; they prefer that the study of 
―‘literature‘ in its earlier comprehensive sense‖ be sufficient for itself in meeting these goals 
(105).  But even the use of the word ―literature,‖ no matter its ―true scope‖ (105), recalls 
Goodman‘s earlier rejoinder to scholars in English: whatever we study at any moment is 
rightfully in the purview of the ―literary‖ according to one definition or another which we can 
invoke whenever necessary.  This redefinition of literature is more akin to an act of 
(re)colonization than to an assessment of reality. ―Literature‖ as the word is commonly used 
today is not synonymous with the ―literature‖ denoted by the first uses of this word, especially 
not in the context of higher education and English departments, and to pretend that it can be so 
easily (re)invoked is to reestablish the domination of literary studies in English departments.  
Perhaps it goes without saying that, like the MLA‘s ―Comment‖ on the Spellings Report and 
white paper, Warner and Siskin‘s article never mentions rhetoric and/or composition, and unlike 
the MLA‘s documents, linguistics is also absent from this article.  These omissions provide an 
object lesson regarding the importance of inter- and intradicsiplinarity in literary studies. 
1.7 Rhetoricality, a New Resolution 
 
But intradisciplinarity, interdisciplinarity, and institutional cooperation are exactly what 
English studies needs to be relevant.  Understanding the historical causes of a false autonomy 
and the structural proclivity in the fields of English literature and literary studies toward it is a 
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necessary first step.  After that, we must develop ways to remedy the effects of that false 
autonomization of English studies.  In the next chapter, I suggest a new conceptualization of 
literature as a metaphor as a way to rhetoricize English studies.  This new understanding brings 
together the aesthetic, the rhetorical, and the scientific in English studies, and it requires that we 
do away with ―the invidious valorization of the literary … and the dismissal of the rhetorical‖ 
(Berlin, Rhetorics 94) and the institutional structures that perpetuate it, as difficult and painful as 
that will be. 
Chapter 2 – The Metaphor of Literature (or Literature as a Metaphoric Process) 
 
The distinction between proper and figurative meaning applied to individual words is an 
obsolete semantic notion that does not have to be tacked onto metaphysics to be taken to pieces.  
An improved semantics is sufficient to unseat it as a “determinative” conception of metaphor.  
As for its use in the analysis of poetry or of works of art, it [the understanding of metaphor as 
metaphysical] is less a matter of metaphorical expression itself than of a very particular style of 
interpretation, an allegorizing interpretation that does go hand in hand with the “metaphysical” 
distinction between the sensible and the non-sensible. 
Paul Ricoeur, Rule of Metaphor 
 
Heil dem Geist, der uns verbinden mag; denn wir leben wahrhaft in Figuren. 
Hail to the Spirit who joins us, for through him arise the symbols where we truly live. 
Ranier Maria Rilke, “Heil Dem Geist, Der Uns 
Verbinden Mag‖ 
 
In my most recent sections of the Introduction to Poetry course I teach, I have assigned 
students to keep a reading journal in which they write reactions to and analyses of each poem we 
read for class.  The analyses should be in terms of a particular rhetorical or aesthetic theory such 
as genre theory or implied authorship, but the reactions are the students‘ space to consider other 
ideas without a focused analysis.  Often, these reactions sound much like those of one of my 
students, Aubrey, who writes about one poem, ―I really like this poem because I can relate to it.  
I personally haven‘t experienced the death of a child, but I know what losing a loved one is like.  
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I was devastated when my grandfather died last year, and the speaker of the poem seems to be 
feeling what I was feeling.‖   
Aubrey provides me with an example of something about which I have heard many 
college-level teachers of literature either lament or laud, namely that the first and perhaps only 
reaction their students seem able to muster is whether the literary text before them is something 
they can relate to.  For some teachers of literature, the relatability reaction indicates little more 
than laziness in their students‘ study of the arts or their disaffection with more than ―purely 
mercantile‖ objectives, to use Bourdieu‘s phrase (Rules 114), for their education.  For other 
teachers, the relatability reaction is a useful way to help students connect personally to the arts 
and, perhaps, to overcome students‘ inadequate esteem for the arts.  Other teachers may think of 
a relatability reaction as a natural part of the unique metaphysical experience of literature, at least 
for those who are somehow endowed with the capacity to appreciate literature.  Teachers of 
literature whose ideological dispositions align with a cultural studies approach to the arts may be 
more likely to lament the relatability reaction on the basis that the objective of literary study 
should be to move beyond immediate personal reactions into a study of the text‘s historical and 
socio-cultural significance.  Teachers who, on the other hand, possess a Romanticist attitude 
toward literary study may find the relatability reaction to be inherently beneficial, an appropriate 
end in itself rather than a (possible) first step toward a more purposeful analysis. 
It is also possible that such responses to students‘ relatability reactions are based in 
dichotomized definitions of literature as either an object or a process.  Those who define 
literature ontologically, separating the literary from the non-literary according to what they claim 
are the observable features common to all literature, have used those definitions of literature to 
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declare that literature exists regardless of the function(s) or use(s) of literature.
16
  On the other 
hand, those who define literature as a process claim that literature is not a thing or any 
combination of observable qualities such as the formal elements that are commonly associated 
with the ―literary‖ like plot or elevated diction.  Or, if those who define literature as a process 
would grant that literature is some ontologically-observable object, they would maintain that 
literature is nevertheless whatever the culture accepts as ―literature‖ in any given moment and 
context.  At first, these process definitions of literature may seem to be a sort of agnosticism, but 
ultimately they acknowledge that the definitions that distinguish literary objects from non-
literary objects change from moment to moment and situation to situation, which ontological 
definitions leave only implied.  This makes the more important question not ―What is literature?‖ 
but ―How and why is this particular thing literature?‖  Still, those who subscribe to these 
definitions cannot deny that there are objects that we call ―literature,‖ and that the process by 
which even unstable standards for distinguishing ―literary‖ texts from non-literary texts may 
have created or influenced discernible, observable textual patterns that are more common to 
literary texts than others. 
In fact, my student Aubrey‘s reaction indicates that literature is best defined as both a 
socio-cultural, individual, and cognitive process of identifying and comprehending literature as 
well as the objects that trigger that process of identification and comprehension.  That is, Aubrey 
has learned that the appropriate reaction to what she perceives to be literature is to weigh 
whether and how she can relate to what the text suggests about the experience of life.  This is 
necessarily a learned behavior since no one is born with an instinctual ability to identify 
literature, let alone a Westernized, Anglo-American version of ―literature‖ that conditions us to 
                                                 
16
 For more on the history of defining literature as an object or a process, see the brief genealogy of ―literature‖ in 
the previous chapter, section 1.2.1. 
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expect that literature should have some personal effect on individual readers.  More specifically, 
the process of identifying, interpreting, and identifying literature that Aubrey has learned is the 
cognitive, socio-cultural process of metaphor.  That is, in our culture, we have learned to 
recognize and respond to literature as a metaphor because we have come to expect that 
―literature‖ consists of those texts that metaphorize our experiences with the experiences 
depicted in the text.  These experiences amalgamate to a relatively stable concept: LIFE as it is 
and can be lived.   
By ―metaphor,‖ I do not mean a figure of speech or an ornamental literary device.  
Rather, ―metaphor‖ here refers to the cognitive process of understanding one thing as another 
thing that it is not (Lakoff and Johnson 5).  This new way of thinking about metaphor comes 
from the field of conceptual metaphor theory (CMT), which for three decades has been 
producing some of the most exciting and insightful research about the nature and uses of 
language and cognition that can be found across the disciplines of linguistics, psychology, 
cognitive science, and philosophy.  My intention in this chapter is to prove that the process by 
which readers of literature in contemporary Western readers identify and interpret literature is a 
metaphoric process: we recognize that any given text is ―literary‖ when we recognize that it is 
accepted and expected that we interpret the text as a representation of LIFE, though no text, 
literary or otherwise, could literally be our LIFE or our experiences of LIFE.  The proof lies 
partly in two histories, the first of which is the Anglo-American concept of literature, which I 
outlined in the first chapter.  The second is the history of the concept of metaphor, which I will 
summarize in the present chapter.  Recounted side by side, these two histories highlight the 
similarities between metaphor and literature as cultural, intellectual, and conceptual phenomena.  
That is, if we recognize the metaphoric nature of literature by way of CMT‘s definition of and 
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approach to metaphor, then it is possible to see that we process literature simultaneously as a 
cognitive, discursive, cultural, and individual-personal textual product and reading process.   
In arguing for a rhetoricized definition of literature via CMT, I do not mean to suggest 
that the cognitive sciences are the only route through which English studies and other humanities 
may be saved.  For a scholar in the humanities, any suggestion to this effect smacks of the 
humanities‘ subjugation to outside interests.  Such fears of a loss of autonomy are misplaced 
because our autonomy from external interests was never possible to begin with, and what we 
ought to fear is the loss of opportunities to develop cross-disciplinary scholarship among the 
humanities and sciences.  Conceptual metaphor theory, at its best, is already multi-disciplinary in 
that it uses the methods and premises of social and ―hard‖ scientific research as well as 
humanistic research in developing a body of knowledge about a subject that is itself of cross-
disciplinary interest – language.  As such, CMT can be a source of insight across the sub-
disciplines of English studies for describing not only how language works but what we create 
using language (historically, the purview of literary criticism and studies) and why or for what 
purposes we employ particular uses of language, including literature, to affect our world (the 
purview of rhetoric).  But CMT can only present us with the opportunity to see the benefits of an 
interdisciplinary study of language; it cannot by itself answer every question about language-in-
use.  To do so, we need a wider breadth of interests in language than linguists, cognitive 
scientists, and metaphor theorists can provide, and we need a depth of specialized expertise from 
scholars in other disciplines, too, including literary studies and rhetoric and composition. 
To see literature as a metaphor according to the premises of CMT necessitates that we 
adopt an understanding of literature that eschews a Romanticist faith in the possibility of textual 
or personal autonomy and that recognizes the influence that various heteronomous forces like 
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history, culture, power, and economics have on any definition and interpretation of literature.  
But it also requires that we reject any inclination inherited from the Enlightenment to make the 
study of literature into a purely scientific endeavor or, following an Enlightenment devaluation 
of literature, to discount the study of literature on the grounds that literature can make no 
scientifically-probative claims about reality.  The reconceptualization of literature as a 
metaphorization of LIFE forefronts the rhetoricized nature of literature and reminds us of the 
necessity of rhetoricizing the intellectual and institutional habits of English studies.  This is 
because such a reconceptualization expands the variety of texts we consider to be ―literary,‖ 
reveals the importance of interdisciplinary approaches to literature, requires a recognition that 
our scholarly work and lived experiences reinstantiate our literary experiences and vice versa, 
and acknowledges the constructed nature of meaning in literary language. 
The benefits of this rhetoricization of literature extend beyond literary studies into the 
field of English studies and its relationship with other disciplines and with non-academics.  A 
rhetoricization of English studies has no better starting point than such a reconceptualization of 
literature since literature is our field‘s most well-known subject and literary studies is our most 
powerful and prestigious subdiscipline.  By recognizing the cognitive, cultural, and personal-
individual nature of literature, we acknowledge the necessity of the interdisciplinary study of 
literature.  We admit that literary study autonomized from its context in English studies, the 
study of language and languages, humanistic study, and the university has no purpose other than 
its own existence.  But if the purpose of the study of literature is to observe how literature, 
alongside other uses of language, influences and is used to influence its readers‘ notions of what 
life is, was, or can and should be, then the study of literature takes on a valid, justifiable 
significance beyond itself.  When literary studies and English studies operate with full 
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cognizance of the heteronomous nature of their field and object of study, other disciplines and 
non-academics will also see their value and necessity.  In the fourth chapter, I will look at what a 
restructuring of the field of English studies that follows from a rhetoricized reconceptualization 
of literature as a metaphorization of LIFE would entail.  But to arrive at that point, we must first 
stop to examine what it would mean to redefine literature in this way. 
2.1 A Brief History of Metaphor Theory 
 
It would not be an exaggeration to think of CMT as the Copernican shift in metaphor 
theory.  CMT stands in a sort of complementary opposition to much of the assumed knowledge 
in Western thought about metaphor that has developed across nearly three millennia.  To 
understand the significance of CMT, we must understand its point of departure: Aristotle‘s 
theory of metaphor and its attendant semantics.  In explaining the implications of Aristotelian 
metaphor theory for CMT, I draw upon the account of Aristotelian metaphor theory that Paul 
Ricoeur articulated in Rule of Metaphor (1975, trans. 1977) as well as Ricoeur‘s analysis of its 
unrealized potential and problematic semantics.  It wasn‘t until the twentieth century that 
metaphor theory began to shift away from the Aristotelian characterization of metaphor as an 
inconsequential, deviational use of language to a mode of thinking and acting.  Conceptual 
metaphor theory, and Ricoeur‘s own tension theory of metaphor, are part of this latest 
development in theories about metaphor.  Their claims, modes of analysis, and implications for 
reconsidering the nature of language and thought are so complex and far-reaching as to be 
capable of constructing a foundation for a rhetoricalized English studies. 
2.1.1 Aristotle’s Theory of Metaphor and Its Problematic Semantics 
 
Arguably, there would be no metaphor theory were it not for Aristotle‘s treatment of it in 
his various works, most notably the Rhetoric and the Poetics.  As Ricoeur finds, Aristotle 
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established metaphor as an important subject in Western philosophy, rhetoric, and aesthetics.  
Across these disciplines, Aristotle‘s theory of metaphor is consistent but flawed, partly because it 
operates on and reinforces a problematic semantics.  The definition of metaphor Aristotle gives 
in the Poetics and refers to in the Rhetoric is that ―metaphor is the application of a noun which 
properly applies to something else.  The transfer may be from genus to species, from species to 
genus, from species to species, or by analogy‖ (Poetics 57b).  This superficial transfer of 
meaning, or epiphenomenon, consists of substituting a word that is inappropriate to the meaning 
of the word that it replaces.  One cannot teach the appropriate, aesthetically-effective use of 
metaphor; it ―is a sign of natural talent […] for the successful use of metaphor is a matter of 
perceiving similarities‖ (59a) where similarities would not otherwise be perceived.  The 
perception of such similarities helps the author to produce the effects of ―reasoning,‖ which 
―include proof and refutation, the production of emotions (e.g., pity, fear, anger, etc.), and also 
establishing importance or unimportance‖ (56a-b).   
Most importantly, metaphor is pertinent to a discussion of literary
17
 discourse because it 
both facilitates and redoubles the overarching purpose of poetic discourse, mimesis.  Howell 
explains that ―Aristotle‘s concept of mimesis [is] a term for the process by which a poet projects 
some aspect of actual human living into an imagined action and then proceeds so to plot 
[muthos] what he has imagined as to make it identify itself with the reality behind it and to reveal 
by identification the deeper human significances of that reality‖ (31).  Since ―Imitation comes 
naturally to human beings,‖ Aristotle writes, ―so does the universal pleasure in imitations.  … 
The reason for this is that understanding is extremely pleasant, not just for philosophers but for 
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 Since Aristotle‘s Poetics is concerned with what we would refer to as ―literature‖ and literary techniques and 
issues rather poetry more strictly speaking, I will often use ―literary‖ where an exact quotation of Aristotle would 
require ―poetic.‖   
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others too in the same way, despite their limited capacity for it‖ (Poetics 48b).  Here, Aristotle 
links the function of literary discourse – to imitate reality in a way that both pleases and reveals 
something not yet understood about that reality – with the function of philosophy – to provide 
explanations for (though not necessarily to reveal) reality.   
Metaphor would seem to be the figure par excellence of literary discourse
18
 and a bridge 
between the literary and the philosophical.  As a stylistic device, it helps to achieve the mimetic 
effect of expressing a pleasing, insightful similarity and helps to guide an audience toward 
certain emotions and interpretations.  Furthermore, for Aristotle, both mimesis and metaphor are 
―deviations from normal lexis‖ – the proper or fitting choice of words to represent what is meant 
or denoted – that present some new assertion about reality via a contradiction of that reality 
(Ricoeur 43).  Insofar as literary discourse and metaphor have the capacity to make speculative 
assertions about reality,
19
 they overlap with the function of philosophy rather than history, in 
which factual assertions about reality are made.   
The characterization of metaphor contained in Aristotle‘s Poetics is more or less 
consistent with that of his Rhetoric, wherein his most detailed discussion of metaphor can be 
found.  In the Rhetoric, Aristotle maintains his four-fold typology of metaphor as a statement of 
similarity between a superordinate category in terms of a subordinate category, a subordinate 
category in terms of a superordinate category, one category in terms of an unrelated category on 
the same level of the categorical hierarchy, or a comparison via analogy (1411a7).  Metaphor is 
also described in the Rhetoric as the epiphenomenological transfer of one word‘s meaning to 
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 See Ricoeur 42-3. 
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 Aristotle writes, for example, that literary discourse is concerned with the imitation of universal patterns of ―what 
such or such a kind of man will probably or necessarily say or do‖ (Poetics 1451b9). 
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another word to which that meaning is improper.
20
  Rhetors, Aristotle cautions, ought to consider 
the aesthetics of the metaphors they choose, being careful to select metaphors that are ―beautiful 
either in sound or in meaning or in visualization or in some other sense perception‖ (1405b13).  
What makes rhetorical metaphor beautiful is whether the substituted word accurately reflects the 
meaning of the word that is substituted since ―one word is more proper than another and more 
like the object signified and more adapted to making the thing ‗appear before the eyes‘‖ 
(1405b13, emphasis added).  Audiences may be persuaded, per the function of rhetorical 
discourse, by the beauty or surprise of a particularly apt metaphor (1412a6).  But rhetorical 
metaphors need not necessarily be pleasing – that is, revealing of some understanding – in and of 
themselves or contribute to the pleasing quality of the text in which they are contained, as with 
literary metaphors.  Above all else, rhetorical metaphors must aid in persuasion. 
The Rhetoric, according to Ricoeur, ―constitutes the most brilliant [attempt] to 
institutionalize rhetoric from the point of view of philosophy‖ by ―developing this link between 
the rhetorical concept of persuasion and the logical concept of the probable‖ (11-12).  The link 
occurs via metaphor because metaphor enables the transfer of meaning between ―things that are 
related but not obviously so, as in philosophy, [since] it is characteristic of a well-directed mind 
to observe the likeness even in things very different‖ (Aristotle, Rhetoric 1412a5).  Likenesses 
presented in rhetorical metaphors should, like literary metaphors, provide audiences with a 
perception of the world that ―brings about learning [and]… creates understanding and 
knowledge‖ (Rhetoric 1410b2).  But insofar as the purpose of rhetoric is persuasion rather than 
proof, metaphor can only re-present or re-describe aspects of reality, while it is the business of 
philosophy to formulate proofs about the nature or essence of that reality.   
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 See Rhetoric, 1450b12 and 1412a 5. 
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The fact that simile is not mentioned in the Poetics is also revealing of the differences 
between the functions of literary/mimetic and rhetorical/non-mimetic discourse.  It has been 
erroneously reported that Aristotle subordinated metaphor to a subtype of simile, but in fact ―in 
six spots [in the Rhetoric], Aristotle subordinates simile to metaphor.  The fact that later 
rhetorical tradition,‖ including the work of post-Aristotelian rhetoricians such as Cicero and 
Quintilian, ―does not follow Aristotle here makes this point all the more remarkable‖ (Ricoeur 
24-5).  For example, Aristotle aligns simile with literary/mimetic discourse, noting that ―simile is 
useful … in speech, but only on a few occasions; for it is poetic.  [Similes] should be brought in 
like metaphors; for they are metaphors‖ (Rhetoric 1406b2, original emphasis).  On the other 
hand, metaphor is more appropriate to rhetorical/non-mimetic discourse since simile ―is less 
pleasing because [it is] longer and because it does not say that this is that, nor does the listener‘s 
mind seek to understand this‖ (1410b3, original emphasis).  When a rhetor‘s metaphors are not 
insightful, they not only may fail to keep an audience‘s attention; they may not be effective in 
persuading or informing the audience.  When a listener realizes ―that he learned something 
different from what he believed … his mind seems to say, ‗How true, and I was wrong‘‖ 
(1412a6).  Metaphor‘s effectiveness in persuasion is dependent on a rhetor‘s awareness of his 
audience‘s shared knowledge and his ability to work within their common logic to construct 
metaphors that will help the audience to see the world in a particular way with minimal effort 
expended, both on behalf of the rhetor and the audience. 
Certainly, metaphor as Aristotle defines it in the Poetics and the Rhetoric is of more than 
passing significance to the disciplines of literature and rhetoric.  But the significance that 
Aristotle grants to metaphor is a limited and sometimes contradictory significance that shapes 
and is shaped by a similarly limited and confused semantics.  First, Aristotle‘s characterization of 
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metaphor as epiphenomenon suggests that metaphor can have no impact on the meaning of 
words or on how those words affect language users.  Metaphor is a surface-level (epi-) transfer 
of the meaning of words, not an assertion about or a proof of the quality of reality.  And yet, 
when Aristotle asserts that a word can be inappropriately used because the word qua word is not 
sufficiently ―like the object [it] signifie[s]‖ (Rhetoric 1405b13), he commits himself to the notion 
that language instantiates reality in a literal, positivistic sense.
21
  This would make metaphor of 
the utmost importance: What follows from it is that a new word meaning would necessitate the 
creation of a new object that is signified.  But Aristotle never gives metaphor that power since 
metaphor can only present new understandings of the world, not create new meaning or a new 
reality.  Ultimately, metaphor is for Aristotle the superficial, improper use of a word to ―fill a 
semantic void,‖ (Ricoeur 17) not a void in the natural or abstract-conceptual world.  And yet, 
metaphor for Aristotle does seem capable of providing audiences with new insights about the 
world as they‘ve experienced it.  Where does one draw the line between thinking about the world 
in a new way and knowing about the world in a new way?  The power of metaphor to create 
knowledge and influence our experience of reality is at least confused in this logic, as is the 
semantics from which this theory of metaphor derives.   
Second, if metaphor does not possess the power to affect word meaning or reality, it can 
be nothing more significant than a superficial ornamentation of discourse, a stylistic deviation 
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 Interestingly, this is the same accusation that Max Black levies against Benjamin Whorf.  In his critique of the 
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, Black writes that Whorf is committed to the claim that human beings perceive reality by 
breaking it up into conceptual categories.  Moreover, observes Black, Whorf asserts that it is a combination of 
perceiving and compartmentalizing reality is what creates reality or at least creates the basis for perceiving reality.  
When Aristotle bases his argument that words that are proper to the reality they redescribe since some words do not, 
in fact, properly fit the reality they describe, he ―subscribes, consciously or not, to the ancient metaphysical lament 
that to describe is necessarily to falsify,‖ as Black writes of Whorf (248).  Whorf, Black finds, ―like many others, 
has succumbed to the muddled notion that the function of speech is to reinstate reality.  Well, the best recipe for 
apple pie can‘t be eaten – but it would be odd to regard that as an inadequacy‖ (248).  Aristotle, too, seems to have 
confused propriety and impropriety in semantics with scientific, positivistic verifiability.   
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from what Ricoeur calls ―rhetoric degree zero.‖
22
  The result of Aristotle‘s ―confining metaphor 
among word-focused figures of speech [was] an extreme refinement in taxonomy‖ at the expense 
of a more substantive, purposeful study of metaphor as it ―operates at all the strategic levels of 
language – words, sentences, discourse, texts, styles‖ (Ricoeur 17).  By reducing metaphor to a 
matter of style on the level of the ―noun or word and not to discourse,‖ Ricoeur explains, 
―Aristotle establishes the orientation of the history of metaphor vis-à-vis poetics and rhetoric for 
several centuries‖ (16).  And certainly, for centuries after Aristotle, the study of metaphor and, 
more generally, the study of language-in-use consisted primarily of identifying possible tropes, 
figures, and other deviational or ornamental patterns for the sake of identifying them, not for the 
sake of understanding their influence on our perceptions of reality.
23
  The study of metaphor only 
reinforced a semantics that assumes that the only import of language is stylistic and superficial. 
We can see the consequences of this problematic theory of metaphor and semantics in the 
division of rhetorical and literary studies.  According to the logic of Aristotle‘s semantics, if 
words can have one and only one proper meaning, then any improper meaning necessarily 
obfuscates reality.  Ramus, for example, reacts to this logic by reducing rhetoric to matters of 
stylistic embellishments that has no significant bearing on reality.  Enlightenment thinkers also 
maintained that rhetoric was nothing more than stylistic embellishment that distorts rhetoric 
degree zero language, and this backlash against connecting language to reality in the way that 
Aristotle suggests is also at the heart of the common contemporary definition of rhetoric as 
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 Ricoeur writes: ―Everyone agrees in saying that figurative language exists only if one can contrast it with another 
language that is not figurative‖ (138).  This would be an arhetorical language in which context has no bearing on the 
meaning of the discourse and in which all intended meanings can be certainly and wholly communicated.  If 
metaphor is defined as deviation from language that certainly and wholly communicates its meaning, ―What, then, is 
this other language, unmarked from the rhetorical point of view?‖ Ricoeur asks.  ―One must … admit that it cannot 
be found‖ (138). 
23
 On the matter of the decline of rhetoric from the Greeks to nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see Ricoeur 44-64; 
Lakoff and Turner 1-15; and Turner 25-9. 
73 
 
evasion or misdirection.  Probably, Aristotle did not intend for his semantics to produce any 
unwarranted fear that changes in language use or the misuse of language would result in changes 
to positive reality, as if to start calling dogs ―cat‖ would turn them into such.  But what must be 
acknowledged is that language can affect reality insofar as it influences how language users think 
and act in the world.  Language does not operate on the same principles as magic; it cannot alter 
empirical reality or determine our thoughts and actions, though it does certainly influence our 
perceptions, thoughts, and actions.  
One can also see the consequences of Aristotle‘s problematic semantics in the realm of 
aesthetics and literature in the premises and effects of the pure aesthetic.  Since language does 
not alter empirical reality – since calling a dog a cat does not turn it from canine to feline – there 
can be no proof that language has any effect on the real, extra-textual world.  Metaphor and other 
figures of speech, as purely stylistic devices that are defined by their deviation from purely 
descriptive language, are taken to be matters of literary or artistic discourse.  Their autonomous, 
decontextualized nature makes them perfectly suited for an autonomous, decontextualized 
discourse, and it also makes them perfectly unsuitable for any discourse that is supposed to 
describe or represent the real world.  Eventually, the impulse in aesthetic and literary analysis 
and criticism to taxonomize figures and tropes gave way to a disavowal on behalf of the 
members of the field of literature of taxonomies and other forms of language-focused analysis.  
Such analysis would have contradicted the assumption that there can be an autonomous literary 
language, since it would suggest that the very medium of the literary communication – language 
– could be understood according to schemas and categories that not only come from an extra-
textual context but also acknowledge the fact that the text does have connections to an extra-
textual context.  Thus, Aristotle‘s metaphor theory and semantics not only condemned metaphor 
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to insignificance for centuries, it also contributed to the millennia-long decline of rhetoric and 
the autonomization of literature and literary studies. 
Of course, Aristotle‘s understanding of metaphor is not wholly flawed, and some of it 
echoes in CMT.  Arguably, his most productive discussions of metaphor are not in either the 
Poetics or the Rhetoric but in the Eudemian Ethics and the Nicomachean Ethics.  In the Poetics 
and the Rhetoric, Aristotle‘s attention to metaphor focused mainly on an ontology of metaphor, 
taking as its central question, ―What is metaphor?‖  But his philosophic treatments of metaphor 
go beyond classifying types of metaphor to examining the ways that metaphor happens, even 
outside language and the significance of the metaphoric event.  Ricoeur notes this important 
contrast in Aristotle‘s multi-disciplinary metaphor theory: In the Eudemian Ethics and the 
Nicomachean Ethics, the terms metaphora and metapherein are used to discuss ―the 
transpositional movement as such, in processes more than in classes.  We can formulate this 
interest as follows: what does it mean to transpose the meaning of words?‖ (17).  These 
philosophical approaches to metaphor posit that metaphor is any transposition, including 
―transfers of a quality of one part of the soul to the entire soul‖ (325).  Following to this 
definition of metaphor, the central question becomes more phenomenological than ontological, 
concerned with how and why metaphor and meaning in language happen than what metaphor is.   
Unfortunately, this philosophic treatment of metaphor did not endure in rhetorical and 
literary studies.  The Aristotelian metaphor theory and its attendant problematic semantics that 
influenced the fields of rhetoric and literature derived from his Poetics and Rhetoric, naturally 
enough.  While we have Aristotle to thank in part for the breadth and depth of modern metaphor 
theory, we can still lament the stunted study, characterizations, and theories of metaphor that 
developed from Aristotle‘s rhetorical and poetic branches of metaphor theory.  Rather than dwell 
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on the metaphor theories developed between the time of Aristotle and the present, I will now turn 
to an account of modern metaphor theories that express (and are arguably rooted in) Aristotle‘s 
philosophic treatment of metaphor.  This important shift away from reductive and confused 
Aristotelian metaphor theory toward a more substantive and purposeful account of metaphor 
begins in the twentieth century with philosopher and, later, literary critic I.A. Richards and 
continues through contemporary CMT.  
2.1.2 Interanimation and Interaction Theories of Metaphor 
 
Indeed, the title of the book in which Richards explicates his reconceptualization of 
metaphor, The Philosophy of Rhetoric (1936), should suggest its similarity to Aristotle‘s 
philosophical treatments of metaphor in its focus on the metaphoric process rather than on a 
catalogue of metaphoric forms.  But Richards‘ theory of metaphor and the semantics on which it 
is predicated contrasts in important ways with Aristotle‘s.  First, Richards takes as a given that 
there is no rhetoric degree zero in language.  Words do not correspond in any real or positivistic 
sense with reality; they mean only what we conventionally use them to mean.  ―The belief that 
words possess a meaning that would be proper to them,‖ Richards warns, ―is a leftover from 
sorcery, the residue of ‗the magical theory of names‘‖ (71).  Consequently, language can only 
approximate the meaning for which it is a medium and rhetoric must be ―a study of 
misunderstanding and its remedies‖ (3).  Here, Richards recasts rhetoric as the study of how and 
why (imperfect) meaning is made in language, moving it away from a taxonomy of what forms 
language takes since such a catalogue wouldn‘t be capable of describing the necessarily context-
dependent slippages in meaning that occur in all language use.   
Richards‘ treatment of metaphor is similarly focused on the purpose and function of 
metaphor.  He rejected theories that ―made metaphor seem to be a verbal matter, a shifting and 
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displacement of words,‖ claiming instead that ―fundamentally it is a borrowing between and 
intercourse of thoughts, a transaction between contexts.  Thought is metaphoric, and proceeds by 
comparison, and the metaphors of language derive therefrom‖ (93).  Richards defines as 
metaphor the process of understanding a ―tenor‖ concept via a ―vehicle‖ concept.  In the process 
of thinking metaphorically, the human mind searches for the common ―ground‖ on which the 
tenor and vehicle are compared.  The capacity to understand and create metaphor does not, by 
this understanding, indicate any sort of genius.  Rather, it is an everyday process since the human 
―mind is a connecting organ [that] works only by connecting and it can connect any two things in 
an indefinitely large number of different ways‖ (82).  Metaphors are necessary because, through 
them, we ―interanimate‖ or mutually inform structure ideas in ordinary and extraordinary ways 
that enable us to have ―control of the world that we make for ourselves to live in‖ (135).
24
   
The Aristotelian notion that metaphor ―brings about learning … and understanding‖ 
(Rhetoric 1410b2) is evident here.  However, Richards‘ interanimation theory considers 
metaphor to be more than a figure by which insightful comparisons are made, which was the fate 
metaphor suffered in Aristotelian metaphor theory.  As Ricoeur explains, Richards succeeds in 
reorienting metaphor theory toward a new query: ―if metaphor consists in talking about one thing 
in terms of another, does it not consist also in perceiving, thinking, or sensing one thing in terms 
of another?‖ (83).  Richards sees this as a fundamentally rhetorical inquiry, one that Ricoeur 
aligns with a sort of ―improved semantics‖ on which new theories metaphor, of meaning in 
language, and of rhetoric can be formulated.  An interanimation theory of metaphor assumes that 
meaning isn‘t in words but in discourse, since the meaning of words is contingent on our using 
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 As an example, Richards points to psychoanalysis, which he takes to be a structured metaphoric structure, to 
borrow from Bourdieu‘s vocabulary, of concepts about ―modes of regarding, of loving, of acting‖ that reflect and 
interanimate our thoughts and experiences of those things and the other lived human experiences that psychoanalysis 
describes.  See The Philosophy of Rhetoric 135-6. 
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them according to socially-constructed conventions that are both linguistic and extra-linguistic.  
Rather, it assumes that words will animate and be animated by the discourse in which they are 
used and our perceptions, thoughts, and experiences of reality.  This makes metaphor something 
much more than stylistic embellishments of language that would otherwise be a direct 
representation of that to which it refers.  Metaphor in interanimation theory is not just in 
language but in thought and action, which means no taxonomy of linguistic figures can fully 
account for what metaphor is.  Consequently, Richards‘ interanimation theory of metaphor is 
part of his call for a new rhetoric that is fundamentally concerned with analyzing the ways that 
language – literary and non-literary – is used effectively and ineffectively to create and exchange 
meaning.   
Ricoeur also finds interaction theories of metaphor that emerged thirty years after 
Richards‘ interanimation theory to be consonant with an improved semantics.  The first theorist 
to delineate an interaction theory was Max Black, in Models and Metaphors (1962).  Black 
proposes a more linguistic rather than philosophic approach to metaphor than Richards‘, one that 
accounts for how meaning is made when two thoughts interanimate one another (Black 1-24).  
Black acknowledges Richards‘ assertion that thoughts ―interact‖ or ―act together‖ to create new 
meaning when they interanimate one another but argues that the mechanisms of that interaction 
remain unclear in Richards‘ explication of interanimation.  Black proposes that the what of 
metaphor be taken as a given: metaphoric statements have at least one metaphoric word – a 
focus, or what interanimation theory would call a tenor – and at least one literal word – the 
frame, which is akin to a vehicle (28-9).  The mechanism that allows us to comprehend 
metaphors, according to Black, is an interaction between conceptual ―systems of associated 
commonplaces,‖ which are ―things … held to be true‖ by some socio-cultural group (40). 
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For example, when the average American hears the metaphor Love is a houseplant, the 
various associated beliefs
25
 that she holds about houseplants interact with her systems of 
associated commonplaces related to love.  If the audience of the metaphor is a botanist or an 
interior designer, then his system of commonplaces associated with the word ―houseplant‖ will 
be substantially different from an audience whose experiences with houseplants may be limited 
to owning and caring for houseplants or having witnessed or heard of someone else‘s owning 
and caring for them.  Similarly, each individual person‘s experience with love will have some 
bearing on their beliefs about love.  In other words, Black would assert, commonplaces are 
always only relatively common.
26
  The trigger that tells the listener not to take literally the claim 
that love is a houseplant is the contradiction of the common knowledge about love, which is not 
usually or literally, using Black‘s terminology,
27
 something that requires adequate shade or 
sunlight and water.  The metaphor effectively ―suppresses some details, emphasizes others – in 
short, organizes our view‖ of the focus, which in this example would be love, in such a way that 
the ―principle subject is ‗seen through‘ the metaphorical expression – or, if we prefer, that the 
principal subject is ‗projected upon‘ the field of the subsidiary subject‖ of the houseplant (41, 
original emphasis).  The interaction of the two systems can cause the frame to be structured by 
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 Black writes that ―literal uses of the [focus] word normally commit the speaker to acceptance of a set of standard 
beliefs about‖ the referent of the focus word (40, emphasis added).  The use of this term is, perhaps, problematic, 
since ―belief‖ carries with it its own set of associated commonplaces that evoke the same metaphysical explanations 
of meaning in language to which Black objects in his introductory apology for a semantics that eschews the 
philosophical.  How, after all, are beliefs created?  What is the mechanism of belief?  Belief and knowledge cannot 
be synonymous, so to what extent does this semantics pertain to the creation of knowledge about a real world in 
which those tangible and intangible phenomena can be experienced rather than ―belief‖ that that which is unseen or 
unexperienced can be true or valid?  Contra this semantics, conceptual metaphor theory situates semantics in the 
realm of knowledge that does not make meaning a matter of disprovable truth but of simultaneously individual, 
socio-cultural, and experiential knowledge. 
26
 See Black 44. 
27
 Black often uses ―literal‖ to mean ―empirically real‖ or ―intended referent‖ such as with a metaphoric tenor or 
focus.  Raymond Gibbs lists five types of ―literal‖ that are often used in comparisons of literal and figurative 
meaning.  Black seems to take ―literal‖ to mean what Gibbs calls nonmetaphorical literality and context-free 
literality; other types of literality include conventional literality, subject-matter literality, and truth conditional 
literality (75).   
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the focus, too, in some cases.  If in our culture we experience the metaphor Love is a houseplant 
often enough, we may begin to think automatically of houseplants when we encounter the 
concept of love or vice versa, even outside the context of the metaphor. 
In keeping with an improved semantics, Black finds that the locus of meaning is in 
context and use, not in the words themselves.  This is because it is not always clear that any 
given statement is metaphorical or literal, or which term in a metaphoric statement is the focus 
and which is the frame.  The statement Marsha was uplifted could be a literal statement of events 
if Marsha was lifted by her husband from a lower chair to a higher one, but it is metaphoric if it 
is used to report that her mood improved.  Context and situation will also determine whether we 
read allegories, proverbs, and riddles literally or as ―attempt[s] to construct an entire sentence [or 
text] of words that are used metaphorically‖ (27).  Black‘s use of the terms focus and frame 
emphasize the importance of considering extra-textual context or the text‘s interaction with the 
constellation of fields that comprise the context of it creation and use, as Bourdieu might 
describe it, for determining whether the whole text should be read as a metaphor.  Such a 
consideration is necessary for recognizing that the assertions about reality implied in an 
allegorical or proverbial text (e.g., that animals can speak or that there ever was a Faerie Queene) 
create new conceptual interactions among systems of thought, ones that are not to be taken as 
proofs about the extra-textual world but that ask the reader to reconsider what she takes to be 
―literal‖ or conventional. 
One can see some of the earliest moves to situate metaphor theory in the study of 
language and linguistics as opposed to philosophy, rhetoric, or aesthetics in Black‘s attempt to 
avoid philosophical explanations of how metaphoric meaning happens.  But while his interaction 
theory of metaphor helpfully defines metaphor as a process that relies on conceptual, socio-
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cultural, and individual experiences, it does not explain the mechanism by which thoughts in the 
brain literally interact.  The mind does not literally ―frame‖ or ―focus‖ ideas; like ―tenor‖ and 
―vehicle,‖ these terms only offer another metaphor to describe the phenomenon of 
comprehending metaphor.  Nevertheless, it helpfully supplements the theory of interanimation 
by making metaphor more than a process of comparison.  The functions of metaphor that Black 
lists include comparisons of systems of concepts, substitutions of one system of concepts for 
another (as with Aristotelian theories of metaphor), and interactions of systems of concepts.  In 
all these metaphoric relationships, conceptual systems shape and change one another.  When 
metaphors change our concepts, they also influence how we react to those concepts as we 
experience them in our lives.  Metaphors, defined this way, may not change reality in an 
objective, positivistic sense but they can and do affect our perceptions of and reactions to it.  
Here, the study of language becomes the study of interactions among people, their ways of 
thinking and knowing, and the reality that they experience. 
Later interaction theories maintained Black‘s fundamental assertions about metaphor, but 
over the next twenty years, during which time interaction theory was the eminent theory of 
metaphor, these variations on Black‘s theory moved the study of metaphor more squarely into 
the fields of language studies and linguistics.  These interaction theories tended to see metaphor, 
problematically, as the creation of a unity of language, meaning, or thought.  Among the most 
notable contributions of interaction theorists is the claim made by philosopher Marcus Hester, in 
The Meaning of Poetic Metaphor (1967), that the nature of metaphoric interaction is one of a 
unification of ideas that results in a seeing the tenor as the vehicle (119-92).  Hester‘s theory, 
however, is explicitly specific to poetic metaphor, which suggests a historically literary or 
rhetorical preoccupation with determining what types of metaphors exist.  In 1968, Philip 
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Wheelwright‘s The Burning Fountain of Symbolism brought interaction theory to 
psychoanalysis.  Like Hester, Wheelwright claimed that metaphor ―fuses heterogeneous elements 
into some kind of unity‖ (45).  Wheelwright uses metaphor to explain that expressive (i.e., 
aesthetic statements or statements used to explain emotions) carry an ―assertorial weight‖ or a 
power of assertion pertaining to figures of speech (e.g., what puns reveal about the psyche), 
archetypes, and religion/mythology.
28
  Ten years later, Robert Rogers‘ Metaphor: A 
Psychoanalytic View (1978) made poetic metaphor a matter of primary and secondary mentation: 
in primary mentation, we comprehend the literal meanings of the poetic statements, and a 
secondary mentation process reveals the ambiguous or concealed meanings of the statements.  
The result of metaphor for Rogers is a gestalt (121) or an ―organic unity‖ of mentation processes 
(45). 
Another notable contribution to interaction theory was the ―perspectival‖ theory of 
metaphor presented by philosopher Eva Kittay in Metaphor: Its Cognitive Force and Linguistic 
Structure (1987).  This theory marks the final stages of interaction theory‘s transition to 
linguistics, where metaphor theory mainly resides today.  Kittay offers perspectival theory as a 
complementary revision to interaction theory.  According to Kittay, metaphor ―is the linguistic 
means by which we bring together and fuse into a unity diverse thoughts and thereby re-form our 
perceptions of the world‖ (6).  Metaphoric meaning occurs when a second-order interpretation is 
necessary to make sense of a statement that does not make sense, given the context, with a first-
order interpretation.  The meaning of the metaphor, Kittay writes, ―depends on systematic 
semantic features of language‖ (46) that are recalled by the topic (rather than tenor) and vehicle 
terms used in a metaphor.  When we encounter any term, we already have other concepts and, 
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 See Wheelwright, chapter 10. 
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therefore, terms associated with it, and metaphor is the process of using one semantic field of 
associated word-meanings as ―a perspective from which to gain an understanding of that which 
is metaphorically portrayed‖ (13-4).   
2.1.3 Ricoeur’s Tension Theory 
 
In Rule of Metaphor, Ricoeur proposes his own tension theory of metaphor as an 
alternative to interanimation and interaction theories of metaphor as well as other metaphor 
theories that are not based on what Ricoeur calls an improved semantics.  The tension theory of 
metaphor postulates that ―the ‗place‘ of metaphor, its most intimate and ultimate abode, is 
neither the [noun], nor the sentence, nor even discourse, but the copula of the verb to be‖ (7).  
Ricoeur nods to Wheelwright‘s prior treatment of metaphoric tension, but whereas Wheelwright 
claimed that the tension of metaphor is produced by the emphasized unity suggested by the 
metaphor – that one thing is another – Ricoeur proposes that metaphoric tension is equally unity 
and disunity.  This tension exists – no matter what the mode of discourse
29
 – in the copula, which 
―is not only relational.  It implies besides, by means of the predicative relationship, that what is is 
redescribed; it says that things really are this way‖ (Ricoeur 247-8, original emphasis).  In this 
way, metaphor expresses what Ricoeur refers to as an ―ontological vehemence‖ that one thing is 
something that it is not.   
The objective of this tension theory of metaphor is to describe the metaphoric 
relationship between the concepts suggested by the words or other symbols, as with paintings or 
with images suggested in poetry, rather than a demarcation of which concept in a metaphor 
metaphorizes and which one is metaphorized.  For this reason, Ricoeur does not use a dichotomy 
like tenor-vehicle, focus-frame, or topic-vehicle.  He does, however, emphasize the importance 
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 See Ricoeur 229-39 and 302 for a discussion of metaphor in verbal and non-verbal expression. 
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of making a distinction between a literal and a metaphoric interpretation of any given metaphor, 
one part of the tension of metaphor is that it is not always clear when a statement is intended to 
be metaphoric or not (246).  But what matters is not distinguishing which term or even whole 
statement is used metaphorically against a backdrop of otherwise literal or representational 
terms; what matters with metaphor is that human beings can understand that one thing is what 
they otherwise expect it not to be.  The relationship of words, texts, and concepts to reality is of 
much greater importance than determining a taxonomy of metaphor that enables us to demarcate 
where vehicles or frames stop and tenors or focuses begin since, in keeping with the spirit of 
interaction theories, the relationship between the two concepts is much more complex than 
merely Focus A is Frame B rather than Focus B and Frame A.  The objective of a tension theory 
of metaphor is the study of why and to what effect human beings use metaphors to create, 
negotiate, and recreate reality by asserting the contradiction that A is B when they know that A is 
not B.   
Ricoeur states that ―the most important theme‖ of Rule of Metaphor is a reformulation of 
rhetoric via metaphor theory and a concomitant improved semantics.  But, he clarifies, his 
objective ―is not to restore the original domain of rhetoric – in any case, this may be beyond 
doing, for ineluctable cultural reasons – rather, it is to understand in a new way the very 
workings of tropes, and, based on this, eventually to restate in new terms the question of the aim 
and purpose of rhetoric‖ (45).  The study of metaphor provides a way to restate rhetoric since 
―metaphor is the rhetorical process by which discourse unleashes the power that certain fictions 
have to redescribe reality‖ (7).  This reformulation of rhetoric is tied to poetics because ―The 
poetic function and the rhetorical function cannot be fully distinguished until the conjunction 
between fiction and redescription is brought to light‖ (247).  In metaphor, the is not pertains to 
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the literary-poetic and the fictive, while the is pertains to the rhetorical and the redescriptive.  
―By linking fiction and redescription in this way‖ to the literary-poetic and the rhetorical, 
respectively, Ricoeur writes, ―we restore the full depth of meaning to Aristotle‘s discovery in the 
Poetics, which was that the poesis of language arises out of the connection between muthos 
[plot] and mimesis [imitation]‖ (7).  Literature here is defined as a mode of discourse in which 
what is presented as a redescription of people, objects, events, and relationships is understood 
both as being real and as not being real simultaneously.  The study of literature requires not only 
that we ask what about the text imitates reality and therefore is not truly real (the realm of the 
Poetics) but also what about the text is real (the realm of the Rhetoric). 
Ricoeur‘s notion of ontological vehemence is particularly helpful for understanding the 
problems with philosopher Donald Davidson‘s critique of the metaphor theories that are based 
on such an improved semantics.  In ―What Metaphor Means‖ (1978), Davidson objects to these 
metaphor theories on the grounds that no metaphor can ―say anything beyond its literal meaning 
(nor does its maker say anything, in using the metaphor, beyond the literal)‖ (32).  Metaphor to 
Davidson is an ornamentational or superficial linguistic device defined by use rather than 
meaning (33).  It ―makes us attend to some likeness‖ and is therefore literal, requiring no 
secondary understanding of what is compared (33).  To say that Love is a houseplant, for 
Davidson, would be to use a sense of houseplant that can apply literally to love; the sense of 
houseplant that does not apply to love cannot be the sense of houseplant that is used in this 
particular metaphoric expression if the expression makes sense.  Thus, the metaphor makes no 
new implied assertion about reality, nothing that was not already taken for granted and required 
no further ontologically vehement assertion to reinforce its validity.  This makes Aristotle‘s 
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seemingly benign claim that metaphor helps its audience to learn and understand an object of 
Davidson‘s critique. 
To claim that metaphor has no bearing on or claim to make about reality is to succumb to 
what Ricoeur calls ―ontological naïveté.‖  There are two forms of ontological naïveté: to claim 
that metaphor asserts nothing about reality, as Davidson avers, and to claim that metaphors 
create reality, which ignores the fact that metaphoric assertions about reality contradict at least 
some aspect of received knowledge about reality.
30
  Even ―dead‖ (conventional) metaphors, like 
the foot of the mountain, contradict empirical reality, though they may not contradict our 
conventional ways of talking about it.  Ultimately, Davidson offers the same understanding of 
the function, mechanism, and significance of metaphor that an impoverished, post-Aristotelian 
metaphor theory and semantics offered.  What Ricoeur‘s tension theory offers is a more 
sophisticated understanding of the relationship of metaphor and symbolic meaning have to 
reality.  Metaphors do ask us to think in ways that ―no plain prose can possibly do‖ (Davidson 
45) and in doing so they can alter how we perceive and act in the world, but they do not do so 
without the tensive complication that what is asserted is not necessarily what is.  In other words, 
metaphor is never comprehended as naively as Davidson suggests.
31
 
2.2 The Contemporary Moment: Conceptual Metaphor Theory 
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 See Ricoeur 249-54.  Ricoeur notes that the claim that metaphor creates reality is tied to some theories of 
metaphor that define metaphor as the unification of word-meaning and reality, even if that unity is only perceived 
and not literal.  This, he says, is an ontological naïveté since the recognition of a metaphor requires that we 
recognize its contradictory assertions at the same time that we recognize the literalness or truth of those assertions. 
31
 Admittedly, dead metaphors are so conventionalized that they do not require any extra cognitive or conceptual 
processing and may be taken as literally true.  But they are not taken to be literally true in the same sense that 
Davidson implies.  To talk about the foot of a mountain is not necessarily to have a separate sense of ―foot‖ that 
means ―base of mountain.‖  Those for whom this is a dead metaphor may have to do extra cognitive work to 
determine why ―foot‖ makes sense in that context, but they would likely not say, ―Because there are human feet, 
animal feet, and mountain feet, and this is a mountain‘s foot.‖  More likely, they would rationalize it as, ―Feet are 
found at the bottom of something,‖ and even this is a form of personification since not all feet-like objects are called 
―feet.‖  Horses have hooves; human beings have feet.  The concept is still metaphoric, not literal, and the only naïve 
aspect of this process comes when the metaphor is conventionalized. 
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Conceptual metaphor theory, the most recent development in theories of metaphor, stands 
in almost diametrical opposition to Davidson‘s estimation of metaphor.  The seminal work in 
CMT is George Lakoff and Mark Johnson‘s Metaphors We Live By (1981; rev. ed. 2003).  In it, 
Lakoff and Johnson articulate a theory of metaphor that builds from interanimation, interaction, 
and tension theories.  To Lakoff and Johnson, ―metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in 
language but in thought and action.  Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both 
think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature‖ (3).  Conceptual metaphor theorists 
define metaphor as ―understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another‖ (5).  
In metaphoric thinking, we use the words, thoughts, emotions, and other experiences that we 
associate with a ―source‖ domain of thought or concept to understand a ―target‖ domain or 
concept.  Targets are often the more abstract of the two concepts, and concrete phenomena give 
us a way to describe abstractions that we have no other means of describing. 
When we understand a target in terms of a source, we ―map‖ the structure or contents of 
the source domain onto the target, reshaping the target in our minds if even for just a moment.  
The process of mapping has the potential to permanently restructure the way we think about the 
target if the given metaphor is experienced often enough in a culture.  Take, for example, the 
common metaphor that Americans live by, LIFE IS A JOURNEY.
32
  We encounter this 
metaphor in everyday speech whenever we hear someone say, ―He‘s on the wrong path,‖ and we 
also experience it when we read Robert Frost‘s ―The Road Not Taken.‖  It would also be the 
metaphor by which we would make sense of a pictorial rendering of ―The Road Not Taken,‖ for 
the metaphor lies not in the symbol but in the cognitive process of understanding LIFE in terms 
of a JOURNEY.  This is a common conceptual metaphor for Americans, so it takes no special 
                                                 
32
Henceforth, all conceptual domains will be denoted typographically using all capital letters.  Specific examples of 
language that uses these concepts will be represented in italics. 
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effort from the average American to make sense of statements or other symbols that assert that 
LIFE IS A JOURNEY. 
The cognitive process of mapping this metaphor involves restructuring the more abstract 
concept LIFE in terms of the concept JOURNEY.  LIFE here refers to our concept of what we 
generally expect out of life as it is lived, it includes our notions of events like birth, death, rites of 
passage, and other culturally-specific events like falling in love for the first time or learning to 
ride a bicycle or leaving home for the first time as an adult.  LIFE also includes a sense of what 
we should expect of certain categories and types of people (e.g., parents, lovers, friends, kind 
people, cruel people, insecure people, etc.) that we expect the average person will have some 
experience of in his or her life.  It also includes our culturally-informed expectations of what 
lived life entails (e.g., choice is both a burden and a blessing, bad things sometimes happen to 
good people, the good die young, we get what we deserve, etc.).   
These concepts that constitute the concept of LIFE are developed and reinstantiated by 
neuro-cognitive processes that make thought possible on an individual level as well as by 
cultural practices and institutions..  In our culture, the prototypical LIFE consists of a 
chronological structure in which birth precedes death, the struggle of living precedes death, and 
death precedes entrance into an afterlife; some of these aspects of that prototypical LIFE may not 
be universally subscribed to by all contemporary Americans, but it is probably what we assume 
most Americans consider to be some of the typical events of LIFE.
33
  Yet even these LIFE events 
are colored by larger cultural notions of what is normal or to be expected; they do not include all 
possible variations on the actual experience of life or actual beliefs about life, which could 
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the concept LIFE isn‘t the point.  It is at least part of the ―folk theory‖ of what LIFE entails: the typical American, I 




include stillbirth or the absence of an afterlife.  Likewise, the structure of the relationships 
among other people, objects, events, and relationships (e.g.,  misfortunes are preceded by 
misdeeds, successes should follow from age and experience, etc.) are based on culturally-shared 
experiences, some of which may not or cannot accurately represent the experience of every 
individual in the culture. 
JOURNEY, as a concept, has its own structures: We may begin a journey, then turn 
around and come back or complete the journey by arriving at our destination.  JOURNEYS are 
usually processes of discovery whereas TRIPS are more brief and have some immediate purpose.  
When we map JOURNEY onto LIFE, we select certain aspects from the source domain, 
JOURNEY, and allow them to change the structure of our concept of LIFE.  Our larger 
categories of life experiences can be understood as events that happen while we are on the 
journey.  DECISIONS might be metaphorized as FORKS IN THE ROAD, and the MENTORS 
we have in life might be metaphorized as GUIDES on our journey.  The chronological schema of 
a JOURNEY maps onto the chronological sequence of events of LIFE, where BIRTH or some 
other earliest point on a chronological spectrum is THE BEGINNING OF THE JOURNEY.  
According to CMT, only the structure of the target changes in a metaphor.  Our thinking of LIFE 
as a JOURNEY will never influence how we think about JOURNEYS in such a way that we 
begin to think of JOURNEYS in terms of LIFE.  Furthermore, sources will never restructure the 
target so much that it becomes unrecognizable; LIFE will still be LIFE if it is metaphorized as a 
JOURNEY or as a GAME or as anything else.  The principle on which these claims are based is 
called the invariance principle, and it is premised on the unidirectionality of the mapping from a 
source to a target.
34
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While one can see the fingerprint of interanimation and interaction theories of metaphor 
in the source-target dichotomy of metaphor in CMT, the explicit lack of bidirectional interaction 
clearly departs from those earlier theories‘ characterization of metaphor.  In More than Cool 
Reason (1989), Lakoff and Mark Turner explain the basis of their divergence: interaction 
theories of metaphor assert that ―there is no source or target.  There is only a connection across 
domains, with one concept seen as the filter of the other‖ (131).  This is a characterization more 
befitting Ricoeur‘s tension theory than interaction theories, which maintain a formal distinction 
between the metaphoric and the literal terms of any given metaphor.  But Lakoff and Turner do 
accurately note that these theories of metaphor often seek to explain metaphor as a unity created 
by ―merely comparing the two domains in both directions and picking out the similarities,‖ (132) 
though one notable exception was Black‘s break with Richards in denying that comparison is the 
fundamental function of metaphor. 
Furthermore, Lakoff and Turner write that to invert a metaphor is to produce ―two 
different metaphors, because the mappings go in opposite directions, and different things get 
mapped‖ (132, original emphasis).  For example, the metaphor A JOURNEY IS A LIFE could 
be mapped out and we could ―perhaps [call] embarkations ‗births‘ and departures ‗deaths‘‖ 
(Lakoff and Turner 132), though since the target is concrete and the source relatively more 
abstract, such an inverted metaphor is unlikely to be of much everyday use to us, though we 
might encounter it in less-common contexts like a poem.  But this assertion about the 
unidirectionality of metaphoric mapping does not fully account for interaction between concepts 
in the way Black theorized it.  In fact, Black‘s interaction theory is probably consonant with the 
invariance principle.  This is because interaction theory claims, fundamentally, that it is simply 
more likely to think of either the source or the target when only its counterpart in the metaphor is 
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encountered outside the context of the metaphoric concept.  That is, if people in a certain socio-
cultural context think of PEOPLE often enough in terms of MACHINES, as may be the 
metaphoric concept underlying such linguistic expressions as Who flipped your switch? and I’ve 
run out of gas, then it is likely that they will be more likely to think about MACHINES as 
connected to PEOPLE since their minds have formed a strong neuro-cognitive connection 
between the two concepts.  Thus, they will be more likely to think, act, and talk about 
MACHINES as PEOPLE than they would be to connect MACHINES to another concept that 
they have never experienced as connected to MACHINES before.  They will be more likely to 
anthropomorphize a machine – to talk to it, to cajole it into working, to think it has a will to 
function – than they will be to talk about it as if it were some other living creature with sentience 
like a DOG or an ELEPHANT, let alone something without those salient features, like a 
BUILDING or a JOURNEY.   
Later interaction theory undoubtedly overemphasized the unity of thought that 
metaphoric cognitive interaction between conceptual domains produces.  This led to some 
muddled thinking about the nature of metaphoric thought and the nature of the transfer of 
structured ways of thinking from one area of the brain to another.  But a tension theory of 
metaphor can preserve both the invariance principle and a principle of contextually-dependent 
likely association since it understands metaphor to be a matter of simultaneously comprehending 
disunity and unity in a pair of concepts.  That is because it recognizes that in metaphoric 
thinking, we do not only consider that one thing is another thing; that way of thinking would 
result in a tautological unity, whereby we map all aspects of a source onto a target and the target 
onto the source, thereby violating the invariance principle.  Tension theory recognizes that 
human beings can ―know‖ that a source is not a target nor the target the source, even while they 
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―know that it is.  The mechanism by which we recognize this contradiction, as CMT points out, 
is that some aspects of both concepts will not map as easily onto the other concept, or they will 
only restructure the concept for a moment in a specific situation (as with the poetic application of 
A JOURNEY IS A LIFE).  But the ontologically vehement assertion that the target is the source 
nevertheless makes it more likely that the two concepts will interact together cognitively and 
conceptually than other concepts that have not previously interacted in a metaphoric tension in 
our minds. 
2.3 Literature as a Metaphor for LIFE 
 
2.3.1 A Theory of the Literary Metaphor Process 
 
Literature provides us with a particularly helpful example of the bidirectional interaction 
that can happen in metaphor.  This is because literature is itself metaphoric in nature, or to be 
more specific, because we process literature as we do metaphors.  Consider the parallel that 
Ricoeur observes between the functions of metaphor and the overlapping functions of literature 
and rhetoric that becomes clear when we think of metaphor as a tensive relationship of is/is not.  
Per Aristotle‘s theories, rhetoric aligns with the is function of metaphor because it seeks to 
redescribe reality or probable experiences in and interpretations of reality.  Literary discourse 
aligns with the is not function of metaphor insofar as it imitates (and therefore suggests a 
difference from) reality.  At the same time, in imitating reality, literary works reveal reality by 
redescribing via imitation the experience of reality.  Howell explains that Aristotle 
acknowledged just this sort of overlap between literature and rhetoric.  For instance, rhetors may 
use imaginative, fictional examples
35
 such as fables in order to produce  
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 The very fact that literature can be talked about as an example of the reality that is redescribed in a rhetorical text 
is significant.  Aristotle considers example, also sometimes translated as ―paradigm,‖ to be a form of rhetorical 
induction that appears to be metaphoric in nature.  Aristotle writes, ―It has been explained that a paradigm is an 
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a mimetic discourse within the context of nonmimetic verbal procedures. … The 
important problem about a given fable when it is judged in its own terms is that of 
ascertaining how accurately it reflects human truth, and how significant that truth is.  But 
the fable used in the context of an oration is to be judged in connection with its capacity 
to prove the orator‘s case – to offer logical, emotional, and ethical support to what he is 
recommending. (60, emphasis added) 
In this formulation, literature uses mimesis not to prove that the real world is this way or that, but 
to assert something about the human condition.  Imitation, by definition, suggests that the 
imitator is not the imitated.  But literature is always only a half fiction or half is not.  It is always 
simultaneously not historically-probative and also a real example of ―human truth.‖  On the one 
hand, in its rhetorical capacity, literature redescribes what Lakoff has called ―experiential 
reality,‖
 36
  which defines reality in terms of experience ―in the broad sense: the totality of human 
experience and everything that plays a role in it – the nature of our bodies, our genetically 
inherited capacities, our modes of physical functioning in the world, our social organization, 
etc.‖ (Women 266).  On the other hand, in its literary capacity, literature imitates that real human 
experience.  The mechanism by which literature both is and is not the reality that it 
simultaneously reveals and redescribes is the same social, cognitive, conceptual process of 
metaphor. 
                                                                                                                                                             
induction… It is reasoning neither from part to whole nor from whole to part but from part to part, like to like, when 
two things fall under the same genus but one is better known that the other‖ (Rhetoric 1357b19).  Examples in 
rhetoric are either historical examples (based on a principle of comparison) or fictional examples from fables (which 
operate on the principle of logoi, or reasoning) (Rhetoric 1393a2).  Rhetorical induction via fable, then, is another 
instance of the overlap between rhetoric and literature: not only can the imaginative, fictional mode of fable be used 
within a rhetorical text, it has a rhetorical nature, being useful for reasoning about the real world of which it is not a 
direct transcription. 
36
 Experiential realism or experientialism is more accurately attributed to Lakoff and Johnson, but it is explained in 
detail in Lakoff‘s monograph, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things.  See Women 265-8. 
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More specifically, the conceptual domain associated with ―human truth‖ or the ―human 
condition‖ is LIFE, the same target in the metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY.  In any given literary 
text, our experiences, in the Lakoffian sense of ―experience,‖ with the people, objects, events, 
and relationships among them that we take as conventional aspects of the conventional human 
life interact with the experiences of the participants, objects, events, and relationships among 
them that are depicted in the literary text.  Take, for example, a science fiction text that does not 
depict any human person whatsoever.  The participants in the plot – the muthos or depiction of 
life, in Aristotelian terms – will nevertheless correspond to types or categories of people or 
human dispositions.  An autobiographical depiction of Benjamin Franklin‘s life may be a more 
or less historically accurate redescription of his life, and we can read it as a historical document.  
We read it as literature, however, when our process of reading is metaphoric, when we recognize 
that Franklin‘s experiences of LIFE are not our own direct, redescribed experiences of LIFE 
(just as the LIFE depicted in the science fiction novel is not literally a redescription of our 
experiences with LIFE) at the same time that we recognize that his autobiography does reflect 
the same types of experiences we have with the same constituent categories of the concept LIFE. 
When we recognize the metaphoric nature of literature, we begin to see the connections 
among cultural studies approaches to literature and to more personal-individual responses to 
literature like the relatability reaction.  That is because literature not only depicts or imitates 
reality, it has the potential to inform or change it.  The validity of this contention is tethered to 
the validity of interaction theories of metaphor since the metaphoric process must then be 
bidirectional: LIFE in the reality of our experiences is LIFE as depicted in the work of literature, 
and LIFE as depicted in literature is LIFE as we experience it outside the text.  Without this sort 
of recognition that works of literature have the potential to affect how we experience reality and, 
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thus, how we act and think based on our conceptualized reality, what purpose is there for 
studying literature?  In fact, the metaphoric nature of the literary experience has become so 
automatic that we cannot but admit that literature affects how we think and act, and our extra-
textual experiences will affect how we interpret literature.  This bidirectionality is the basis for 
our relatability reaction to works of literature: we automatically weigh our experiences against 
those depicted in the text, and if we read often enough that sisters are more nurturing than 
brothers or that suburbia is a breeding ground for spiritual malaise, we may begin to think of and 
act as if those depicted experiences are real.  
The metaphorization of LIFE may in fact be that which signals to readers of literature 
that they are in the presence of the literary.  Cultural studies in conjunction with post-
structuralism has taught us that ―literature‖ is a constructed concept, not something we 
apprehend because of our connection to some supernal realm or spiritual truth or otherworldly 
metaphysical dominion.  Conceptual metaphor theory and cognitive linguistics have also set 
about debunking the myth that the literary exists outside of our concepts of it.  As cognitive 
scientist and psycholinguist Raymond Gibbs reports in The Poetics of Mind (1994), ―recent 
experimental evidence demonstrating that people understand written language not through the 
mere application of logical and linguistic rules but via certain presuppositions about texts‘ being 
composed by intentional agents (i.e., people)‖ (74).  In the set of studies to which Gibbs refers, 
participants were asked to read metaphors that they were told were either written by famous 
twentieth-century poets or generated by computers.  ―Readers found metaphorical expressions, 
such as Cigarettes are time bombs, more meaningful when these statements were supposedly 
written by twentieth-century poets, who are intentional agents, than when these same metaphors 
were seen as random constructions of a computer program,‖ Gibbs writes (74).  Furthermore, 
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participants took more time to process cognitively and consider the meaningfulness of the 
metaphors that they thought were composed by poets, but they ―quickly rejected as 
‗meaningless‘ these same anomalous expressions when told that they were written by an 
unintelligent computer program, because computers are assumed to lack communicative 
intentions‖ (74-5).  In other words, there is no inherent property of literariness; it is instead a set 
of acquired expectations and reading strategies.   
The research that Gibbs summarizes indicates that there are many cues that tell a reader 
to read a text as literature.  One such cue is knowing that the text is written by someone who 
writes literature – a poet or a novelist or a playwright.  Another is reading the text in a situation 
in which literature is commonly read, such as for a literature class or in the ―Literature‖ or 
―Fiction‖ section of a bookstore.  It is my claim that readers also know that they should be 
reading the text as literary – that is, looking for how it metaphorizes their experiences of LIFE – 
if they think the text is intended to or can be interpreted as having some message about the 
experience of LIFE.  This may seem to be a circular logic, and it is, but not one that has appeared 
arbitrarily.  It is quite natural, as Gibbs reminds us and as cultural and literary studies scholars 
including Eagleton and Williams maintain, we read as literary that which we expect to be 
literary.  Any understanding of literature that locates the literariness of the texts we read in an 
inherent property of literature that transcends our socio-cognitive construction of LITERATURE 
implies an arbitrariness that contradicts what we know and can prove about the fact that 
―literature‖ is in our concepts, expectations, and actions rather than in literature itself. 
What makes the relationship between metaphor and literature special is not only what is 
metaphorized – the concept of LIFE – but the fact that the metaphoric nature of literature may be 
what distinguishes the literary from the non-literary.  Metaphor appears in all areas of thought 
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and communication, for there is no rhetoric degree zero and we need concrete ways of talking 
and thinking about abstractions and unseen things.  But literature functions cognitively as a 
metaphor, and this fundamentally metaphoric quality of literature as well as the particular 
metaphor literature operates on demands a set of expectations and reading strategies that sets it 
apart from other forms of communication.  When we read a menu or a class syllabus, or when we 
hear an evening news broadcast, we do not expect that these texts are composed by agents, to use 
Gibbs‘ term, whose intentions are to ask us to consider what we know and expect about LIFE in 
terms of the LIFE they present to us in the text.  We do not expect, even on a subconscious or 
automatic level as we may with literature, that an intentional agent has put any depiction of LIFE 
in those texts, let alone that our reading strategy should be to understand our experiences in 
terms of those that the texts may depict.   
However, when we encounter literary texts such as Martin Luther King, Jr.‘s ―I Have a 
Dream‖ speech or the testimonios of Rigoberta Menchu, we recognize that these are literary texts 
because there is some larger assertion about the nature of LIFE that we assume the authors, as 
intentional agents, wanted us to consider.  Perhaps non-literary texts metonymize the human 
experience, and perhaps non-literary discourses including the sciences and the graphic arts also 
metaphorize LIFE in different modes than does literature.  And our concept of what constitutes 
literature can also be included  to include genres not currently considered literary, such as 
cookbooks, sitcoms, and graphic novels.  Ultimately, my focus on literature should not be taken 
as an indication that ―literature‖ is the only genre that can metaphorize LIFE; it should, in the 
spirit of rhetoricality, suggest that we must reconsider what it takes to be literary, how ―literary‖ 
happens cognitively and culturally, and why literature matters.  Reconceptualizing literature as a 
metaphorization of LIFE helps us rhetoricize LITERATURE as a concept. 
97 
 
2.3.2 Variations on a Theory of Literature as a Metaphoric Process 
 
Versions of this understanding of literature appear in a number of important cultural and 
literary theories.  Nietzsche suggests a similar theory in ―On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral 
Sense‖ (1873).  Language is at least doubly metaphorical, Nietzsche writes: the first metaphor 
consists of ―the stimulation of a nerve … into an image,‖ which is ―then imitated by a sound,‖ 
which results in the second metaphor (767).  Humankind comes to recognize reality only in 
terms of metaphor, both insofar as we experience reality in terms of language and as we 
understand all phenomena as categorically related to similar phenomena (one of Nietzsche‘s 
examples is that all leaves are both unique and similar).  Our metaphors are lies that we‘re 
willing to accept because they make life easier and more tolerable, Nietzsche writes.  To 
apprehend truth, the ―thing-in-itself‖ rather than the thing as understood via language or via other 
preconceived notions, requires ―an aesthetic way of relating‖ to phenomena (770, original 
emphasis).  Aesthetic thinking allows us to exert some control over our worlds by creating new 
metaphors instead of being enslaved to the familiar metaphors (772-3).   
The modern cognitive linguist and conceptual metaphor theorist would no doubt agree 
that people construct their worlds metaphorically on  a number of levels (linguistically, 
conceptually, etc.) and that these levels are intertwined and can have a powerful impact on how 
we live and act in the world.  Specifically, Nietzsche‘s theories underwrite the notion that 
metaphor is of greater importance than as merely a figure or trope, and that to look at various 
(conceptual and cultural) phenomena as metaphoric is not only fruitful but accurate.  But to think 
of literature as a cognitive-conceptual metaphor is not to make the literary-aesthetic the panacea 
of that which ails the modern soul in a (post-)Industrial world, as Nietzsche implies.  Nor is it to 
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seek ―truth.‖  Rather, it is to observe patterns of how people construct and reconstruct their 
reality via literary modes in ways that can be observed both in science and in humanistic study. 
As an argument against early historical-materialists who contended that literature merely 
reflects reality, Raymond Williams cites Volosinov‘s explanation that literature does not 
constitute reality but is a socio-cultural-historical activity that changes and contests or ―refracts‖ 
reality (37-8).  Similarly, Frederic Jameson writes in The Political Unconscious (1981) that 
works of literature do more than reflect the unconscious ideology; literature operates 
allegorically, expressing an ―imperceptible‖ homology between the ideology presented in the 
text and the ideological context from which the text is produced and interpreted (58).  To refer to 
literature as allegorical, however, suggests a precise unity of mappings – that all aspects of the 
ideology presented in the text will align with those of the extra-textual world.  Using Black‘s 
notion of allegory as metaphoric vis-à-vis its extra-textual context can help us understand the 
essentially metaphoric function of the literary text.  A ―refraction‖ suggests a tension – the 
refraction is the original light and is not the original light – that ―allegory‖ might not unless 
understood in terms of its socio-historical context. 
Jacques Lacan brought psychoanalytic theory, language, and metaphor onto common 
ground, as Eagleton explains (142-8).  When a child recognizes difference and absence, he 
desires some unity of meaning.  Language offers that unity by uniting a signifier with that which 
it signifies, but it can only do so metaphorically since the signified is not the signifier.  Literature 
is like the ego in that it represses the chaos of its own production, making a unified narrative out 
of disorganized events.  Psychoanalysis does not, however, have the capacity to explain the 
mechanism behind this metaphoric process.  Lacan uses metaphors (e.g., metaphors work like 
mirrors, individuation is metaphorization, etc.) to describe a psychoanalytic process of a 
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recognition of selfhood and otherness.  But those metaphors do not describe in a literal sense 
either the psychoanalytic processes that they describe or the process by which we make meaning 
in language.  They are metaphors that describe metaphors.
37
  I argue that literature is literally a 
metaphoric process.  It is not like a metaphor; it actually operates on the same metaphoric 
process of understanding one thing in terms of another that LIFE IS A JOURNEY operates on.  
Understanding metaphor this way allows us to explain what literature is and how it functions in 
our minds. 
Kenneth Burke suggests a similar reconsideration of literature as ―equipment for living‖ 
in The Philosophy of Literary Form (1941).  His argument extends from his understanding of 
proverbs: ―Proverbs are strategies for dealing with situations.  In so far as situations are typical 
and recurrent in a given social structure, people develop names for them and strategies for 
handling them‖ (296-7).  If this is true, ―Why not extend such analysis of proverbs to encompass 
the whole field of literature?  Could the most complex and sophisticated works of art legitimately 
be considered somewhat as ‗proverbs writ large‘?‖ Burke asks (296).  Just as there are different 
and sometimes contradictory proverbs (e.g., Out of sight, out of mind compared to Absence 
makes the heart grow fonder), there are apparent contradictions in literary depictions of the 
world (297).  When we metaphorize literature as a proverb, we can see literature more clearly as 
a sociological phenomenon, a change in perspective that ―automatically breaks down the barriers 
erected about literature as a specialized pursuit‖ (303).  This would make the study of literature a 
study of types of recurring sociological phenomena and ―would derive its relevance from the fact 
that it should apply both to works of art and to social situations outside art‖ (303).   
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 Ricoeur‘s discusses the inadequacy of such metaphorical descriptions of metaphors as well as the limitations of 
speculative philosophies that are based on metaphors in the final study of Rule of Metaphor (257-313). 
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Burke‘s formulation of literature as a proverb and his suggestion that literature operates 
metaphorically in the same ways that proverbs do is fruitful, particularly insofar as it highlights 
the socio-cultural nature of the construction of knowledge and experience.  But in doing so, it 
suggests that literature is like a proverb and, thus, like a metaphor in its capacity to reflect and 
recreate human thought and activity.  I would go one step further to assert that literature is not 
like a metaphor but that it is metaphoric insofar as we process it in the same way that we process 
metaphor.  To see literature as actually being metaphoric in nature inscribes literature with the 
power of metaphor to determine the reality of any given phenomenon or aspect of a phenomenon 
―through a variety of perspectives‖ or metaphoric perceptions (Burke, ―Master‖ 504).   
Metaphor theorists have also speculated that literature‘s interaction with reality is of a 
fundamentally metaphorical nature.  Samuel Levin‘s Metphoric Worlds (1988) argues that a 
literary text‘s use of specific metaphors that ―are expressed in language that is semantically 
deviant … like ‗The trees were weeping‘‖ (xi) will demand that readers create a metaphoric 
world in which the metaphoric reality described is possible.  Readers must then project 
themselves into this fictional world that violates their understanding of reality in order to 
comprehend the false reality.  But a theory of metaphor based in CMT and a tension theory 
would reject the implicit assertion that we must negate our own experiential knowledge of reality 
in order to understand metaphors.  Furthermore, understanding literature as a metaphoric process 
requires that we consider LITERATURE as a concept and a mode of discourse rather than the 
individual metaphors that are used in any given work of literature.  Levin‘s theory seeks to 
explain how we interpret and comprehend individual works of literature, but it does not explain, 
as this dissertation aims to, how LITERATURE as a mode of discourse has the capacity to create 
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a (metaphoric) reality that readers can see as being their own reality at the same time that they 
realize it is not their reality. 
Mark Turner explains in Reading Minds (1991) that metaphoric concepts appear in 
literature on at least three distinct levels (240-7).  First, metaphors appear on the level of ―local 
phrasing‖ just as they do with all other modes of discourse.  By local phrasing, Turner means 
individual linguistic expressions of conceptual metaphors, some of which may or may not be 
more culturally prevalent than others.  Levin‘s example of Wordsworth‘s ―The trees were 
weeping,‖ for example, is a linguistic expression of the conceptual metaphor TREES ARE 
HUMAN BEINGS, a common use of personification, and also perhaps a less-common 
metonymy like THE WEEPING OF TREES IS THE SADNESS OF NATURE, which would 
still rely on the metaphor of personification.  Second, metaphor operates on the level of an entire 
literary work in the form of controlling metaphors and metaphor systems.  In Tolstoy‘s War and 
Peace, one possible controlling metaphor that governs the meaning of the text is LOVE IS 
WAR.  This metaphor might be developed across the text using a system of local-level 
metaphors (both as linguistic expressions and as events depicted, such as when two lovers are 
depicted as being ―at war‖ with one another) to form a coherent concept across the entire text.  
Third, Turner writes, we might metaphorize our concept of LITERATURE as A 
CONVERSATION BETWEEN AUTHORS AND READERS or as A READER‘S JOURNEY 
THAT IS LED BY THE AUTHOR (245).  But to recognize LITERATURE as A METAPHOR 
is not to metaphorize LITERATURE.  Literature actually operates on the basis of metaphor; the 
literary experience is itself the experience of metaphor.  In this formulation, literature 
metaphorizes LIFE. 




These variations on a theory of literature as a metaphoric process have taken as their 
primary concern an explanation of what literature is by explaining how (various aspects of) 
literature operates.  This concern with a description of what and how was also the primary 
concern of the metaphor theories that proceeded from interanimation and interaction theories, 
including tension theory and CMT.  As yet, however, metaphor theory largely has not taken up 
the central, rhetorical question of why or to what effect we use metaphors in the ways that we do.   
In the field of literary studies, as I indicated above, the homologous shift to a rhetorical 
inquiry can be seen in cultural studies.  Literary analysis and criticism in such cultural studies 
subfields as feminist studies, post-colonial studies, and queer studies take for granted that 
literature provides distorted redescriptions of the reality that various subaltern and minority 
populations experience.  The leitmotiv sustained across this sort of cultural studies analysis is 
that readers are  asked to recognize both the commonality and impossibility of commonality of 
their experiences of LIFE as they read these texts.  In fact, that tension explains why we as 
human beings use literature to communicate: we do so to redescribe our own experiences of 
LIFE in terms of the more abstract experience of LIFE that all human beings share to some 
extent or another, and we do so to experience and reconceptualize LIFE according to someone 
else‘s experiences.    
Metaphor theory today is in need of such a move toward the rhetorical, for it has made 
too little of the question why and for what specific purposes both individuals and socio-cultural 
groups of people use metaphor in literary and non-literary texts.  In CMT, literature is usually 
fodder for proofs about how metaphor functions; this is particularly the case as the field of 
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neurolinguistics takes up the question of the physical brain mechanisms of metaphor.
38
  This 
contributes to other legitimate reasons as to why CMT has kept its distance from English 
departments and literary studies.
39
  Conceptual metaphor theory is primarily located not in 
English studies departments but in linguistics departments or departments that house the 
cognitive sciences.  Consequently, as a ―scientific‖ discipline, it enjoys both better funding and 
more respect both within and outside the academy than either literary or rhetoric and 
composition studies.  Furthermore, literary scholars have no reason to consider the findings of 
CMT if those findings treat literature as a filler of corpora to be dissected by cognitive scientists 
rather than studied for its purely linguistic significance.   
Without a consideration of the rhetorical, a consideration of the effects of language use – 
literary and otherwise – will be absent from both metaphor theory and literary studies.  But there 
are also good historical reasons for why rhetoricians and rhetoric and compositionists have been 
comfortable with ignoring CMT.  Rhetoric is still often seen as the study of taxonomies for 
taxonomies‘ sake, and a return to the study of a particular trope or figure, as metaphor is still 
often defined, may seem to any given rhetorician to reduce the full capacity of rhetorical 
analysis.  Furthermore, rhetoric and composition has fought a long battle for disciplinary and 
institutional autonomy against literary studies, and as metaphor is sometimes also seen as a 
literary or purely stylistic device, rhetoric and compositionists who want to wholly autonomize 
                                                 
38
 Lakoff reported during a plenary session at the Fillmore Fest (2009) at the University of California at Berkeley 
that the latest research in neurolinguistics and neuronal grammar indicates that metaphoric thought happens when 
otherwise-separate neuronal nodes (there are, Lakoff reported, roughly 1,000 neurons per node) respond to the same 
stimulus simultaneously.  This, Lakoff reported, makes metaphor not abstract but ―doubly concrete.‖  It does not, 
however, explain why people would need to formulate doubly-concrete thoughts to negotiate their social contexts 
and rhetorical situations. 
39
 This is with the exception of a period from the early 1980s and the beginning of a formal conceptual metaphor 
theory through Turner‘s Reading Minds, which was published in 1990.  During this time, some prominent CMT 
theorists such as Lakoff, Johnson, and Turner used CMT to make observations about the meaning and interpretation 




their discipline may also eschew the findings of CMT since it presents the risk of proximity to 
the literary.  Finally, rhetoric and composition has already had what scholars in that field refer as 
a ―cognitive‖ moment.  During this period, from the 1970s through the 1980s, compositionists 
attempted to identify universal cognitive compositional processes.  When it became clear that 
composition is too complex a cognitive task to identify any such universal process without also 
univeralizing other factors (e.g., socio-economic status of the writer, the differences among 
particular compositional tasks, the competencies of different writers, etc.), this cognitive 
movement fell out of fashion.
40
  In short, rhetoric and composition scholars have avoided a 
cognitive theory of metaphor out of a fear of reductive, universalizing explanations of linguistic 
competency and use. 
But many opportunities are missed by the institutional and disciplinary separation and 
autonomization that keeps CMT from being a truly interdisciplinary, not just multi-disciplinary, 
area of academic research.  CMT operates on the sort of improved semantics that locates 
meaning not in words but in the contexts and situations in which those words are used.  It proves, 
even in empirical ways in the age of neurolinguistics, that language not just a matter of 
ornamentation or deviation but constituent of human thought and, therefore, action in ways that 
have effects on the real world.  And it locates the significance of the study of language not in the 
study of aesthetics, linguistics, or stylistics exclusively but, as Ricoeur remarks, in the realm of 
the rhetorical, where the central concern is of how particular uses of language to redescribe 
reality can affect the real world by affecting language users. 
The improved semantics on which CMT is based is compatible with the disciplinary and 
institutional disposition of rhetoricality.  CMT supports the assertion that reality is constructed 
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since it locates the meaning of metaphors and of language generally not in words themselves but 
in the use of those words to create concepts and, thus, predispositions to conceptualize the world 
in particular ways that can change from context to context and situation to situation.  In locating 
the creation and comprehension of metaphor and meaning in language in the brain, CMT argues 
that metaphor in particular is a process of thought that occurs in all variety of human discourse, 
thinking, and action.  This means that metaphor and other types of human communicative and 
cognitive activity aren‘t necessarily a matter of interest for one area of research or another.  It 
requires that we open up the study of metaphor to a variety of texts and that we work 
interdisciplinarily to refine our knowledge about how those discursive strategies affect how we 
operate in any given context or situation.  Because the nature of CMT‘s improved semantics 
promotes interdisciplinary research, it also promotes disciplinary and institutional recursivity.  
Disciplinarily, scholars of the various uses of language must acknowledge that our language 
choices create, reflect, and recreate our realities, and those realities may not always invite 
outsiders to share our knowledge.  The structure of the field of academia necessitates a tension 
among the disciplines, for we can never have a unity of thought and purpose since we must have 
a diversity of specializations.  What may appear to be the paradox of the structure of the 
university should instead be seen as a tension, one in which we acknowledge our unified and our 
discipline-specific objectives as being the same and different simultaneously, working in and 
through the tension toward both sets of objectives.  Productive tension, rather than 
autonomization, must be the nature of interdisciplinary study.   
English studies is particularly well-situated to be an example of how rhetoricality can 
curb the impulse toward disciplinary and institutional autonomization in the academy and 
promote more purposeful and profitable knowledge.  In the next chapter, I will examine the 
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literary (and sometimes non-literary) genre of the autobiography as an example of what the 
rhetoricized study of literature as a metaphoric process would entail and what its implications are 
for the field of English studies.  To research and teach literature as a metaphorization of LIFE 
would entail explicit treatment of the tensions between representations of reality and extra-
textual experiences; both the literary and the extra-textual must be seen as ―real‖ experiences, but 
the tension – the is and the is not – between what is redescription-imitation and what is directly 
experienced by people outside the literary work must be explored to understand the impact of 
literature for the extra-textual world.  Consequently, in keeping with the objectives of cultural 
studies, it must acknowledge why the representation of reality depicted in a given literary work 
differs from another literary work and why those representations differ from the reality 
experienced by readers of different perspectives.  It must also consider how language creates, 
reflects, and reinstantiates those tensive realities.  Thus, it requires that English studies recognize 
that linguistics and rhetoric and composition have as much to offer for the study of the linguistic 
phenomenon of ―literature‖ as literary studies itself since metaphor is not exclusively or even 
properly an aesthetic or literary phenomenon.  Ultimately, to reconceptualize literature in this 
way will require English studies as a field to fundamentally reshape its structure and function 
since to conceptualize literature as a metaphoric process is to acknowledge that the study of 
literature is fundamentally a matter of the study of language and rhetoric. 
Chapter 3 – Truth, Concepts, and Autobiography 
 
When a critic insists that only certain subjects are fit subjects for poetry, the statement argues 
from the reality spectrum. … You can read anything, from a Shakespeare sonnet to a cereal box, 
“literarily.”  From this premise departs the current discipline of Cultural Studies, which chooses 
to read the whole of society as a series of “texts.” … You don’t posit an external reality against 
which to measure the reality presented in the literary work.  You accept that literary reality as 
reality itself. 




Everything is a metaphor for human life.  If we build machines, it’s all metaphoric for our own 
bodies.  These race cars are like gladiators out there.  They are performing with full power and 
full impact. 
Jeff Koons, on his design for the BMW Art Car 
 
3.1 Lyndon B. Johnson and the Fallacy of Literary Non-Reality 
 
A special feature on Lyndon B. Johnson in the 23 January 1973 edition of The New York 
Times reports that as soon a young Lyndon could read, he decided that he disliked fiction.  Of the 
stories his mother read to him, Lyndon reportedly asked, ―But Ma, is it real?  Did it really 
happen?‖  According to the article, President Johnson grew to take pride in his preference for 
fact over the non-reality of fiction since facts, by President Johnson‘s understanding, are real, 
true, or historically verifiable and fiction is non-real, at best a distortion of reality, and therefore 
incapable of being true or historically verifiable.   
But the logic of this understanding confuses the relationships among fact, fiction, and 
reality.  Despite President Johnson‘s categorizations, fact and fiction often coincide, as Aristotle 
noted in treating the use of fictional examples in works of rhetoric as a means of rhetorical 
induction.
41
  In such cases, rhetors depict the given facts of a ―real‖ or historically-verifiable 
situation in terms of a fictional situation in an attempt to persuade audiences of the ―reality‖ (i.e., 
correct way of seeing) of that ―real‖ (i.e., historically-verifiable) situation.  Such overlaps 
between rhetorical and literary discourse align with Aristotle‘s distinctions between the aims of 
rhetorical and literary discourse and historiography and philosophy: it is the purpose of neither 
rhetorical nor literary discourse to act as disinterested reports of ―real‖ or factual (historically-
verifiable) events or as logical proofs about the ―reality‖ (objective world) they represent. 
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Furthermore, by Johnson‘s logic, fictional literature or any literature other than historical 
reports (e.g., biographies, historical narratives) cannot, by definition, be ―real.‖  In fact, in 
preferring fact to fiction because fact accurately represents reality while fiction distorts that 
accurate representation, Johnson is committed to the notion that it is possible to accurately 
(objectively) refer to the reality described.  This assumes that historians and biographers, and 
other language users, have access to the objective language and interpretation that Ricoeur called 
rhetoric degree zero.  It also means that, like Aristotle, Johnson assumes that language does not 
have the capacity to change positive reality – which also suggests that reality can be purely 
perceived because it can be purely represented by a rhetoric degree zero – and any attempt to 
affect the pure perception of reality via language will result in a distorted depiction of reality.  
Consequently, any depiction of non-reality is essentially a misuse of both language and reality. 
Johnson was neither the first nor will he be the last person to dismiss fictional literature 
as irrelevant to or as a distraction from ―reality.‖  In fact, Johnson‘s rejection of literature is 
based on a confusion about the nature of fiction, language, and reality that also distorts a sense of 
the capacity of literature to not just entertain and instruct, as Sir Philip Sidney put it, but to affect 
the realities of those who experience it.  And it is probably a rationale for rejecting the 
significance of literature that is more prevalent today than contemporary English studies scholars 
may think. 
On the other hand, many contemporary scholars in English studies think that the purpose 
for studying literature is so self-evident or well-covered that it requires little or no explanation.  
But if one were to take a survey of English studies scholars and teachers about what those 
purposes are, surely the range of responses would indicate that some explanation is indeed 
necessary since there isn‘t (and, I aver, should not be) a universal sense of purpose.  Since the 
109 
 
necessity of English studies, particularly that of literary studies, has been predicated on a 
mystification of the literary object, we now require a demystification.   
Conceptual metaphor theory, cognitive linguistics, and rhetoric each give us ways to 
demystify the literary object by explaining the mechanisms and principles by which language, 
meaning, and reality interrelate.  Conceptual metaphor theory has demonstrated in ways that are 
culturally-, contextually-, and empirically-aware that language and, consequently, literature 
create and reflect reality.  In this chapter, I will explain how literature becomes real in the minds 
of those who experience it.  This literary reality has the potential to affect extra-textual reality by 
influencing both our cultural knowledge and the ways that we perceive and comprehend natural, 
positive reality.  The interactional process of understanding our experiences of reality in terms of 
the experiences of reality depicted in literature and vice versa is fundamentally metaphorical.  To 
explain the mechanisms of this process, I will draw upon the work of conceptual metaphor 
theorists, including Lakoff and Johnson, to explain how the processes associated with 
metaphorization – including categorization, interactivity, prototype effects, and highlighting – 
are at work when we metpahorize literature.  Finally, I will conclude with a series of case studies 
of autobiographical texts that demonstrates the need to rhetoricize the field of literary studies by 
recognizing literature as a metaphor for the cognitively- and culturally-constructed concept 
LIFE.  By approaching literature in this way, English studies scholars and teachers can promote a 
more accurate, demystified understanding of the relationships among language, literature, and 
reality.   
3.2 Categories and/of Experiential Reality 
 




In Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff and Johnson explain the implications of our cognitive 
capacity to create and comprehend metaphors for a theory of truth and reality.  Philosophical 
approaches to metaphor, Lakoff and Johnson write, have tended to treat metaphor in opposition 
to truth, defined as ―objective (absolute and unconditional),‖ thereby relegating metaphor to the 
realm of the poetic or literary, wherein questions of metaphor‘s truth or objective connection to 
reality had been banished (Metaphors 159, original emphasis).  This notion of truth comes from 
what Lakoff calls in his later work Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things (1987) the classical 
theory of category construction.  According to this classical theory, human beings perceive 
phenomena as being part of certain categories based on the shared natural properties of those 
phenomena.  Furthermore, it assumes that there is one and only one way of correctly 
categorizing those phenomena into concepts since there is only one valid way to perceive and 
interpret reality.  The confusion may arise, Lakoff suggests, because  
Most categorization is automatic and unconscious . . . In moving about the world, we 
automatically categorize people, animals, and physical objects, both natural and man-
made.  This sometimes leads to the impression that we just categorize things as they are, 
that things come in natural kinds, and that our categories of mind naturally fit the kinds of 
things there are in the world.  But a large proportion of our categories are not categories 
of things; they are categories of abstract entities. … Any adequate account of human 
thought must provide an accurate theory for all our categories, both concrete and abstract. 
(Women 6, original emphasis) 
The assumptions of the classical theory of truth were based more on philosophical speculation 
than on empirical study of the perception and interpretation of reality, Lakoff asserts.  But they 
do not account for the discoveries made by linguists in at least the past sixty years about what 
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language use can tell us empirically about the relationship of categorization and concepts to 
reality.   
Conceptual metaphor theory is based in a different theory of truth than is the classical 
theory of category construction.  On one hand, conceptual metaphor theorists disagree that there 
exists an objective, natural truth that our concepts and language can and do accurately reflect.  
On the other hand, conceptual metaphor theorists do not claim that all connections among 
language, semantics, and reality are relative.  Rather, the theory of truth undergirding CMT 
asserts that we perceive something to be true when it fits our existing systems of concepts or, 
more rarely, fits as a result of having caused us to cognitively adjust our conceptual system 
(Women 267).  Adjustments to our conceptual system occur as a result of our cultural context, 
individual embodiment, and experience of the natural world.  Consider the findings of Eleanor 
Rosch‘s groundbreaking work with language and categorization, to which Lakoff refers in 
Women.  Rosch‘s study of the category BIRD
42
 indicates that categories are not the result of 
direct and objective perception of the categories that are natural and self-evident.  Rosch 
discovered that people think of some birds as better and worse examples of the category BIRD.  
Specifically, robins and sparrows were considered by the subjects of Rosch‘s study to be better 
examples of BIRD than owls and eagles, Lakoff reports (Women 45).   
At first, Rosch‘s results seemed to suggest, according to Lakoff, ―that membership in the 
category bird is graded and that owls and penguins are less members of the bird category than 
robins‖ (Women 45).  But this isn‘t the case.  Each of the birds listed as examples were 
recognized by respondents as being fully birds, not more or less birds, as they would be if 
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 Typographically, words that are capitalized indicate that the word refers to a concept, something that is entirely in 
the minds of language users; categories, insofar as they refer to the conceptual categories that we construct to 
understand reality, will also be capitalized.  Italics, as with the previous chapter, indicate the use of an example.  For 




membership in the category BIRD were graded.  Lakoff explains that the fact that some birds are 
recognized as better examples of BIRD than others proves that there are other ways to structure 
categories than natural or ―true‖ correspondence to an objective reality.  Instead, we cognitively 
organize the phenomena we encounter into conceptual categories.  That is, our perception not 
only of things but ―of abstract entities … [including] events, actions, emotions, spatial 
relationships, social relationships, and abstract entities‖ is fundamentally ―a matter of both 
human experience and imagination – of perception, motor activity, and culture on the one hand, 
and of metaphor, metonymy, and mental imagery on the other (Women 6-8).  Rosch‘s work 
proves that we are capable of perceiving in our world in terms of prototypicality – recognizing 
that there are better and worse examples of things that are equally members in a category – 
because our categories are conceptual rather than natural or positive.   
3.2.2 Truth, Reality, and Experience 
 
Thus, we perceive truth not when something fits with objective, natural reality but when 
it fits with the conceptual categories of reality that we have constructed as a result of our direct 
and indirect experiences of that reality.  This is the fundamental premise of experiential realism, 
which Lakoff and Johnson offer to as an alternative to the classical theory of truth.  Consider the 
example, cited by Lakoff in Women, of Charles Fillmore‘s study of the conceptual category 
BACHELOR (70-1).  We are not born knowing what or who is properly called a ―bachelor,‖ and 
not all cultures and languages have a term for the concept BACHELOR.  We come to ―know‖ or, 
more accurately, to construct a conceptual category of BACHELOR by first encountering the 
concept in our culture, adopting it into our own conceptual systems of thought, and by meeting 
or hearing about people who fit the category BACHELOR.  Because categories are constructed 
rather than natural, according to experiential realism, our conceptual systems can absorb 
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anomalies.  For example, we can simultaneously know that the word ―bachelor‖ denotes an 
unmarried adult man and that there are men who meet those criteria but are not members of the 
conceptual category BACHELOR.  The Pope is one such example.  The Pope is not an 
uncommon member of the category BACHELOR nor is he a bad example of the category.  To be 
either a prototypical or atypical member of the category would imply that the Pope belongs to the 
category at all.  If BACHELOR were a natural category, then the Pope would have to belong to it 
since it would be against nature to omit him from a category whose criteria he meets.  But, of 
course, like all conceptual categories, BACHELOR is not natural and objective but constructed 
from personal and cultural experience with and knowledge of that category, as are exceptions to 
the rules that structure our knowledge of the concept. 
How is it possible that we can know that BACHELOR should include the Pope and that 
BACHELOR should not include the Pope?  Fillmore‘s study, Lakoff remarks, suggests that we 
can explain the discontinuity by understanding that not all categories consist of prototypical or 
graded membership (whereby, for example, some bachelors are better examples of BACHELOR 
than others) but by recognizing that what is graded is ―the degree to which the [category] fits our 
knowledge or assumptions about the world‖ and vice versa (Women 71).  Lakoff offers another 
equally plausible explanation of the contradiction between categorization and knowledge as 
being a matter of thinking of BACHELOR as an idealized cognitive model (ICM).  An ICM is a 
complex of multiple concepts with its own internal structure.  Idealized cognitive models are 
―idealized‖ in that they represent how we think about things more than they represent actual 
things.  They are ―models‖ in that their idealized structure reflects (what we perceive to be) 
reality more than an accurate reflection of reality.  The ICM for BACHELOR would include not 
only a structured concept of the criteria by which we consider something as a member of the 
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category BACHELOR; it would also include a structured concept of our knowledge about the 
background conditions that are necessary for membership in the category.  In this example, we 
would ―take two cognitive models – one for bachelor and one for characterizing one‘s 
knowledge about an individual, say the pope – and compare them, noting the ways in which they 
overlap and the ways in which they differ‖ (Women 71).  Since our knowledge of the Pope does 
not fit our knowledge of BACHELORS, we do not perceive this discontinuity as a 
misrepresentation of nature. 
These studies of language, cognition, and categorization reveal that reality consists of our 
constructed knowledge both of objectively-observable phenomena and of abstract entities.  
―Since we understand the world not only in terms of individual things but also in terms of 
categories of things,‖ Lakoff writes, ―we tend to attribute a real existence to those categories‖ 
(Women 9).  That is, we take our categories as appropriate to reality, and we reason about the 
world based on the ways we have constructed reality in categories.  The fact that we recognize 
better and worse examples of the members of categories and that there are multiple ways of 
explaining the contradictions and unpredictability of those categories supports the notion that 
reality is in many ways more experiential than objective. 
To some, it may seem that experiential realism is essentially a theory of relativism, but 
experientialism contends that our concepts are grounded in our experiences of certain objective 
phenomena, including our physical environment and embodiment (Metaphors 180; Women 210, 
344).  For example, the color green exists in the world objectively to the extent that most human 
beings possess the same color receptors that allow us to see the same hues, and any given object 
that we may perceive as being green will be green (i.e., reflect light in ways that would create the 
effect of being green) regardless of human perception.  GREEN, as a conceptual category, is 
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different from the phenomena that produces what we perceive as the color green, and it is 
different in objective ways from both the cognitive and physical perception of other colors.  The 
difference is not a question of mere language peculiarities but one of both objective and 
constructed reality: if I am told that a traffic light is blue when I perceive it, as a result of my 
physical capacities, to be green, I will think that the speaker has mistaken or purposefully 
misrepresented reality, though the speaker could be using the construction of ―blue‖ available to 
her through her particular background knowledge (e.g., her culture, her native language), which 
may be quite different from my own.   
This theory regarding the ties of the positive, physical world to perception and knowledge 
opposes scientific objectivism and improves upon scientific realism. ―Scientific objectivism,‖ 
Lakoff explains,  
claims that there is only one fully correct way in which reality can be correctly divided up 
into objects, properties, and relations.  Accordingly, the correct choice of objects is not a 
matter of a choice of conceptual schemes: there is only one correct way to understand 
reality in terms of objects and categories of objects.  Scientific realism, on the other hand, 
assumes that ―the world is the way it is,‖ while acknowledging that there can be more 
than one scientifically correct way of understanding reality in terms of conceptual 
schemes with different objects and categories of objects. … Since no God‘s eye view 
standard is possible, that is the best we can do – and it‘s pretty good.  Good enough to 
provide us with reasonable standards for stable scientific knowledge.  (Women 265) 
The downfall of scientific realism, Lakoff finds, is that it still offers insufficient explanations of 
why categories don‘t universally correspond to the natural world and why it is possible for the 
human mind to reason around overlaps and contradictions in categories.  Experientialism, 
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however, helps us explain that categories are ―real‖ when they fit our experiences of the natural, 
positive world and our constructed knowledge about it. 
Arguably, ―reality‖ isn‘t as important a concern to experiential realism as meaning.  
Experiential realism sees ―reality‖ in the sense of ―objectively observable phenomena‖ as raw 
data that people experience and interpret.  We make use of our existing conceptual categories in 
experiencing and interpreting (phenomena as being part of) these conceptual categories, sorting 
the data into applicable categories, perhaps restructuring the categories if necessary, and 
recognizing some experiences as better or worse fits for these existing categories.  If it is true 
that our concepts and categories are not objective but are a matter of the interpretation of the raw 
data of experience through the various (biological, physical, and social) lenses of our embodied 
nature as human beings, then it becomes clear that our very interpretations of the ―real‖ material 
world and our constructions of ―real‖ abstractions like time, truth, and honesty are not objective 
in a positive sense but experientially and cognitively real in an objective sense.  Put simply, any 
experience is real and has the capacity to affect reality by affecting how we think and act in the 
real world. 
3.2.3 Metaphor and Experiential Reality 
 
In experientialism, metaphor can be treated as true or false since truth and falsity are 
determined by fit with concepts rather than natural categories.  This contradicts the traditional 
notion that metaphor is a poetic aberration from ―literal‖ language that is incapable of being or 
communicating ―truth.‖  It also means, Lakoff and Johnson aver, that we can study metaphor 
using empirical and social-scientific methods that give us a more precise understanding 
metaphors‘ ―conceptual nature, their contribution to understanding, [and] their function in 
cultural reality‖ (Metaphors 159).  Once we assume that reality is both objective and constructed 
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and that our conceptual systems give structure and meaning to our experience of reality, we can 
make the study of metaphor a matter of studying the mind and its cognitive mechanisms, 
capacities, and habits, and of understanding how and why we use cognition to link our 
conceptual systems and reality.  We can use methods from literary analysis to discourse analysis 
and neuroimaging to show those who think that language has no bearing on reality that to link 
source and target linguistically or culturally is to link them physically in our brains and 
cognitively in our minds; we can explain that hearing a repeated metaphor produces observable 
effects in the minds of individuals and in whole cultures.  By extension, we can also explain that 
the experience of (particularly recurrent patterns of) literary plots and tropes also affects our 
minds and our perception of and participation in reality in empirically-verifiable ways. 
To prove that metaphors are true – that is, that they fit with our conceptual systems – one 
must first observe what the conventional knowledge is of the source and target concepts involved 
in the metaphor.  This is particularly easy for conventional metaphors such as ANGER IS HEAT 
and SAD IS DOWN that are already part of our culture‘s way of conceptualizing, experiencing, 
and communicating about reality.  These conventional metaphors may seem to be ―transcendent‖ 
because they are nearly universal, and in those cultures where these metaphors are commonly 
encountered, they may seem too automatic to be constructed.  However, their universality and 
commonality derive not from some property inherent in the concept (qua concept) or linguistic 
expression (qua language) but from the fact that all people experience ANGER IS HEAT and 
SAD IS DOWN as the result of our physical embodiment: Anger leads to increased heart rate 
and to increased body temperature; similarly, those who are sad or depressed are often lack the 
energy it takes to sit or stand up straight (Metaphors 15).  Statements such as She was steamed 
and He seems really down are linguistic expressions of metaphors that are structured by our 
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conceptual categories of ANGER, HEAT, SAD, and DOWN, and the metaphors they express – 
ANGER IS HEAT, and SAD IS DOWN – are themselves concepts that are conventional for 
most cultures.  Each culture has its own sets of conventional metaphors, and when we adopt 
concepts like ANGER IS HEAT into our conceptual systems, we measure truth against it. 
Lakoff and Johnson find that unconventional metaphors can be understood as true in the 
same way as conventional metaphors.  To prove this assertion, they examine the truth of two 
linguistic expressions of the same conceptual metaphor, LIFE IS A STORY.  The first – Tell me 
the story of your life – is a conventional expression in our culture.  The second – Life’s … a tale 
told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing – is an unconventional expression of 
the same metaphor.  To understand whether the unconventional expression is true – that is, 
whether LIFE can be A STORY – we must understand what it means to think that LIFE IS A 
STORY.  ―It is assumed‖ in our culture, Lakoff and Johnson write, ―that everyone‘s life is 
structured like a story, and the entire biographical and autobiographical tradition is based on this 
assumption.  Suppose someone asks you to tell your life story.  What do you do?  You construct 
a coherent narrative that starts early in your life and continues up to the present‖ (Metaphors 
172).  LIFE, when conceptualized in terms of a STORY, will be structured in terms of categories 
of common LIFE experiences, including experiences with/of people, parts of life (―significant 
facts, episodes, and significant states‖), stages of life (including preconditions, beginning, 
middle, and end), a linear sequence of events and an indication of the causes for the linear 
progression of the sequence, and purposes (goals, plans, or other catalysts) (Metaphors 173). In 
telling our life stories, we highlight some participants and events over others and ―perceive them 
as fitting together coherently in the way specified by the structure of the narrative‖ (Metaphors 
173-4).  The unconventional expression of this conventional metaphor can also be true if it  
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fit[s] the lives of people whose life circumstances change so radically, rapidly, and 
unexpectedly that no coherent life story ever seems possible for them. … [W]e should 
stress … that issues of truth are among the least relevant and interesting issues that arise 
in the study of metaphor.  The real significance of the metaphor LIFE‘S … A TALE 
TOLD BY AN IDIOT is that, in getting us to try to understand how it could be true, it 
makes possible a new understanding of our lives.  It highlights the fact that we are 
constantly functioning under the expectation of being able to fit our lives into some 
coherent life story but that this expectation may be constantly frustrated when the most 
salient experiences in our lives, those full of sound and fury, do not fit any coherent 
whole and, therefore, signify nothing.  (Metaphors 174) 
For those cultures in which LIFE IS A STORY is not a conventional metaphor, it will not be 
automatically true that LIFE is any sort of STORY, though the metaphor can still be true insofar 
as it fits its audience‘s knowledge of the source and target concepts.  
3.3 Literary Reality 
 
3.3.1 Interaction between LIFE and STORY 
 
Lakoff and Johnson‘s choice of the conventional metaphor LIFE IS A STORY proves 
particularly felicitous for considering ways in which the study of language, including literature, 
can be enriched by the principles, methods, and discoveries of CMT.  In this metaphor, we 
consider LIFE
43
 in terms of A STORY, highlighting salient entailments or aspects of both 
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 By LIFE, I do not mean ―those things which are alive‖ or ―the state of being alive.  The distinction is important 
since the sense of ―life‖ I have in mind has more to do with the constructed notion of daily lived experience than any 
state of being.  Furthermore, as regards the category structure of the concept LIFE, I have refrained from any 
description of LIFE by some existing distinctions (e.g., Lakoff‘s distinctions among subcategories in Women, Fire, 
and Dangerous Things).  I affirm that LIFE is a concept and that it and its constituent conceptual categories exhibit 
prototype effects because of their various types of category structures (e.g., radial categories, ICMs, metonymic 
models, etc.).  But since multiple explanations of the structures of categories are possible, and since making this sort 
of distinction would only be of minimal importance for my observations about the nature of literature (i.e., that the 
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concepts and hiding others, then mapping the salient entailments from the relatively more 
concrete phenomenon STORY to the relatively more abstract phenomenon of LIFE or lived 
human experience.  The aspects of STORY that Lakoff and Johnson find most pertinent to 
understanding LIFE include participants/characters, plot, stages of the story, the linearity of the 
sequence of events or plot, and the purpose or the moral communicated in the story.  Less salient 
aspects of the concept STORY include where and how STORIES are told, though these are also 
part of our concept of STORY and we might not recognize something as being a story if we 
encountered it in a nutrition label or if it were shouted at us.  The aspects of STORY that are 
highlighted are those that that help us to see a resemblance
44
 between LIFE and STORY.  The 
structure of this conceptual metaphor can be as illuminating as it is oppressive, as Lakoff and 
Johnson point out: stories narrate and organize the experiences they depict, guiding us to see 
some examples of LIFE – the lived human experience of certain (categories of ) people, events, 
causes, and purposes – as being better or worse examples of the experience and/or story of LIFE.  
The metaphor LIFE IS A STORY also exemplifies the validity of the interanimation and 
interaction theories of metaphor that were first offered by I.A. Richards and Max Black.  Lakoff 
and Johnson and many conceptual metaphor theorists after them rejected interaction theories on 
the grounds that they imply a conceptual unity rather than a tension exists between metaphorized 
                                                                                                                                                             
prototype effects of the categories of LIFE presented in works of literature are evident when we consider what 
experiences are and are not what we take to be ―typical‖ in both culture and literature), I leave the work of defining 
the types of categories of LIFE to others who may find such an investigation to be necessary and fruitful. 
44
 Ricoeur comments at length in Rule of Metaphor about the relationship of metaphor to resemblance.  While he 
rejects the notion that metaphor is a matter of superficial substitution or comparison (the purview of simile), he 
remarks that comparison is not synonymous with resemblance; metaphor requires the ability to see resemblances in 
phenomena, but it does not necessarily require that we compare the phenomena or their similar or dissimilar 
features.  Ricoeur endorses Hester‘s theory that metaphor is a matter of seeing one thing as another: ―‘Seeing X as 
Y‘ encompasses ‗X is not Y‘‖ (214).  To see a resemblance implies that we recognize both the similarities and the 
dissimilarities simultaneously in a metaphor, and that in recognizing them, ―The borders of meaning are transgressed 
but not abolished‖ (214).  Seeing-as also indicates that we do more than use a trick of language to effect a 
comparison when we formulate metaphors; it ―designates the non-verbal mediation of the metaphorical statement‖ 
(214, original emphasis).  Ultimately, the mimetic work of metaphor is not in imitation or comparison but in 
highlighting salient resemblances between two distinct phenomena. 
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domains.  This unity implies that metaphors can be inverted and retain their meaning, but Lakoff 
and Johnson note that the entailments that follow from LIFE IS A STORY are different from A 
STORY IS LIFE.  That is, the second metaphor would produce such expressions as This story is 
born rather than My story began with my birth.  These qualms with interaction theories, however, 
do not take into account that Black‘s interaction theory rejects the notion that metaphor is only a 
matter of comparing or finding likenesses between concepts.  It also ignores the fact that 
interaction theories of metaphor are more concerned with the likelihood that when we encounter 
one concept from a common metaphor we are more likely to think about the other concept from 
the common metaphor than we are another concept that we have never or only rarely associated 
with the concept.   
In fact, the history of how we have conceptualized literature in the West indicates that the 
concepts LIFE and STORY have come to interact with one another beyond the scope of the 
metaphor LIFE IS A STORY.
45
  Since at least Aristotle, we have come to understand stories as 
being significant for their ability to hypostatize abstract notions about LIFE into the concrete 
representation of experiencing/experienced LIFE.  As Eagleton demonstrates,
46
 we judge 
STORIES to be good in terms of style – their aesthetic execution – or in terms of their meaning – 
how interesting the stories are or whether they provide the best reflection of our experiences or 
the reflection of our best experiences.
47
  We have taken some stories as being more important or, 
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 Whether this interaction caused the metaphor LIFE IS A STORY or is the result of that metaphor is perhaps 
something that can be ascertained with a relative degree of certainty, but it would require us to investigate the 
metaphor systems and uses of literature across history, cultures, geographic locations, and modes of discourse.  I am 
inclined to say that it is as likely that the concept LIFE IS A STORY led to our thinking of LIFE and STORY in 
terms of one another beyond this metaphor as it is that the interaction of STORY and LIFE in the minds of people in 
various Western cultures has led Americans to metaphorize LIFE as a STORY.  Regardless of which came first, the 
metaphoric and conceptual interactions recursively construct and reshape each other each time we use them. 
46
 For a summary of Eagleton‘s overview of definitions of literature, see chapter 1, above. 
47
 I have not included ―significant‖ alongside ―style‖ and ―meaning‖ because ―significant‖ works may not 
necessarily be ―good,‖ either stylistically or in terms of meaning.  They may be significant because they are bad, and 
so they are not necessarily appropriate to the category of GOOD STORIES to which I refer here. 
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like robins in the category BIRD, as better examples than others both of good writing and of the 
LIFE depicted in the (fictional and non-fictional) texts.  We have created a conceptual category 
for these stories and an accompanying linguistic term, ―literature.‖  Put another way, we have, as 
Eagleton notes, come to equate the stylistic excellence and engaging content of a work of 
literature with its importance or significance for our own life experiences.   
3.3.2 The Metaphoric Nature of Literary Comprehension 
 
The equation of our concept of GOOD or LITERARY WRITING with our concept of 
what constitutes a GOOD LIFE isn‘t the consequence of the natural characteristics of any of 
these categories.  It is the result of our processing literature as a metaphor.  In reading a work of 
literature, readers draw upon their conceptual category of LIFE – both what is considered 
prototypical or normal according to the multiple cultures to which they belong as well as to their 
own direct, personal experiences – in order to discern what the text before them suggests is or 
should be involved in the experience of LIFE.  This is a metaphoric process, one in which 
readers understand the text in terms of their knowledge about the participants, parts, stages, 
linearity, causality, and purpose of lived human experience.  This literary comprehension is 
interactional, though, insofar as readers‘ concepts about LIFE can be changed by experiencing 
LIFE (as it is depicted) in works of literature.  Ultimately, this sort of indirect experience is the 
same as hearing only second-hand information about bachelors and constructing a conceptual 
category of BACHELOR based on purely these sorts of indirect experiences.  Without having 
had the direct experience of meeting a bachelor, it is still possible for me to draw upon others‘ 
experiences to gain my own knowledge of the category.  It may be that literature is even more 
powerful than other indirect experiences of LIFE (such as listening to our friends‘ stories of their 
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experiences with bachelors) because we have been conditioned to recognize LITERATURE as 
having something significant to say about LIFE.  
It is important to emphasize that this experience of literature as a metaphorization of 
LIFE is fundamentally tensive in the way that Ricoeur theorized metaphor to be tensive.  We 
may find many opportunities to metaphorize the experience of LIFE depicted in a literary text 
and in terms of our particular lives and our concept of LIFE.  But we will also inevitably find 
that the correspondences and resemblances between the literary depiction of LIFE and our own 
knowledge of it will never form a unity or tautology, both because it is not an individual reader‘s 
life story being told in every work of literature and because the reader‘s particular experiences 
and concept of LIFE are not always those that are suggested to the reader in the work of 
literature as being possible, typical, or ideal.   
The metaphoric nature of literature and the fact that what literature metaphorizes are 
concepts of LIFE makes literature of the utmost importance.  This metaphoric theory of literature 
is predicated on the notion that we construct our experiences into conceptual categories and that, 
in turn, our concepts affect how we perceive, react to, and comprehend reality.  This means that 
literature has the potential to influence reality by influencing its readers‘ notions of what people, 
events, stages, sequence and causes for changes and developments, and purposes are typical of 
LIFE, categorically speaking.  It bears repeating that this is a matter of influence, not 
determination.  The fear of cognitive determination is at work whenever any authority – from the 
federal government to parents – threatens to ban a book because of its capacity to influence the 
masses (not just scandalize them).  But this folk theory
48
 of literary determination often 
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 Lakoff defines folk theories or folk models as the theorization by ―Ordinary people without any technical 
expertise‖ (Women 118).  Folk theories are not to be entirely discounted, but it is important that we recognize that 
folk theories can oversimplify or misrepresent both the natural world and the nature of human activity in it. 
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reinforces an unfounded fear that to influence concepts and thinking, even temporarily, is to 
permanently and irreversibly change that concept.  Thankfully, experientialism demonstrates that 
such a theory of determination oversimplifies the relationship among language, cognition, and 
reality.  Concepts are neither made or fundamentally reshaped suddenly, nor are any such 
changes necessarily permanent, certainly not from a cognitive point of view.  If, for example, if 
we read often enough about female characters who are either sweet and helpless or cruel and 
domineering, or if those are the primary type of culturally-significant or well-known female 
characters, then those literary experiences of women can affect our concept of WOMEN at least 
temporarily and perhaps permanently.  Concepts like WOMAN may not change overnight, but 
they can change over time if repeated experiences, such as literary experiences, influence our 
structure of the concept.   
As an example of the ways that literature can metaphorize and influence our concepts of 
entailed aspects of LIFE, consider the conceptual category DETECTIVE as it is typically 
represented in literature.  The typical detective is a man who eschews emotion in favor of a cool, 
logical approach to most things in life, including his detective work, but who is also a loner and 
operates on his own authority.  Prototypical examples of the DETECTIVE include Sherlock 
Holmes and Philip Marlowe.  Atypical examples of DETECTIVES are women, but female 
detectives often exhibit many of the personality traits of the prototypical male detectives.  One 
example of such a female detective is V.I. Warshawski, the protagonist of Sara Paretsky‘s novels 
including Killing Orders (1985) and Hardball (2009).  V.I. also goes by the androgynous 
truncation ―Vic,‖ though her full name is Victoria.  Nancy Drew is an even less ―good‖ example 
of DETECTIVE than V.I. Warshawski because of her age and friendly temperament.  As we 
read works of literature that feature detectives, we weigh whether the depiction of DETECTIVE 
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– as a conceptual category of people and therefore part of our concept of what the experience of 
LIFE can or should entail – is or is not a good fit with our existing knowledge about LIFE and 
the world as we‘ve experienced it.  It would take many more stories with female detectives to 
make gender a moot point for defining goodness-of-example of the category DETECTIVE in 
works of literature and for those literary examples to permanently affect the structure of 
DETECTIVE as a conceptual category in our minds. 
Furthermore, our non-literary experiences of DETECTIVE as a category influence the 
structure of the category for us as individuals and, if the experiences are widely-shared, for an 
entire culture.  As we read a work of literature that has a character who is a detective, we balance 
the depiction of the character presented in the text against our expectations of the typical 
detective.  We may find Nancy Drew‘s atypicality as a member of the category DETECTIVE to 
be interpreted as new and creative or as a purposeless deviation from the norm.
49
  We may find 
both Nancy Drew and Sherlock Holmes to be atypical of our direct, personal, extra-literary 
experience of detectives, even if Holmes remains typical for our concept of LITERARY 
DETECTIVES.  The process of identifying when and how any given work of literature presents 
us with an accurate depiction of ―real‖ LIFE always involves a process of recognizing both fit 
and incongruity between our concept of what the literary work suggests about LIFE and the 
concept of LIFE that we bring to the text. 
Thus, the metaphoric nature of literature is what makes it worthy of study and research.  
The ways that the world is presented in literature matters, particularly if the representation is one 
that recurs in a culture.  If DETECTIVES are thought by a culture to be one way or another, then 
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 For more on the implications of genre-based categorical normativity regarding the concept DETECTIVE, see 
Anne Cranny-Francis‘s chapter in The Power of Literacy, ―Gender and Genre: Feminist Subversion of Genre Fiction 
and its Implications for Critical Literacy.‖ 
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atypical detectives – whether ―literary,‖ fictitious (as with characters like Monk or Cal 
Lightman), or flesh-and-blood – may not be recognized as detectives.  The stakes can be quite 
high for people from marginalized or underrepresented groups.  Often, their experiences do not 
align with what the mainstream anticipates should be the norm, and literature has the potential to 
reinforce or adjust how readers think about both the norm and those whose experiences do not 
always fit well with it.   
In the remainder of this chapter, I offer a brief study of the metaphoric nature of 
autobiography and four case studies of autobiographies as a more detailed example of what the 
study of literature as a metaphorization of LIFE can reveal about the relationships among 
language, literature, cultural, individual readers and writers, and cognition.  Autobiography is a 
fruitful example of this approach to literature for several reasons.  First, autobiography as a genre 
is not always considered ―literary,‖ and even when it is, not all autobiographies are equally 
esteemed as ―literary,‖ sometimes because they are not considered aesthetically-pleasing or 
aesthetically- or culturally-significant.  Analyzing several autobiographies, including those that 
may not generally be considered to be literary, will help prove that it is the reading and 
comprehension process that is fundamentally ―literary‖ and that we can and do read a variety of 
texts as literature. 
Second, autobiography presents us with opportunities to observe the tensive but 
complementary interaction of history, rhetoric, and aesthetics that has been the source of 
profound confusion about the relationship between language and truth or reality and between 
rhetoric and literature.  Third, autobiographies give us an opportunity to explore the ways that 
our concepts, perceptions, and actions structure and are structured by our individual and socio-
cultural experiences.  For this reason, I focus my study on autobiographies written by Americans 
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after 1970 since it was after 1970 that autobiographies that were atypical in terms of style and 
that represented an atypical (concept of) LIFE began to receive serious critical and cultural 
attention.  These autobiographies represent the tensions between LIFE as depicted in the work of 
literature and the concept of LIFE as it is constructed by the individual and cultural experiences 
of the autobiographer and readers. 
3.4 Autobiographical Experiences of LIFE 
 
3.4.1 Autobiographical Prototype Effects 
 
Are genre-based classifications made in the same way that all other types of categories 
are developed?  As rhetorical genre theorist Amy J. Devitt remarks in Writing Genres (2004), 
this ―is a question deserving examination by neurologists, cognitive psychologists, and 
psyscholinguists.  What we know,‖ she continues, 
is that language users perceive genres without being taught them apart from learning 
language (once they know the words, they describe themselves as telling ―jokes‖ or 
―stories,‖ for example), and different groups develop new words to describe the different 
genres they use.  People classify unique actions under common labels, and we scholars 
call those labels ―genres.‖ (8-9) 
Devitt goes on to warn that genres are not synonymous with categories if by categories we mean 
arbitrary divisions or seemingly inherent qualities (6-9).  Devitt endorses the view of genre that 
has dominated rhetorical genre theory for nearly three decades: that genre is a typified rhetorical 
action that becomes typified as a result of its use in ―recurring conditions [that] involve a social 
context‖ (13). 
These views of genre align with what cognitive linguistics and an experientialist theory 
of knowledge and reality tell us about the interaction of language and the cognitive process of 
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categorization.  For both rhetorical genre theorists and cognitive linguists who accept the basic 
premises of experientialism, genres can be considered categories without ignoring that genres are 
conceptual categories, constructed by language users, that both shape and are shaped by how 
their users perceive and act in the world.  To think of genres as categories in this way is not to 
think of them as arbitrary or false labels that derive more from scholars‘ and critics‘ arbitrary 
pronouncements about what a given genre‘s essential traits are or should be.  Instead, it defines 
genre as a strategy employed by language users to construct their worlds and establish 
expectations for reacting to recurring situations. 
As conceptual categories, genres are one way that reader cognitively structure their 
individual and cultural experiences and of the (experiences depicted in the) texts they read.  
Because conceptual categories are constructed from experiential knowledge, they are, as Devitt 
notes about genres, constantly balancing between stability and instability (135).  However, the 
fact that genre labels and categories exist indicates a shared experiential knowledge of patterns of 
text form, function, and effects.  That is, the fact that the genre label ―joke‖ is commonly used 
and recognized in our culture indicates that we share the conceptual category JOKE like we do 
BIRD and BACHELOR.  We expect that jokes will fit our experiential knowledge of what JOKE 
entails; texts that are not funny or that are serious may not be recognized as JOKES.  We may 
find atypical jokes to be innovative or bad examples of the category JOKE.  Regardless, 
rhetorical genre theory, cognitive psychology, and cognitive linguistics all indicate that the 
conceptual structure of JOKE isn‘t something we‘re born with; we construct our knowledge of 
the genre category by hearing others talk about and tell jokes and by seeing others‘ reactions to 
the jokes we tell or hear. 
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Because our knowledge of genre categories depends on our individual and social 
experiences of the genre in cultural contexts, the conceptual structures of genre categories reveal 
just as much about culture and history as the textual patterns to which they refer.  For example, 
whether we define AUTOBIOGRAPHY as a subcategory of LITERATURE has to do with our 
expectations of what is prototypical for the conceptual genre categories of both LITERATURE 
and AUTOBIOGRAPHY.  It is often problematically assumed that autobiography is more a 
matter of historical reportage than the craft of composing texts – literary or otherwise – that may 
or may not be worthy of special esteem.  Our cultural knowledge of HISTORY makes history 
seem more objective than it ever actually is; the narrative
50
 nature of historiography requires that 
the historiographer highlight and hide elements of her report.  But narrating one‘s life necessarily 
requires highlighting and hiding certain parts of one‘s life since autobiographies are not direct 
transcriptions of one‘s minute-to-minute activities and thoughts.  Autobiographies are generally 
assumed to be at least relatively less reliable than histories or biographies since their authors are 
also the subjects and we expect that their assessment of their histories will be colored by 
subjectivity.  Since the prototypical autobiography or memoir deviates substantially from 
HISTORY by not offering a direct, objective report of the events of the autobiographer‘s life, the 
typical autobiography probably belongs just as much if not more to the category of 
LITERATURE than HISTORY. 
Another reason that AUTOBIOGRAPHY as a genre is typically separated from 
HISTORY is that personal anecdote is prototypically more appropriate to autobiographical 
writing than historical writing.  Because the personal and anecdotal are not typically valued as 
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effect of ―narrativizing‖ (suggesting a falsely linear, causal structure to) the events they depict, which tacitly 
proposes a sense of what experiences are normal, expected, and ideal.   
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―historically accurate,‖ this conceptualization of autobiography undermines its use-value
51
 as a 
means of saying something of cultural and historical importance.  Furthermore, the personal 
anecdotes of some people are valued more than others, usually because their lives are seen as 
being more culturally-significant and their personal anecdotes as worthy of recording either for 
the sake of history or for the sake of using their lives as an example of an ideal life in one respect 
or another.  Thus, our concept AUTOBIOGRAPHY has privileged or made typical the propriety 
of telling only the stories of lives that our culture already considers prototypical or ideal.  One of 
the consequences of this conceptual structure of the category has been the devaluation of the life 
stories of marginalized people, whose life stories and styles of autobiographical writing are often 
quite different from those of the typical autobiography.   
The generic expectation that autobiography will tell the historically accurate story of a 
historically or culturally important life derives in large part from the relationship of our concept 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY to the genre of Greek epic.  As Ronald L. Williams, Jr. remarks in African 
American Autobiography and the Quest for Freedom (2000), our cultural knowledge of 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY inherited from Greek epic the expectation that any story worth telling 
about an individual person must be about a great man who overcomes adversity through his own 
ingenuity and the help of good fortune and friends (1-6).  Even autobiographies by members of 
marginalized groups can reinforce this genre expectation by highlighting certain events or 
choices that present the autobiographer as a hero(ine) or as someone from that marginalized 
group who has endured or overcome adversity.  But quite often, autobiographies by of members 
of marginalized groups do not meet this expectation.  These autobiographies may focus more on 
the communities of which an autobiographer sees herself as a representative example rather than 
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Instability (1994) 1-29. 
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on the autobiographer as an individual.  They may focus more on the events of the LIFE depicted 
than on the person(ality) of the autobiographer.  And they may focus more on the fact that the 
autobiographer‘s life is not to be taken as an ideal but perhaps just as a salient example
52
 of LIFE 
that does not fit well with the mainstream conceptualization of LIFE. 
3.4.2 Reading Autobiography as a Metaphorization of LIFE 
 
There are certain cues that suggest to readers that they should read an autobiographical 
text as literature and, therefore, as a metaphorization of LIFE.  Readers may recognize a 
resemblance or correspondence between the depiction of LIFE in autobiographical texts and their 
own concept of LIFE, which could trigger a metaphoric process of understanding some aspects 
of one concept in terms of corresponding aspects from a different concept.  From this approach, 
readers would come to read an autobiographical text as literature because they‘re reading it as a 
metaphorization of LIFE.  Other cues may also trigger the recognition that a reader should be 
reading an autobiography literarily and thus as a metaphor, such as whether the reader knows 
that the autobiography is culturally significant or whether she has encountered the autobiography 
in a literature course or in the literature section of a bookstore or library. 
We read autobiography as a metaphorization of LIFE in the same way that we read other 
works of literature as metaphorizations of LIFE.  This reading process begins with a reader‘s 
experiential knowledge of the concept LIFE.  An American conceptualization of LIFE might 
entail that in terms of PEOPLE, the typical LIFE will involve a nurturing MOTHER, 
breadwinning FATHER, a loving SPOUSE, and competent if not enjoyable COWORKERS, 
among other subcategories of PEOPLE.  We might also think of the typical LIFE as being 
structured by certain parts such as rites of passage or states like BEING IN LOVE or 
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 In Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, Lakoff differentiates among types of prototypes (86-90).  These include 
typical examples, ideals, paragons, generators, submodels, and salient examples.  
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GRIEVING.  LIFE seems to have clearly defined stages (i.e., birth, childhood, adolescence, 
young adulthood, middle age, late adulthood, old age) with increasingly less well-defined sub-
stages (e.g., awkward teenage years, mid-life crisis).  And we think of the purpose of LIFE as 
being something we will never completely understand, something we must always be searching 
for.  Of course, our ―knowledge‖ about LIFE will probably not exactly match our direct, personal 
experiences of these constituent parts of the conceptual category of LIFE since the concept is so 
complex and complicated or destabilized as a result of its being based on knowledge shared in 
our culture.  It is an idealization of what LIFE typically entails or should entail.
53
 
In reading an autobiography, readers draw upon their concepts of LIFE in order to 
understand whether and how LIFE as it is depicted in the autobiography aligns with what they 
―know‖ through their cultural and individual experiences to be typical of LIFE.  They weigh 
whether LIFE in the work of literature is LIFE as they are familiar with it or if it is not a good fit 
with their concept of LIFE.  Readers may correlate the goodness of the (concept of) LIFE 
depicted in the autobiography with the goodness of the depiction of the life, per Eagleton‘s 
comments about the history of the concept LITERATURE.  The possibility exists for readers‘ 
concepts of LIFE to cognitively and conceptually interact with those of the autobiographical 
depiction of LIFE.  They may reevaluate or restructure – perhaps even automatically and 
unconsciously, as Lakoff says (Women 6) – their concept of LIFE based on their new experience 
of LIFE through the autobiography.   
With autobiography in particular, readers may emphasize the is in the metaphor 
processing rather than the is not.  This may be due in part to autobiography‘s roots in Greek epic 
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and ―great man‖ stories,‖ which encourage us to aspire to be like the autobiographical subject, 
who has overcome tragedies and has not only lived to tell the tale but has lived so well as to be 
worthy of an audience.  But the is not is just as important as the is in metaphor; we will never be 
the autobiographers about whom we are reading, and even if our experiences of LIFE resemble 
theirs or are theirs in that we also have experiences with the (types of) participants, parts, stages, 
linear-causal events, and purposes that they have, their experiences will never exactly be ours.  
Because of the metaphoric nature of literature, when we detect resemblances between our 
experience of LIFE and the experience of LIFE that we read about in autobiographies, we 
understand those experiences of LIFE as being our own experiences of the same categories of 
LIFE at the same time that we understand that they are not our own direct, personal experiences. 
For all its typical characteristics, there is much variation in actual autobiographies.  
Paragons of autobiographies like Benjamin Franklin‘s Autobiography and, more recently, Bill 
Clinton‘s My Life are only the norm in that they are paragons, not because they are the 
statistically most common or best type of autobiography.  There are many other examples and 
even independent subgenres of autobiographies, such as fictional autobiographies and children‘s 
or young adult autobiographies.  Each of these different types of autobiographies present 
different strategies of metaphorizing LIFE for both their writers and readers.  In the case studies 
below, I will observe some of these strategies as they are used in prototypical and atypical 
autobiographies. 
3.4.3 A Brief Genealogy of Post-1970 American Autobiography 
 
The OED indicates that the word ―autobiography‖ was first used in 1797, and its first 
titular use, according to literary critic and autobiography scholar James Olney, was in 1834 in 
W.P. Scargill‘s The Autobiography of a Dissenting Minister (5).  Olney writes that ―three Greek 
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elements meaning ‗self-life-writing‘ were combined to describe a literature already existing‖ (6).  
In addition to the Greek epic, autobiography scholars including Olney, Sidonie Smith, and Leigh 
Gilmore find the Christian confessional tradition to be the next significant antecedent of 
autobiography.  Christianity made the individual person significant not only in terms of the 
opportunity for a personal relationship with God but also in terms of the personal responsibility 
for self-examination required for repentance and salvation.  In this way, ―the truth of an 
individual‘s inner struggle‖ became the basis for determining the value and worth of confession 
(Smith 22; see also Gilmore 108-29).  In addition to Christianity‘s attention to the individual, 
Smith writes that ―The disintegration of the feudal system‖ also increased the sense of how 
important individuals are within a social system (22).  The Copernican revolution had a similar 
effect of centering human beings as agents in their own universe and as creators of knowledge 
about that universe (Olney 31; Smith 23).   
Later cultural changes and historical events also shaped and partially demystified the 
notion of individual ―identity.‖  During the medieval age, ―mediocre metal plates that were used 
in antiquity gave way […] to silver-backed mirrors produced by Venetian technique‖ (Olney 32), 
which were further refined during the Renaissance (Smith 24).  This technological improvement 
made a familiarity with the ―true‖ self seem possible.  The proliferation of the written word via 
the printing press during the Renaissance led to increased literacy and readership, and much of 
the philosophy, literature, and political writing available to this extended readership theorized 
about the relationship of the individual to society (Smith 24-5).  For U.S. autobiography in 
particular, Smith and Williams, Jr. both remark that the spirit of independence related to the 
Revolution, the Protestant work ethic, and the industrial revolution shaped our interest in the 
self-made man (Smith 4; Williams, Jr. 9-39).  Interest in psychology from the nineteenth and 
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twentieth centuries reinforced this interest in the individual mind.  Freudian psychology 
validated the notion that the key to personal happiness lies within one‘s own mind, but it also 
checked this focus on the individual by requiring supervision by an authority, much like a priest 
oversees confession (Gilmore 56). 
These cultural and historical shifts influenced our conceptualization of autobiography as 
a form of historically and emotionally accurate disclosure of all pertinent facts, feelings, and 
events by a person who is capable of truthful self-revelation and whose life stands as a ―supreme 
example‖ of morality, life experiences, or the essence of a given historical moment (Smith 8).  
As both a cause and an effect of this development of autobiography, autobiographical criticism 
and theory until the 1970s privileged these features.  But certain autobiographies consistently 
failed to meet these criteria, both in terms of content and form.  Women, for example, were 
thought by social and literary critics to be incapable of understanding themselves or their worlds 
in any significant and/or truthful way (Smith, Gilmore); even if their texts were not dismissed 
outright on those grounds, they might be condemned as morally or experientially irrelevant to 
mainstream, androcentric culture, or they might be dismissed as formally unacceptable since 
many women‘s autobiographies reflect and reinstate the dissonance of women‘s lives with the 
androcentric mainstream.  Similar things can be said of the autobiographies of other 
marginalized and underrepresented groups, including homosexuals, genderqueers, ethnic 
minorities, and the economically disadvantaged, whose autobiographical works have been 
neglected or dismissed for not being authoritative representations of mainstream 
(conceptualizations of) LIFE.   
Around 1970, however, autobiography criticism began to take up a greater variety of 
autobiographies, including those by marginalized or underrepresented groups and literary or 
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artistic autobiographies that didn‘t adhere to readers‘ stylistic expectations of 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY.  Olney and Smith remark that part of the reason for this change was the 
fact that scholars, primarily in the humanities, began to reconceptualize HISTORY.  Instead of 
thinking of HISTORY as a disinterested, truthful report of objective reality, scholars began to 
think about and treat HISTORY as a normalizing, necessarily subjective narrative that shapes 
how we think about our past (and present) as much as it reports on it.  In autobiography studies, 
this validated inquiries into the individual (auto) experience as constitutive of rather than defined 
by history (bio).  For the academy, Olney writes, autobiography ―offers privileged access to an 
experience (the American experience, the black experience, the female experience, the African 
experience),‖ which made the study of autobiography ―a popular, even fashionable, study [since] 
traditional ways of organizing literature by period or school have tended to give way to a 
different sort of organization (or disorganization)‖ (13).  As critics and scholars of autobiography 
became dissatisfied with the norms and characteristics associated with autobiography, they took 
up a new label – ―life writing‖ – to create critical distance between the traditional genre of 
autobiography and ―the protean forms of contemporary personal narrative, including interviews, 
profiles, ethnographies, case studies, diaries, Web pages, and so on‖ (Eakin 1) that do not readily 
conform to the genre conventions or common conceptualization of AUTOBIOGRAPHY. 
3.4.4 Case Study One: Bill Clinton’s Contemporary Paragon of Autobiography 
 
Bill Clinton‘s My Life is a prototypical autobiography, a historical but personal and 
friendly account of a historically- and culturally-significant life.  In the Prologue to his 
voluminous autobiography, Clinton writes that when he was a young man, he made a list of life 
goals: ―I wanted to be a good man, have a good marriage and children, have good friends, make 
a successful political life, and write a good book‖ (3).  The autobiography is an account of how 
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Clinton set about achieving all but the last of these goals.  ―As for the great book, who knows?‖ 
Clinton asks, hinting at his autobiography.  ―It sure is a good story‖ (3). 
In his autobiography, Clinton is a paragon of an American conceptual category of LIFE.  
That is, as an autobiographical subject, he is (mostly) admirable, has a happy family, makes good 
and beneficial friendships, and is successful in terms of the goals he sets for himself and in terms 
of cultural metrics of success (e.g., fame, wealth, charitableness, etc.).  Clinton‘s life is the kind 
of LIFE that many in his intended and potential audience may want to identify with.  In this way, 
My Life is also a good example of literature – a text that asks readers to see LIFE as it is depicted 
in the text in terms of their experiential knowledge of LIFE and to consider whether that LIFE is 
one that should be their own though it is not.  Although Clinton refrains from outright moralizing 
– a feature common in older prototypes of American autobiography like Benjamin Franklin‘s 
autobiography – to emphasize the ―should be‖ of his life story, he adheres to the expectation that 
autobiographies that are worthy of our attention will skew more toward historical accuracy and 
frank confession than artistic retelling of a life story.  This suggests that readers are free to 
interpret the relevant life lessons for themselves rather than have Clinton himself pronounce the 
significance of his life experiences for the rest of us, as Franklin often did in his autobiography.   
In recounting the events that led him from infancy to presidency, Clinton employs a type 
of storytelling that blends mostly history with confessional writing and psychological self-
examination that is prototypical to autobiography.  One example of this historical but personal 
style comes with Clinton‘s recollection of his return to the U.S. from a series of visits to the 
U.K., Ireland, and Germany in the winter of 2001.  ―When I came home to the budget war,‖ 
Clinton writes,  
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the Republicans shut down the government again and it sure didn‘t feel like Christmas 
was on the way, though seeing Chelsea dance in The Nutcracker brightened my mood 
considerably.  This time the shutdown was somewhat less severe because about 500,000 
federal employees deemed ―essential‖ were allowed to work without pay until the 
government reopened.  But benefits to veterans and poor kids still weren‘t being paid.  It 
wasn‘t much of a Christmas present to the American people.  (689-90)  
These observations about issues that he, as a prototypical great man, must face are tinctured by 
the subjectivity of his opinions about them as well as by his thoughts regarding his emotional 
life.  By disclosing his thoughts on this range of historical and personal issues, he invites reader 
to recognize the resemblance of their experiences with such categories of LIFE experience as 
JOB DIFFICULTIES, FAMILY EVENTS, MILITARY DRAFTS, FATHER-DAUGHTER 
RELATIONSHIPS, and ECONOMIC TROUBLES.  Readers may find the joy that Clinton takes 
in his family in the face of worries at work fits their understanding of how these elements of 
LIFE operate in relationship to one another, at least in terms of the structure of our cultural 
expectations of LIFE if not also in terms of our individual experiences.  At the same time, 
readers know that Clinton‘s experiences are not literally their own, and some readers may not 
find his handling of this situation to fit their knowledge of the typical LIFE.  Some readers, for 
example, may think that it is difficult to bracket off one‘s work woes from one‘s familial life and 
that Clinton has either not dealt with the situation well or that he has misrepresented it in his 
autobiography.   
Readers of Clinton‘s autobiography can identify with Clinton‘s general experiences with 
LIFE in terms of concepts such as EDUCATION, SUCCESS, and MISTAKES.  But events 
particular to Clinton‘s life make Clinton‘s experiences exceptionally good examples of LIFE, 
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perhaps even an EXCEPTIONAL LIFE.  Their exceptionality can make it difficult for readers to 
map salient features from Clinton‘s specific LIFE experiences to their own because it may be 
difficult to see relevant correspondences beyond the level of general categorization (i.e., beyond 
a general concept like SUCCESS to the more specific concept POLITICAL SUCCESS or even 
more specific concept NATIONAL (U.S.) POLITICAL CAMPAIGN SUCCESS).   
Of course, these exceptional experiences are probably what make Clinton an ideal 
according to mainstream American notions of what LIFE entails or should entail.  For example, 
Clinton was a Rhodes scholar, achieved the greatest success possible in his chosen career (as a 
two-term President), and committed and overcame the personal mistake of having an affair, all of 
which are extraordinary events and achievements that the average person will not experience.  
Rhetorically, however, Clinton‘s style helps readers to see or make correspondences between his 
extraordinary experiences and their own experiences or notions of LIFE.  Of the extraordinary 
event of having a Senator write a letter of recommendation for his Rhodes scholarship 
application, Clinton writes,  
I hadn‘t wanted to bother the senator because of his preoccupation with and deepening 
gloom over the war [in Vietnam], but Lee [Williams] said he wanted to do it, and he gave 
me a generous letter.  … Applying in Arkansas was a big advantage.  Because of the size 
of our state and its college population, there were fewer competitors; I probably wouldn‘t 
have made it to the regional level if I‘d been from New York, California, or some other 
big state, competing against students from Ivy League schools.  (114-5) 
The conversational style (―hadn‘t wanted to bother,‖ ―some other big state‖) in which Clinton 
writes reinforces his status as an everyman and an underdog who managed to pursue the 
American dream despite not being from a well-known state or having an Ivy League education.  
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The personal style with which Clinton writes about these events may be cues that suggest to 
readers that they should be reading Clinton‘s autobiography metaphorically, looking for 
resemblances between Clinton‘s life and their own lives.   
Thus, Clinton‘s autobiography recreates the irony of all autobiographies: that the LIFE 
depicted in an autobiography reflects culturally-shared concepts about LIFE and yet is supposed 
to be exceptional in some way.  As Williams, Jr. suggests, the most culturally-significant 
autobiographies are usually by people whose lives fit our culturally- and cognitively-constructed 
concept of the kind of LIFE we should (want to) aspire to, even though these autobiographies are 
also written by people who are exceptional, whose lives the average reader will not be able to 
mirror.   
The same metaphoric tension exists in the photographs that are included in My Life.  
Writing in 1865 about the legal probity of photography, John Ruskin remarks that photographs 
―are popularly supposed to be ‗true,‘ and, at their worst, they are so, in the sense in which an 
echo is true to a conversation of which it omits the most important syllables and reduplicates the 
rest‖ (qtd. in Adams 4).  Public faith in the ability of photography to validate the assertions of the 
autobiographer is only part of the reason as to why photography has become appropriate to the 
genre of autobiography, particularly to prototypical autobiographies.  Photographs also facilitate 
the telling of a historical narrative.  In Clinton‘s autobiography, for example, the photographs are 
roughly in chronological order; the first set of photographs document the history of his personal 
life, and the second set of photographs document his life as a public servant and politician.   
The photographs in Clinton‘s book also affect the mapping of experiences of LIFE as it is 
depicted in My Life with the reader‘s own experiences and knowledge of LIFE.  Many of the 
photographs, particularly from his childhood and young adulthood, are of Clinton participating in 
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things we think to be typical of LIFE at that stage – celebrating Christmas with family members, 
eating with friends at a picnic, and standing in a preschool class photo.  Other photographs – 
such as one his wedding day and another of himself lying down on the floor next to his dog 
while holding his infant daughter on his chest – also remind the reader of the prototypicality of 
Clinton‘s LIFE.  These photographs are interspersed with photographs of Clinton campaigning 
for governor and President; appearing on The Arsenio Hall Show; and meeting with heads of 
state including Jiang Zemin, Ehud Barak, and Yasser Arafat.  Cognitively, this suggests to 
readers that such an exceptional LIFE is possible, and it reinforces the cultural knowledge that 
Clinton‘s is the kind of life that we should want to be living.  But in doing so, it also reinforces 
the tension that this prototypical LIFE is not one that is lived by those who aren‘t heterosexual, 
male, politically powerful, white, and Christian.  In the metaphoric tension of literary reading, 
those who cannot see themselves in Clinton‘s place in these photos may understand their life in 
terms of how it is not Clinton‘s life. 
Readers of Clinton‘s autobiography process the depiction of Clinton‘s life and the tacit 
arguments about LIFE, at least for the prototypical man, that are presented in his autobiography 
by metaphorizing them against their own experiences, processing what they read in terms of 
whether it is or is not their own experience.  In reading Clinton‘s autobiography, readers may be 
persuaded to see LIFE as he sees it (or represents it, or as readers think he represents it) and to 
act accordingly, but it does not determine that readers will think as Clinton thinks, act as Clinton 
acts, or have the kind of life that Clinton has.  Some may be comforted by that; others may 
lament that the autobiographies of ―great‖ or ―important‖ men do not have the power to 
determine anything about their readers.  Regardless, understanding literature this way proves that 
there is no magic in literature, only a complex web of individual cognition, concepts, and culture.   
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3.4.5 Case Study Two: The Opposing Paragon: James Frey’s A Million Little Pieces  
 
Anyone who has paid even passing attention to pop culture or literature in the past five 
years has heard about the scandal of Oprah‘s endorsement of James Frey‘s A Million Little 
Pieces (2005).  The book was the September 2005 selection for Oprah‘s Book Club, and like 
many of the books chosen for the book club, A Million Little Pieces told a harrowing and 
sometimes salacious tale of personal hardship and personal redemption.  The tale marketed – 
both for Oprah‘s Book Club and beforehand – as a memoir.  Generally, it was received as such 
without question despite the fact that many of its formal features – its lack of punctuation, 
unconventional capitalization, and fact that it is written in present tense – are unconventional for 
autobiographical writing.
54
  In January 2006, when the website The Smoking Gun revealed that 
the accounts Frey gave of his life did not, as President Johnson might say, really happen, Oprah‘s 
first reaction was to support of Frey, saying in an interview on Larry King Live that his memoir 
was his real ―memory‖ of the events.  Within weeks, Oprah changed her position and conducted 
her own interview with Frey and his editors and publishers in which she condemned Frey for 
lying and his publishers for their complicity.  
To think that the to-do was a matter of kabuki theatre misses the point of why the 
experience of literature and of literary reality matter to us cognitively, conceptually, and 
culturally.  In many ways, Frey‘s fictional memoir recalls Nietzsche‘s observations about ―truth‖ 
and literature in ―On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense‖: ―the liar uses the valid tokens of 
designation – words – to make the unreal appear to be real. … If he does this in a manner that is 
selfish and otherwise harmful, society will no longer trust him and therefore exclude him from its 
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 One might add to this list the formal feature of photography, though it is arguably less common for a memoir, 
which Frey‘s book seems closer to, generically speaking.  For more on the uses of photography in various types of 
autobiographical writing, see Adams 1-79. 
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ranks.  Human beings do not so much flee from being tricked as from being harmed by being 
tricked‖ (876).  In representing his work as memoir, Frey and his publishers violated no law of 
nature, but they did attempt to trick those who share experiential knowledge about MEMOIR as 
a genre into thinking that his memoir met the fundamental criterion of truthfulness (i.e., that none 
of the memories summarized in it were intentionally fictionalized – things not remembered but 
fabricated).  But, as Lakoff notes, because it takes no special cognitive effort to construct or use 
conceptual categories, they have a way of seeming real or proper to natural reality.  Genre 
categories, insofar as they are also conceptual categories that we construct cognitively from 
experiential knowledge, can also seem real or true to reality.  When a given text fails to meet our 
expectations of a genre,
55
 we might think and act as if our experience of reality in reading the 
text and the LIFE it depicts has been made into a non-reality, a lie.  Violating reality, not to 
mention having one‘s trust as a reader and consumer violated, may be enough to constitute 
―harm,‖ which Nietzsche suggests will trigger ostracization.   
If Clinton‘s My Life is a paragon of autobiographical writing, Frey‘s A Million Little 
Pieces is a sort of opposing model.  Both books are paragons in the sense that paragons are, 
according to Lakoff, ―individual members [of categories] who represent either an ideal or its 
opposite‖ (Women 87).  Frey not only fails to adhere to the expectation that he will report facts 
and that his story is worth considering since it tells an extraordinary tale that reinforces certain 
cultural values regarding the prototypical LIFE – self-reliance, perseverance in the face of 
adversity, improving family difficulties.  His autobiography is also an inverse paragon in its 
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 Of course, some violation of genre expectations isn‘t seen as a lie at all.  It can instead be seen as innovative.  
Some questions of intentionality and the clarity of intention for readers seems pertinent to these matters.  The 
difference between Frey‘s violation of genre expectations and, say, what some readers of POETRY may see as 
violations of that genre in prose poems or poems by the LANGUAGE poets, is that Frey insisted that his text 
adhered to very strict genre guidelines whereas unconventional poetry might be seen as trying to break genre 
boundaries rather than adhere to them.  Frey claimed that his text adhered to genre conventions that he knew it 
didn‘t, and this seems to be the difference between a lie and an innovation. 
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depiction of the kind of LIFE that we do not expect to want.  When we first encounter James in A 
Million Little Pieces, he is on a plane, unaware of how he sustained the injuries that have left him 
bloodied and missing some of his teeth.  His parents pick him up and take him to a rehabilitation 
center that has ―the highest success rate of any Facility in the World‖ (7).  The facility has its 
work cut out for it since, James reports, ―At fifteen I was drinking every day, at eighteen I was 
drinking and doing drugs every day.  It has gotten much heavier since then,‖ and his arrest record 
includes charges for ―Possession, Possession with Intent to Distribute, three DUI‘s, a bunch of 
Vandalism and Destruction of Property charges, Assault, Assault with a Deadly Weapon, 
Assaulting an Officer of the Law, Public Drunkenness, Disturbing the Peace.  I‘m sure there‘s 
some other shit,‖ James adds, ―but I don‘t remember exactly what‖ (28).  Frey‘s memoir inverts 
the model of the Clintonian Rhodes scholar.  Drug abuse, adolescent addiction and delinquency, 
and lawlessness are not included alongside self-reliance and individualism in our American 
concept of what the typical LIFE does or should involve.  LIFE as James experiences it is not 
what we ―know‖ the typical transition from adolescence into adulthood is or should be.
56
  
James‘s experiences with other general categories of LIFE similarly invert our 
expectations of the typical LIFE.  We expect that in LIFE we will have FRIENDS, a subcategory 
of the types of PEOPLE we encounter in LIFE.  FRIENDS should be loyal, supportive, 
dependable, and positive influences, among other qualities.  The friends that James makes in the 
facility are perhaps good FRIENDS though they are not who we might expect would make good 
                                                 
56
 Though, as David Parker notes, life writing can be an ideal space for weighing the individual‘s notions of the 
GOOD or a GOOD LIFE against others‘.  Parker ponders ―the question of why the claims of others should virtually 
constitute the moral domain instead of being simply one sort of claim among others.  What of the claims of the self? 
… [W]here the procedure of universalization dominates practical reason, it is not so easy to see how what Bernard 
Williams calls ‗the I of my desire‖ ever gets much mass in the moral scale against the omnipresent and arguably 
more weighty obligations I have to others.  The heuristic of impartiality does not simply insist on the moral 
equivalence of selves; it gives no weight to my particularity as a self.  In a word, it can find no place in the equation 
for the moral significance of my difference‖ (66).  As Parker notes, there must always a tension always exists etween 
these two sides of the scale in life writing. 
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FRIENDS.  James‘s friend Leonard fulfills the role of the BEST FRIEND or MENTOR-
FRIEND, the older and wiser man who proves to be loyal and who is the only person that James 
thinks understands him; and Lilly fulfills the role of the emotionally fragility that typically 
accompanies the categories FEMALE or WOMAN, and she eventually becomes a 
GIRLFRIEND to James.  But the particular people whom James befriends are not like Clinton‘s 
well-placed or morally-upright friends; they have been, like James, living an atypical LIFE.  
Leonard and Lilly, like James, are in the facility for their vices, and Lilly eventually takes her 
own life.  But life as we live it is never an exactly match with our concept LIFE, and many of us 
probably have friends in our lives who seem unlikely to be good influences or dependable.  
These characters are perhaps all the more interesting to us because they do not meet our 
expectations of FRIENDS though they are presented as such.  As we read, we weigh our 
knowledge of FRIENDS, including our own experiences with FRIENDS, against what the text 
suggests to us is real or possible regarding friends.  Perhaps we will find Frey‘s representation of 
unconventional FRIENDS to be unrealistic – whether that be in terms of our individual 
experiences with FRIENDS or our experience of cultural knowledge about FRIENDS.  We may 
conversely find that this different conceptualization of FRIENDS opens us new ways of thinking 
about the category by challenging our existing expectations about who can be a good FRIEND.  
It is this sort of play with conceptual categories of LIFE that might make A Million Little Pieces 
of interest to readers. 
As with his experiences with FRIENDS, James‘s experience of the category PARENTS 
is fraught.  His parents love him enough to get him into rehabilitation, but they are emotionally 
and often physically distant.  It is not until they pick him up at the airport that, James recalls, ―I 
learn that my Parents, who live in Tokyo, have been in the States for the last two weeks on 
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business. … They had driven to Chicago during the night‖ to collect James from the airport (4).  
His parents participate in the Family Program at the facility in an effort to demonstrate qualities 
we usually associate with PARENTS, like LOVE and PATIENCE.  But they are also examples 
of what we think PARENTS should not be.  The story that James tells his parents of his early 
drug and alcohol abuse casts them as absent parents.  Of his habits at eighteen, for example, 
James recalls, ―Went away to school in the Fall.  No Rules, you weren‘t around, I got a monthly 
allowance.  I was in Heaven.  I blacked out every night‖ (219).  In a moment of kindness, he 
remarks, ―I know you‘re sitting there thinking you should have known more and you should have 
stopped me, but I hid things well and you tried, you tried hard,‖ James says (219).  But this 
seems to contradict the story of how well his parents raised him that James tells throughout the 
memoir, and readers can easily connect the qualities that make these parents an example of BAD 
PARENTS who are complicit with James‘s own self-destructive experiences. 
Such inversions of our expectations of LIFE as well as of AUTOBIOGRAPHY that 
Frey‘s memoir presents are perhaps the more interesting as commentaries on LIFE than those 
that we think are prototypical.  But ultimately, Frey‘s memoir does adhere to what we may 
expect in autobiographical writing: a depiction of the autobiographical subject as a man whose 
individual choices have made him successful and worthy of having a tale to tell about himself.  
At the beginning of the book, James rejects the approach of the rehabilitation facility, answering, 
―I don‘t know,‖ when he is asked if he is ―willing to do whatever it takes‖ to get better (29).  
James‘s approach to self-help becomes a vehicle for Frey to restate our cultural value of 
individualism: ―If you‘re not willing to do whatever it takes,‖ the doctor tells James, ―you might 
as well leave.  I would rather you not, but we can‘t help you until you‘re ready to help yourself.  
Think about it and we can talk more‖ (29).  James replies, ―I will,‖ and his ordering and sending 
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back a glass of bourbon after leaving the facility is supposed to be proof that anyone who is 
strong enough can overcome his own demons on his own. 
Of course, this LIFE did not really happen, and perhaps that suggests that despite the fact 
that the conventions of autobiography indicate that we at least think a good example of LIFE can 
(or maybe even should) involve a self-made or self-helped man.  The story that Frey tells in A 
Million Little Pieces was real to its audience – actually and ideally – and when it wasn‘t, and the 
audience felt tricked about what is real, true, and possible about LIFE according to their 
experiential knowledge of it.  The audience‘s reactions to this trickery indicate that, despite what 
President Johnson thought, what matters when it comes to literature isn‘t what is real and what is 
fiction but what we expect to be real and possible.   
3.4.6 Case Study Three: Disidentification in Audre Lorde’s Zami 
 
Audre Lorde‘s autobiographical Zami: A New Spelling of My Name (1982) negotiates the 
genre conventions of autobiography in markedly different ways than do Clinton‘s and Frey‘s 
autobiographies.  Some of these differences are suggested by the genre description Lorde has 
given Zami: ―biomythography.‖  Like autobiography, biomythography is writing about the 
experience of lived life (―bio-‖).  But in removing the ―auto,‖ it is also suggested that this life is 
not, as is the case with prototypical autobiographies, the life of an autonomous self; rather, this is 
the story of a life as it is interconnected with others‘ lives.  And by situating Zami within 
traditions of ―myth‖-making and -telling, Lorde flouts the notion that an autobiographical text‘s 
validity derives from its historical accuracy or disinterested reportage.  Referring to her 
autobiographical work as a myth, Lorde suggests, among other things, that it is written (―-
graphy‖) from stories shared by a people who also share culture and history, and that the work is 
itself a new telling of the stories, culture, and history. 
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The extent to which Zami is an autobiography is debatable on at least two grounds, then: 
whether Lorde wants her readers and critics to think of Zami in terms of their concept of the 
genre of AUTOBIOGRAPHY, and whether any such correlation between Zami and 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY is possible for readers.  The former issue is not necessarily central to the 
issue of whether readers will read this text as a metaphorization of LIFE and which cues in and 
surrounding the text encourage them to do so.  The latter issue has to do with what textual and 
contextual cues about Zami encourage the reader to see connections between the genre and this 
particular text.  And there are many such opportunities for readers to recognize the 
autobiographical nature of Zami: its chronological retelling of Lorde‘s life as a girl and young 
woman (with a focus in this case on friendly, romantic, and mentor relationships with females in 
those years); it is written by and about the same person; and the exploration of the 
autobiographer‘s selfhood and the significance of the her experience, which she shares with the 
reader.   
But in many ways, Zami does not fit the typical notion of AUTOBIOGRAPHY, which 
has been defined by the standards that those whom  society has historically sanctioned to write 
autobiographies, namely, men who are notable because of their success or virtuousness.  For 
example, both Clinton and Frey negotiate the genre of autobiography by adhering to (and at the 
same time challenging) the notion that the autobiographer‘s life story is worth telling because it 
is exemplary or more important than the average person‘s life story in some way.  This is not 
necessarily the case with Lorde‘s autobiography.  As Johnnie M. Stover asserts in Rhetoric and 
Resistance in Black Women’s Autobiography (2003), to affirm the notion that autobiography 
must report the experiences of a paragon of whatever demographics – gender, race, class, 
religion, etc. – that the autobiographer represents ―effectively denies the importance of ancestral 
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connections, another aspect of community rootedness that characterizes African American 
women‘s autobiography‖ (32).  In writing a biomythography titled Zami, which is the 
―Carriacou name for women who work together as friends and lovers‖ (Lorde 255, original 
emphasis), Lorde operates in a tension between the biomythography‘s emphasis on the group and 
autobiography‘s emphasis on the individual.  That is, Lorde affirms her place in and connections 
to Carriacou women as well as the importance of her own story and experiences for those who 
are both inside and outside that group. 
This genre tension thus becomes a mechanism for negotiating new knowledge or ways of 
thinking within a reader‘s existing concepts about autobiography.  Despite the fact that Zami is 
not the typical autobiography, it has many of the hallmarks of the genre, and its divergences do 
not utterly disorient the reader so much as they require readers to reconsider what they know to 
be real about the genre of autobiography and the conceptualization of LIFE that they encounter 
in the text.  Francoise Lionnet asserts in Autobiographical Voices (1989) that this sort of generic 
tension allows autobiographers to challenge  
the conceptual apparatuses that have governed our labeling of ourselves and others, [and] 
space is thus opened where multiplicity and diversity are affirmed.  This space is not a 
territory staked out by exclusionary practices.  Rather, it functions as a sheltering site, 
one that can nurture our differences without encouraging us to withdraw into new dead 
ends … For it is only by imagining  nonhierarchical modes of relations among cultures 
that we can address the crucial interdeterminacy and solidarity.  (5) 
Unlike Frey, in naming Zami a biomythography, making it a story of shared LIFE, and situating 
it at the periphery of autobiography, Lorde has been up front with her readers about the fact that 
her autobiographical book will not satisfy many of their category expectations for 
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AUTOBIOGRAPHY.  Rather, it will capitalize on those expectations by using them to 
encourage readers to reconsider what they expect of the typical autobiography and the (typicality 
of the) LIFE it depicts. 
In addition to her unusual use of genre, another strategy that Lorde uses to 
simultaneously invite and disinvite readers to identify with her is the second-person.  While not 
exclusive to life writing by people who are part of disempowered or marginalized groups, it is 
certainly more commonly- and significantly-used in those texts than in more traditional 
autobiographies wherein the autobiographical subject is the central focus.  When readers 
encounter the second-person in autobiographical writing, they are required to negotiate multiple 
metaphoric tensions.  ―If you asked the wrong woman to dance‖ at a lesbian bar called the 
Bagatelle, Lorde writes, ―you could get your nose broken in the alley down the street by her 
butch, who had followed you out of the Bag for exactly that purpose‖ (221).  Of course, the 
average reader has not had this exact experience, and so the ―you‖ does not apply in a literal 
sense.  Lorde invites her readers to see themselves as being her or as having the same knowledge 
and feelings that she has about the ―important part of lesbian relationships in the Bagatelle‖ 
(221).  The fact that she has to explain this experience, however, suggests that she knows that her 
readers will not be able to see themselves as having had the same experiences she has had, both 
as Audre Lorde and as a black lesbian living in New York City in the 1950s.  The ―you‖ suggests 
the tension that is always at work in autobiography and literature: You, the reader, will be able to 
understand the LIFE depicted in this text as being your own experience of LIFE in terms of some 
general categories of experience like COURTSHIP, DATING, VIOLENCE, and REACTIONS 




Lorde often uses the plural first-person to remind readers that they will always only be 
able to share in her experiences in terms of some broad categories of experience, such as 
FALLING IN LOVE or BEING YOUNG or of DATING or SEX.  In her use of the plural first-
person, Lorde indicates to readers that they cannot be the ―us‖ about whom she tells her 
biomythographic story.  For example, in explaining what the scene is like at the Bagatelle, Lorde 
writes, ―For some of us … the role-playing reflected all the deprecating attitudes toward women 
which we loathed in straight society.  It was a rejection of these roles that had drawn us to ‗the 
life‘ in the first place‖ (221).  This selection appears in the paragraph directly after her use of the 
second-person to describe asking a woman to dance at the Bagatelle.  This ―we,‖ specifically, is 
the group of women whom Lorde knew at the Bagatelle, but more indirectly it includes women 
who can share the same experiences of loathing deprecating mainstream attitudes toward 
women.  These are groups that, in using the more exclusive plural first-person, Lorde separates 
from the readers she had invited to identify with her experiences just sentences beforehand by 
using the more inclusive second-person.  This is one way that Lorde disinvites her readers from 
seeing their experience of LIFE as being the LIFE they read about in Zami.  Readers may not 
feel as if they are part of the mainstream, on the outside looking in because they have been 
allowed to look in by a narrator, which inverts (or subverts) the usual positions of power and 
perspective.  This also situates readers in a multiplicity of metaphoric tensions, each of which 
creates a new conceptual ―space‖
57
 wherein they might renegotiate their knowledge of actual and 
ideal LIFE in terms of the conceptual category of LIFE that Lorde asks them to consider as real 
and really possible as they read her mythic life writing. 
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 The notion of space that Lionnet refers to is of particular significance for metaphor theory and cognitive 
linguistics.  It suggests a theory of mental spaces and conceptual blends, which are different from metaphor in that 
they combine several, not just two, distinct concepts.  Further extrapolations on the uses of blends and mental spaces 
in this theory of literature as a metaphor can be found in the Afterward. 
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3.4.7 Case Study Four: Fictionalized and Marginalized, for Children: Walter Dean Myers’ 
Autobiography of My Dead Brother 
 
Walter Dean Myers‘ Autobiography of My Dead Brother (2005) blends some of the same 
fictional elements of A Million Little Pieces with the heightened tension of shared experiences 
that cannot be shared that comes, for most readers, with reading an autobiography, such as Zami, 
written by someone from a marginalized or minority community.  Myers‘ book also departs from 
the expectations of the conceptual category AUTOBIOGRAPHY in that its intended audience is 
adolescents and young adults.  Unlike A Million Little Pieces, Autobiography of My Dead 
Brother declares itself to be fictional from the very start.  It is narrated not by ―Walter Dean 
Myers‖ but by the fictional character Jesse, who is fifteen and growing up in Harlem, facing 
some of the problems that our culture takes to be prototypical of a young black man‘s experience 
growing up in an urban setting, including the violent deaths of friends, gang wars, drug abuse, 
and unhappy families.   
The autobiographical aspect of Autobiography of My Dead Brother is like Zami in that it 
is not an individual-oriented autobiography but life/story about a life shared by a group told by 
one member‘s point of view.  Unlike Lorde‘s autobiography, this story is told from a character‘s 
point of view rather than the author‘s/autobiographer‘s.  In this autobiography, Jesse, rather than 
Myers, tells the audience the story of how he grew apart from his childhood friend and ―blood 
brother‖ Rise because of Rise‘s involvement with gangs and drugs.  ―Jesse here is writing my 
life up,‖ Rise tells his girlfriend.  Rise continues: 
I‘ve been telling him there‘s three important times in a man‘s life.  The first was when 
he‘s born.  That‘s about the circumstances he got going for him.  Then when he dies.  
That‘s about what he‘d done with his days.  But then there‘s one minute in his life where 
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he makes the big D to take over his life.  That‘s what most people don‘t do, take charge 
of their lives.  (172) 
Rise‘s meta-generic commentary reflects the significance of the generic conventions of 
BIOGRAPHY and AUTOBIOGRAPHY.  Rise seems to expect, like many readers of 
Autobiography, that biographies are written about great men by other people who admire them.  
As with Clinton and Frey, Rise wants to be known for his exceptional qualities (―That‘s what 
most people don‘t do‖) and his self-reliance (―take charge of their lives‖), and his concept of 
BIOGRAPHY suggests that the ―story‖ part of his life story should be more historical reportage 
than subjective or fictionalized storytelling.  But Jesse does not compose a biography about Rise; 
he calls his story an autobiography in contradiction to the expectation that AUTOBIOGRAPHY 
is written by the same individual whose life is its focus because he sees Rise‘s life and his own 
life as the same life and experience of LIFE.  But this shared life, which is what makes it 
possible for Jesse to call this story an autobiography, is what makes the story of their friendship 
heartbreaking: Rise, as the title indicates, dies as a result of gang violence, the victim of his own 
attempts to be a ―great‖ or important person in his sphere – attempting to have the kind of LIFE 
that is portrayed in Clinton‘s autobiography, or to be great because of his own will and efforts in 
spite of adversity as Frey‘s memoir suggests he should be – worthy of having biographies written 
about him, leaving his brother to write an autobiography about a shared life that has passed 
away. 
This fictional, dual-life autobiography about two culturally-marginalized teenage boys 
whom history might deem insignificant also disrupts our constructed knowledge of 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY and the type of LIFE that is usually considered appropriate to the genre 
because it is a children‘s or young adult autobiography.  Because prototypically valid authors of 
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autobiographies are historically- or culturally-significant people, young adults rarely have 
sanction to write or be the subject of autobiographies, and it is assumed that few audiences 
would be interested in reading such autobiographies by or about young people.  But Myers‘ 
―autobiography‖ is not actually both by and about a young adult; it is a work of fiction that uses 
the conceptual category of AUTOBIOGRAPHY to create a ―space,‖ as Lionnet says, in which 
we can reconsider both the importance of young people‘s struggles in the world and, in the case 
of Myers‘ book, those of black, urban youth.   
In reading Autobiography of My Dead Brother, readers understand their own LIFE in 
terms of Jesse and Rise‘s experiences of LIFE, and they also have the opportunity to empathize 
with the decisions that Jesse and Rise make in response to their circumstances.  Older readers 
may think back to the experiences they had as young people and try to understand why these 
teenagers might make certain choices or have the reactions they do to certain situations.  For 
example, a reader might have the opportunity in this book to consider why Jesse writes an 
autobiography rather than a biography, particularly if that reader comes from a cultural 
background that privileges individual ideas and achievements, which are some of the 
fundamental principles of traditional autobiographical writing.  In Rise and Jesse‘s context, 
collective experience is just as if not more important than individual experience, as evidenced by 
Jesse‘s reflections on the gang shootings that tear apart his community: 
The shootings made the paper the next day, and everybody on the block already knew I 
had been picked up.  People I didn‘t even know were asking me questions.  It made me 
mad to think that my friends, kids and grownups who thought I was a nice guy one day, 
could think the next day I was shooting people in the streets.  And in a way they wanted 
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me to be involved in the shooting simply because it made it all more exciting for them.  
(194) 
The opportunity is there – cognitively and culturally – for readers to consider the importance of 
having close friends for one‘s survival in tough neighborhoods or in adolescence.  Such 
interpretive work can go a long way toward building empathy for all people who have any shared 
LIFE experience with these very basic categories of FRIENDS, NEIGHBORHOODS, and 
ADOLESCENCE as well as others depicted in the story. 
Myers, like Clinton, includes images in his text, but the images are not photographic.  
They are drawings made by Myers‘ son Christopher of some of the people and plot points of the 
book.  The photographs Clinton used complemented the generic expectation that autobiographers 
will provide historically-accurate accounts of their historically-significant lives because, as 
Timothy Dow Adams writes in Light Writing and Life Writing (2000), ―autobiography and 
photography are commonly read as though operating in some stronger ontological world than 
their counterparts, fiction and painting, despite both logic and a history of scholarly attempts that 
seem to have proven otherwise‖ (17).  Just as Zami challenged the notion that the veracity of an 
autobiography is in proportion to its distance from shared experiences and cultural ―myths,‖ 
Myers‘ inclusion of drawings provides alternative ways of knowing and sharing a LIFE 
experience.  The drawings recall the formal features of children‘s literature, which often includes 
illustrations, and thereby suggest that the LIFE story worth knowing is not that of an important, 
self-made adult man.  Unlike Clinton‘s photographs, these drawings do not promise that the story 
is historically-verifiable.  In fact, they draw attention to the fictionality of the story, being 
themselves interpretations of what Jesse and Rise‘s experiences would be if they had actually 
happened.  But the drawings also concretize these fictional events, pulling them out of the realm 
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of the abstract and making them more cognitively accessible to readers, just as a detailed written 
description might, and helping readers to understand Jesse‘s thoughts through the metaphoric 
process of understanding one more abstract concept in terms of a more concrete one.  This 
realism is compounded by the fact that the drawings were made by Myers‘ son, who was raised 
in New York City; this connection also gives the drawings and the story they complement a 
sense of autobiographical authenticity.   
Some of the drawings might be considered typical to autobiographies, such as portraits of 
main characters.  Other drawings – like those of Jesse with a black eye and his father side by side 
with the words ―Punching bag‖ below Jesse and a metal plate over his father‘s mouth – tell the 
reader what Jesse might be thinking – that he is angry at his father less for hitting him than for 
not apologizing to him about it and ―hold[ing] up his end‖ of the responsibility not to be a violent 
family (156). These drawings give readers an opportunity to see the reality that Jesse 
experiences, which goes beyond that which he can document as historical fact.  It reminds 
readers of the reality of the emotional side of the experience of LIFE.  It also gives readers 
another opportunity to see their own similar LIFE experiences, such as with PARENTS and 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, as being and not being those that Jesse experiences.  Some readers 
may have had their own encounters with domestic violence and some may not.  Those who have 
will interpret the drawing and the situation in terms of whether Jesse‘s reaction is reasonable or 
fits their personal experiential knowledge of such situations.  Others who have not directly 
experienced domestic violence will still weigh Jesse‘s reaction according experiential 
knowledge, but their experiential knowledge will be primarily cultural rather than personal.  
Readers may highlight certain factors of Jesse‘s LIFE such as his age or class or location in an 
urban environment over others in reasoning about whether his choices make him a character 
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whose LIFE experiences seem realistic and/or better or worse examples of the type of person we 
want to be.  The drawings included in the autobiography give readers a more concrete and 
complex understanding of the reality depicted in this fictional character‘s life story. 
As with Autobiography of My Dead Brother, young people‘s literature as a genre often 
tells poignantly tragic or sad stories.  Perhaps, as Plato said, this is a way of acculturating 
children to the knowledge that LIFE brings with it both joys and tragedies.  If children encounter 
this bittersweet depiction of LIFE again and again in the stories that they hear and read, then 
young adult literature will have fulfilled its task of informing its audience of the unhappy 
realities of life.  Conceptual metaphor theory shows us that this happens cognitively and 
culturally as much as individually any time we have a text that we (even as children) read as 
having some larger indication of what LIFE entails.  In Autobiography of My Dead Brother, 
Jesse and Rise‘s story indicates to children that their tragedies may come from people close to 
them, people who are good and worthy of love but who make bad decisions.  The depiction of 
Jesse‘s relationship with his father and with Rise does not oversimplify the complexities of that 
relationship; it asks its readers, young and old alike, to consider whether that sort of relationship 
is something worth enduring as Jesse did or if they have or would have dealt differently with 
those situations.  Regardless of whether we find Jesse‘s experiences with that type of person to 
be ours or not, it is the metaphoric nature of literary reality that asks us to consider those issues 
and think about the complications that LIFE seems to hold for us. 
3.5 The Rhetoricality of Literary Metaphorization of LIFE 
 
To recognize the fundamentally metaphoric nature of the literary comprehension process 
is to recognize the rhetoricality of literature.  It is premised on the notion that our perceptions of, 
concepts of, and actions in the ―real‖ world are constructed.  We construct our knowledge via a 
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recursive process of understanding the world through our experiences and understanding our 
experiences through our interactions with the world.  One way of constructing our concepts of 
the world recursively is via the literary experience, whereby we recursively construct our 
understanding of LIFE through the examples of LIFE that we encounter in works of literature.  
Furthermore, this approach to the experience of literature via CMT makes clear that literary 
meaning is located in cognition, recurring rhetorical situations, and experiential reality, not in 
any intangible, magic quality inherent in the literary object.   
This suggests that literature requires an interdisciplinary approach.  An approach to 
literary study that recognizes literature‘s metaphoric nature requires that we use the methods and 
insights of cognitive linguists, rhetoric and compositionists, literary scholars, aesthetes, and 
everyday readers of literature if we wish to have a more complete understanding of how 
literature affects the concepts and realities of its readers.  It will also require that we look at a 
wider variety of texts as ―literary‖ or as being open to ―literary‖ comprehension by readers.  If, 
for example, we are able to use the methods of conceptual metaphor theorists to determine 
empirically that readers of literature metaphorize their own conceptual domains of LIFE with 
those depicted in the texts they read, then we will have to also determine when and for which 
texts readers do not employ that comprehension strategy.  Ideally, this interdisciplinarity should 
recursively influence the institutional structure of English studies, making each field within 
English studies a truly equal partner and cooperating effectively with those scholars such as 
linguists, communications scholars, and, increasingly, rhetoric and compositionists whose 
interests overlap with English studies but who are institutionally separated from English as a 
discipline.   
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In the final chapter, I will outline some of the implications of how English studies as a 
field would have to change were it to accept this rhetoricized characterization of literature as a 
metaphorization of LIFE, some of which I have mentioned here briefly.  In particular, I look at 
the ramifications of a more unified English studies.  This unification is at least two-fold: within 
the discipline, English studies would recognize literature not just as a fundamentally cultural 
phenomenon, as we already do, but as a linguistic and rhetorical phenomenon as well; and our 
institutional structures and practices would be more clearly unified with our disciplinary 
knowledge.  English studies in the U.S. has for more than fifty years led the way in cultural 
studies and making the study of literature meaningful beyond itself.  Now, in the face of tectonic 
shifts in higher education, we have a new set of challenges to confront.  A rhetoricized English 
studies, I will argue, will best equip us to meet that challenge. 
Chapter 4 – Rhetoricality in Today’s Literary and English Studies 
 
I got the idea that what I was telling was really a story about conflict that had been evaded.  And 
I began to feel that this failure of our profession to confront our conflicts was connected with the 
murkiness about what it is we do.  We adopt a pluralistic model that lets us study literature in 
any number of ways, but by not coming to terms with or asking students to come to terms with 
the conflicting approaches or conflicting readings, we evade questions about what it is we are 
doing. 
Gerald Graff, ―Only Connect‖ 
 
I’m a uniter, not a divider. 
President George W. Bush 
 
4.1 A Rhetorician’s Perspective 
 
English studies in contemporary American higher education is, to venture a metaphor, a 
loose federation of allies.  Most of these are willing allies: they see themselves as partners who 
want to perfect their union and mutually benefit from sharing their burdens, work, and privileges.  
This is a fine union in theory but it is difficult to effect.  Its structure and functions are much 
debated, and theories about and instantiations of the institutionalization of its practices and 
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mission differ from locale to locale (of necessity, since no two locales are the same and have the 
same specific history or needs).  Furthermore, the institutional structures through which power is 
negotiated are divided along party lines, such that one‘s allegiances are declared according to 
disciplinary boundaries that cannot often be traversed easily without risk to one‘s professional 
reputation. 
Like President Bush, I want to be seen as a uniter rather than a divider.  And, like 
President Bush, I say that from the perspective of a partisan.  My ultimate goal is not to do away 
with disciplinary boundaries or to pretend as if they don‘t matter or don‘t exist.  Moreover, my 
argument for rhetoricizing English studies should not be seen as a way for me to gain political 
points for my chosen party, rhetoric and composition.  Instead, it is an argument for rhetoricality, 
which, as I will explain in this chapter, proceeds from modernist rhetoric but is not itself a 
rhetoric or system of understanding the creation of communicative meaning-making.  
Rhetoricality gives American higher education a way to bridge intellectual-disciplinary 
dispositions and form a more perfect union with the institutional structures that give knowledge 
form and function.  But it does not pretend that disciplinary boundaries don‘t matter or aren‘t 
useful. 
Any effective uniter must acknowledge her subjective position and consider how that 
position might affect how she proposes to confront the conflicts, as Graff says, inherent in the 
division.  This is particularly important and delicate when it comes to the claims that a specialist 
in the field of rhetoric and composition makes about the field of English literary studies.  The 
history between these two fields, as I explained in the first chapter, is nearly a century long and 
has often been acrimonious.  As Maxine Hairston explained in her 1985 address as president of 
the Conference on College Composition and Communication, titled ―Breaking our Bonds and 
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Reaffirming our Connections,‖ for compositionists in English departments, ―Fighting that 
literature faction often makes you feel like you have invaded China.  You can mount an all-out 
assault and think that you‘re making an impression, but when the smoke clears, nothing has 
changed.  The mandarins are untouched‖ (273).  Less a decade later, the issue still loomed large 
over rhetoric and composition, as evidenced by the Tate-Lindemann debates, in which rhetoric 
and composition scholars held forth in the pages of College English about whether literature had 
any place in first-year writing courses and whether the inclusion of literature in first-year writing 
courses posed a substantial risk to the disciplinary capital of rhetoric and composition.  More 
recently, rhetoric and compositionists have also been confronting labor issues related to the 
secondary status of rhetoric and composition in English studies because across the nation, 
composition is quite often taught by a corps of graduate students or adjunct faculty whose 
primary interest or training is not in composition studies and who are not highly valued enough 
to receive the kinds of intellectual or employment benefits that full time and tenure-track faculty 
receive.
58
   
The issues to which Hairston pointed are no less issues today, though rhetoric and 
composition has gained disciplinary capital in the intervening twenty-five years, as the secession 
of numerous rhetoric and composition factions from English departments at many notable 
universities
59
 indicates.  And yet, many rhetoric and composition programs remain within 
English departments, whether because they feel a symbiosis with their literary and English 
language studies counterparts or because of inertia, or because they lack the clear sense of 
purpose necessary to dislodge themselves from their English departments.  Regardless, the lack 
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 For more on the labor debates, particularly as they are summarized in the work of Berlin and Crowley, see section 
1.3, above. 
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 As I noted in section 1.3, above, these include the University of Colorado-Boulder, the University of Wisconsin-
Madison, Washington State University,  Syracuse University, and the University of Texas-Austin. 
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of uniformity in rhetoric and composition‘s approach to its relationship to the other 
subdisciplines in English studies, particularly literary studies, indicates that the debates are on-
going,
60
 and the fact that many rhetoric and composition factions have departed English 
departments should indicate that the conflicts between rhetoric and composition and literary 
studies continue to encourage those who work in rhetoric and composition to pursue 
autonomization, and that this autonomization is often borne of the kinds of acrimony that 
Hairston, Tate, and Lindemann addressed.   
Ultimately, as I argued earlier, the contemporary conflicts between rhetoric and 
composition and literary studies – as and when the two disciplines are united within the context 
of English studies – are very much like the intellectual and institutional conflicts that caused 
literary studies to see itself as autonomous from other academic disciplines.  Both disciplines 
sought disciplinary autonomy (from disciplines outside English departments, in the case of 
literary studies, and from literary studies, in the case of rhetoric and composition) as a way of 
establishing themselves as disciplines, asserting that their validity derives not from what they 
have to gain from and contribute to academia but from their exclusivity within that academic 
context.  This sort of autonomy is a false autonomy, one in which these disciplines assert a 
decontextualization from– and concomitant privilege or power over – other disciplines that 
doesn‘t really exist.  As a uniter, I present rhetoricality as the intellectual-disciplinary and 
institutional basis for pursuing heteronomy rather than autonomy.  In a rhetoricized, 
heteronomous model, both disciplines would see themselves as part of a larger matrix of 
disciplines that maintain their disciplinary identities while also sharing the charge of contributing 
to and making the most of others‘ contributions to academic pursuits.   
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 At least within rhetoric and composition though perhaps not in literary studies.  I am presently unaware of any 
serious discussion in literary studies about the relationship of rhetoric and composition to literary studies. 
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Today‘s English studies scholar, no matter her disciplinary specialization and 
perspective, cannot deny that English studies has come far from the days of the early and mid-
twentieth century when those who worked in literary studies argued for its validity and value as 
an academic discipline in terms of its autonomy from other disciplines.
61
  The situation has also 
changed in terms of some of the particular problems rhetoric and composition has had to 
confront because of its complex and strained relationship to literary studies.  As I noted in the 
first chapter, the shift toward cultural studies has also helped make the field of English studies 
more hospitable to rhetoric and composition by making the study of literature much more 
rhetorical (and perhaps also rhetoricized) insofar as it shifted the discipline away from the study 
of literature-as-high-art toward the study of literature as it (in)forms and is (in)formed by cultural 
practices and institutions. 
This sort of progress in English studies has been necessary and helpful, but it has also 
resulted in new expressions of some residual problems for English studies.  In particular, there 
remains a problem of definitions: what is literature, if not the study of high art?  What is English 
studies, if not primarily the study of literature?  In light of recent changes in higher education 
policies and priorities that affect not only our budgetary and institutional concerns but also the 
demands put on the intellectual labor of those of us who work in English studies, we must also 
ask ourselves, how do we justify the place of English studies if we can‘t define it?  How (and 
why, and for whom) might we go about defining English studies in this changed environment?
62
  
One way to answer these questions, I propose, is by adopting the disciplinary disposition of 
rhetoricality, which provides English studies and its subdisciplines with a set of premises and 
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 For more on the history of rationales for literary studies as a discipline, see section 1.3, above. 
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 For more on the ―crisis‖ (or lack thereof) of defining literary and English studies, see section 1.1, above. 
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principles to follow as we begin to redefine our discipline and confront the institutional 
challenges concomitant to these disciplinary shifts. 
In the present chapter, I present a schematic overview of what a rhetoricization of English 
studies in American higher education might involve.  Unfortunately, anything more precise than 
a sketch is outside the scope of the present project, as it would require the acquisition of a set of 
empirical data about disciplinary and institutional practices in ―English studies,‖ variously 
defined, and its subdisciplines that does not already exist and perhaps could not exist because of 
the permeable and ever-changing boundaries of the fields of English studies and its 
subdisciplines.  Nevertheless, it is possible to outline some of the most significant or obvious 
opportunities for English studies to use rhetoricality as the basis for its continued progress as a 
field.  Because literature and literary studies have historically been privileged above other 
subjects and subdisciplines within English studies as a field, I will begin with an overview of the 
benefits of rhetoricization for literature in its institutionalization as an academic discipline, both 
in terms of a rhetoricization that proceeds from defining literature as a metaphorization of LIFE 
and in terms of other forms of disciplinary and institutional rhetoricization.  Afterward, I will 
observe what rhetoricization can do to align the intellectual pursuits with the institutional 
structures of English studies as a whole, both as a result of the telegraphed reverberations of 
rhetoricizing literature and literary studies and of a more general rhetoricization of other areas of 
English studies. 
4.2 Rhetoricizing Literature and Literary Studies 
 




In order to understand the importance of rhetoricizing literature for the rhetoricization of 
English studies, I will begin with a summary of the problematic definitions of literature.
63
  These 
definitions are not explicit in today‘s leading research in literary studies and literary theory, but 
to confront our contemporary problems and continue to progress as a field toward more accurate 
and helpful conceptualizations requires that we also confront our intellectual and institutional 
history.  We might put unhelpful conceptualizations of literature into four general categories.  
Literature has been conceptualized as spiritual in nature.  In this conceptualization, literature 
might be ontologically spiritual, with its own sort of spiritual essence, or experientially spiritual, 
in that it causes the reader and/or writer to have some sort of spiritual experience.  This was the 
concept at the heart of Romanticist notions of literature as spiritual escape from the drudgery and 
tragedy of material existence.  It carried over into the Victorian idea that literature could replace 
religion as an ordering principle of society that touched people spiritually rather than just 
communicated information and ideas to them.  This conceptualization of literature is sometimes 
associated with the conceptualization of literature as falsely autonomous, acontextualized, or 
universal and timeless in its appeal because its transcendence could be seen as the product of its 
spiritual essence.  But transcendence need not be spiritual in nature; it could be a matter of the 
work‘s transcending the context of its creation by virtue of the eternal nature of its themes, 
characters, or plot.   
Another conceptualization of literature that often overlaps with these conceptualizations 
of literature as spiritual is of literature as creative or imaginative texts composed by an individual 
writer, one who is often endued with special spiritual gifts or inspiration.  And literature has been 
conceptualized as texts that are culturally significant (because they are esteemed by artists, 
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critics, or the public) or about culturally-significant people or topics.  If the texts, people, or 
topics are also universal in their appeal (e.g., as with famous texts or archetypal characters and 
situations), or if their authors are uniquely inspired in their imaginative or creative efforts, this 
conceptualization will overlap with conceptualizations of literature as spiritual, acontextual, or 
uniquely creative. 
These are unhelpful conceptualizations of literature insofar as they are throwbacks to 
outmoded ways of thinking about literature that produced problematic approaches to and 
valuations of literature and the discipline of literary studies and, over time, the field of English 
studies.  Though recent work in literary criticism and theory has demanded that literary scholars 
work from a much more productive set of notions about literature than those that guided the 
earliest forms of English study in Anglo-American higher education, these problematic 
conceptualizations cannot yet be put away as non-issues.  Lest we think the work of this forward 
progress is done, we must continue to be aware of how these conceptualizations of literature 
have affected our mainstream American culture‘s belief that literature is the most important use 
of language, worthy of investments of time, energy, intellectual labor, and economic resources.  
Correspondingly, these conceptualizations have encouraged our culture to value literary studies 
as the most important of all subdisciplines within English studies.  Even if those who lead the 
way in influencing literary studies realize that literature is but one form of human 
communication and that other areas of equal importance in English studies and other disciplines 
have equal contributions to make, there is still much work to be done to ensure more equal, 
productive intellectual and institutional valuation and cooperation among the subdisciplines of 
English studies.  That is why rhetoricality matters today. 




As Bender and Wellbery claim, literary criticism, as a discipline of ―modern knowledge 
itself,‖ is arguably already inclined toward rhetoricality (35-9).  The five assertions on which 
rhetoricality is premised are: (1) Contra the Romanticists, there is no possibility of an 
autonomous of decontextualized human subject or literary-aesthetic object.  All human beings 
and human phenomena take place in observable, describable contexts.  (2) Contra Enlightenment 
theorists, there is no possibility of decontextualized scientific objectivity.  When human beings 
create or have knowledge, that knowledge will be affected by the context of its creation or use.  
(3) Contra liberal humanism, human beings cannot bracket their subjectivity completely, and so 
public discourse can only be relatively disinterested.  (4) All human communication is 
polyglottal, and (5) human beings use many different modes of communication to construct the 
realities in which they act.  Academic disciplines that have adopted this disciplinary attitude of 
rhetoricality will operate according to four principles: they will (1) acknowledge their own 
inherent interdisciplinarity and actively seek to build and improve interdisciplinary cooperation, 
(2) expand the variety of texts and occasions that they address, (3) acknowledge that reality and 
our knowledge of it is constructed, and (4) operate recursively by allowing the transdisciplinary 
body of knowledge that they contribute to and draw from to influence their institutional 
structures and practices and future intellectual work.   
None of these assertions or principles are anathema to contemporary literary studies.  But 
they are anathema to problematic residual conceptualizations of literature as spiritual, 
acontextual, uniquely creative, or of special significance and a falsely autonomous discipline of 
literary or English studies.  To rhetoricize literary studies requires a clearly articulated 
conceptualization of literature that is consonant with the assertions and principles of 
rhetoricality.  The conceptualization of literature as a metaphorization of LIFE provides that sort 
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of platform.  It denies that literature is somehow endowed with special inherent qualities – 
spiritual, cultural, textual, or otherwise – that make it wholly distinct from and more significant 
than other uses of language.  It does this not by a purely empirical appeal wherein what we know 
about language, text, and culture matter only insofar as we can use cognitive science to put in 
quantitative terms what properly belongs to qualitative assessments; rather, it affirms the claims 
of cognitive linguistics that meaning-making in language is a complex function of human 
cognition that is affected by individual and socio-cultural experiences.  This promotes an 
interdisciplinary approach to the study of literature because it values and perhaps even requires 
simultaneous attention to linguistic, rhetorical, aesthetic, and socio-cultural concerns.   
In promoting interdisciplinarity along these lines, a reconceptualization of literature as a 
conceptual metaphor highlights the fact that literary texts and our concept LITERATURE are 
constructed and made meaningful by our experiences as embodied individuals participating in 
socio-cultural contexts.  That is, we could not understand that literature metaphorizes LIFE 
unless we understand that language in all its uses is created, used, and made meaningful by 
people, not because it possesses some (spiritual) connection to a realm of acontextual, universal 
meaning.  A reconceptualization of LITERATURE according to the premises of cognitive 
metaphor theory means that in our accounts of what literature is, how it functions, and why we 
use it, we must address qualitative as well as quantitative data.  Our notion of what literature is 
must take into account the influence of culture, history, and individual perception and 
interpretation and the empirical proof that the brain processes language and helps us create 
meaning within those cultural, historical, and personal contexts. 
This understanding of literature, then, is itself recursive in that its primary assertion – that 
literature metaphorizes LIFE – is based on empirical data as well as theory and interpretations of 
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those data based on that theory.  It also encourages intellectual and institutional recursivity 
within academia by characterizing literature itself as a phenomenon of interest to the hard 
sciences, social sciences, and humanities.  It thereby promotes research that brings (disciplinary 
fields that are primarily concerned with) the empirical and objective into conversation with 
(disciplines that are primarily concerned with) the interpretive, cultural, and contingent.  This 
sort of interdisciplinarity can only be supported through an institutional structure in academia 
whereby heteronomy and interdisciplinary work – whether in teaching, research, or 
administration – are valued over autonomy and protectionism.  In other words, it is best 
supported by the same foundation upon which a liberal education is constructed.   
Inevitably, whenever literary studies opens itself to the methods and knowledge of other 
disciplines, particularly the sciences,
64
 it also opens itself up to considering a variety of texts.  
This sort of consideration involves developing a functional literacy in the outside body of 
scholarship, ideally in consultation with a colleague in that field; it also involves expanding the 
range of what counts as valid fodder for teaching and research in literary studies.  As Bender and 
Wellbery suggest, contemporary literary studies already opens itself to a variety of texts and 
ideas found in other disciplines.  The literary studies and any discipline that regularly traverses 
disciplinary boundaries must be vigilant to avoid unthinking appropriation of other disciplines‘ 
knowledge and methods.   
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 I by no means wish to impugn literary studies for failing to consider other disciplines‘ methods and knowledge.  
The cultural studies turn in literary studies has been one indication of the flexibility of literary studies in this regard.  
I do wish to suggest that literary studies has much work ahead if it wants to continue doing so, as I say, particularly 
with the sciences, and it must be careful to enter into cooperative partnerships with scholars in other fields as 
opposed to appropriating their methods and knowledge.  Consider the case of ecocriticism in literary studies today: 
In that approach to literature, a danger lies in merely nodding to the theories and methods of research used in the 
(social) scientific disciplines related to ecocriticism, including geology, geography, biology, sociology, and 
anthropology.  To make valuable contributions to a worthwhile body of knowledge about literature according to an 
ecocritical approach (and to clearly articulate to other fields why a consideration of literature, aesthetics, and/or the 
humanities is valuable), literary scholars must pursue honest interdisciplinarity and recursivity in their teaching, 
research, and administrative work. 
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Literary studies is also to be commended for expanding its treatment of texts and 
questioning the boundary of what ―literature‖ means and ―literary study‖ entails.  A 
reconceptualization of literature as a metaphor can further this expansion in that it defines new 
boundaries for determining what is ―literature‖ and what is not.  Rather than determine the 
proper purview of literary studies based on whether a text is ―important,‖ creative, or inspired in 
some apparently inherent literary way, we would define as literary whatever is read as a 
metaphorization of LIFE, and we could potentially read any text as literature in that way.  This 
could give literary scholars another opportunity to work with other scholars outside their field in 
productive ways and prove that the proper purview of a ―literature‖ class isn‘t just to teach a 
course in art history or art appreciation or that teaching literature entails teaching students how to 
see the intersections of methods and knowledge from a variety of areas of study.  It gives literary 
studies another opportunity to continue in its progression away from justifying its existence in 
academia through claims to a false autonomy, spirituality, or unique creativity.  
Interdisciplinarity that leads to heteronomy and an improved understanding of how human 
beings construct their worlds would be justification enough.
65
 
A reconceptualization of literature via conceptual metaphor theory is but one possible 
way of rhetoricizing literary studies and beginning the process of rhetoricizing English studies.  
But a full and explicit rhetoricization of English studies (as opposed to the latent rhetoricality 
that Bender and Wellbery assert is probably already part of the discipline) does not have to begin 
with a reconceptualization and rhetoricization of literature and literary studies.  However, I 
contend that if those who work in literary and English studies want their discipline(s) to operate 
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 At least, in a world or context where liberal education is a fundamental value.  Even so, for those who value 
higher education as a means to economic success, interdisciplinarity and heteronomy can be appealing for its 
efficiency (it is possible to cover many subjects simultaneously in such an approach) and, more importantly, because 
it produces the most accurate and comprehensive understanding possible of human activity. 
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by the premises and principles of rhetoricality, they would be well-served to begin with a 
consideration of the rhetoricality of literary studies, given the power and prestige of literature
66
 
within our culture and literary studies within English studies.   
4.2.3 Locating Rhetoricization in Literary Studies 
 
4.2.3.1 Literature Classrooms 
 
A rhetoricized approach to teaching literature – particularly one that reconceptualizes 
literature as a metaphorization of LIFE – would 
67
 answer the question ―Why read and teach 
literature?‖ proleptically.  Students in such courses would read more than just ―great‖ or 
―important‖ works and, when they read texts that appear on lists of ―great‖ books or poems or 
dramas, they would read them for their inherent worth qua ―great‖ literature or for the sake of 
reading ―great‖ literature.  The point of reading literature would not be for students to have 
ingested the works that will give them the maximum cultural or symbolic capital, to put it in 
Bourdieu‘s terms.
68
  The new objectives would hinge on developing students‘ awareness of the 
constructed, recursive, heteronomous nature of discourse, thought, and action, with an emphasis 
on aesthetic discourse.  Students would learn a variety of methods – from discourse analysis to 
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 At least, in comparison to non-literary texts. 
67
 Although I have acknowledged the fact that rhetoricization is already happening in implicit and explicit ways in 
both literary and English studies, I will from here on write about rhetoricization in these disciplines as if it is 
hypothetical.  This is not to deny that literary or English studies do not, in some form or another, work according to 
the model of rhetoricality; it is to acknowledge that my intention here is to present general models that I hope will be 
applicable to as many of the myriad types of situations and contexts (e.g., from small schools to large schools, and 
from technical and community colleges to research universities) in which we find literary and English studies, even 
though it may be the case that the forms of rhetoricization that I suggest are already part of the practices, structures, 
and institutions of any given location in which we might find literary or English studies in any given institution of 
higher education in America today. 
68
 Of course, there is something to be said for ensuring that our students have among them an equal amount of these 
forms of capital.  Not having them can be nearly as disempowering in our society as not having access to the means 
of economic capital and power.  We do our students no service to deny that having the cultural capital of knowing 
the ―great‖ books, culturally-significant works of art, the history of these great works, how to paint, or how to play a 
musical instrument matters for how socially and economically successful our students are.  When government cuts 
funding for arts education, it is the marginalized who should be most angry that their access to these sorts of capital 
is being taken away from them.  More importantly, though, students ought to have a rhetoricized education in this 
respect, understanding that art and our valuation of it is constructed, recursive, and contextual. 
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interpretive or aesthetic methods – for determining what are ―literary‖ texts and then for 
analyzing and critiquing them.   
Rhetoricized literature classes would also encourage interdisciplinary thinking and study.  
For example, a course in literature and ecocriticism would unite the study of literature with a 
field that is already interdisciplinary; such a course could be co-taught
69
 by a specialist from 
literary studies and another from history, geography, or environmental sciences.
70
  This sort of 
interdisciplinarity in the classroom has the potential to draw in students who might otherwise 
have thought of literature as irrelevant to their education and/or everyday lives since they had not 
yet thought about connections between literature and the sciences or the environment.  It would 
also put into conversation the different disciplinary ways of knowing and methodologies from 
the disciplines that are brought together in the course. 
Courses specifically focused on literature as a metaphorization of LIFE could take any 
number of forms.  Students would have to understand the empirical evidence that metaphors 
shape how we think and act on individual and social levels, and they should also be encouraged 
to see anecdotal evidence for the significance of metaphor from their own lives.  If the course 
focused on some a particular genre, time period, or literary movement, students could read and 
analyze literature according to the unique or significant ways that LIFE or various entailments of 
LIFE (e.g., RITES OF PASSAGE, PARENTS, RELATIONSHIPS, etc.) are constructed or 
metaphorized in the given genre, historical moment, or literary movement.  This is predicated on 
students‘ understanding of how metaphor functions as a concept and their careful consideration 
                                                 
69
 Indeed, such a course could be co-taught, albeit probably to a larger class.  Co-teaching has its own administrative 
and economic complications, though in some circumstances its benefits would outweigh the costs.  
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 I am indebted to Dustin Crowley of the University of Kansas for this conceptualization of a rhetoricized course 
focused on ecocriticism and for informing my earlier comments regarding ecocritical approaches to ltierature.  
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of the structure and entailments of the concept LIFE.
71
  Such an approach particularly lends itself 
to ethnographic investigations of the ways that people construct their worldviews, concepts of 
what life is or should be, and sense of reality.  The move toward criticism could follow from 
these analyses: in observing constructions of LIFE in literature and the reception of those 
constructions within certain groups, students would be able to see that not all conceptualizations 
of LIFE are created equal, and that narratives of what LIFE entails often exclude some 
individuals and life experiences.  If students know that metaphor affects how people think and 
act in empirically-verifiable ways, and if they come to understand the metaphoric operation of 
literature, then they will be able to see that literature has empirically-verifiable
72
 effects on 
readers and their worlds.  This makes critical literary literacy vitally important for a well-
rounded education about how and why human beings construct their worlds as they do. 
Regardless of the focus of the literature class, students would be encouraged to begin 
making recursive connections between literature and other areas of their studies and lives.  In a 
course on contemporary poetry, for example, this sort of recursivity could be fostered by 
assigning papers that ask students to analyze how a poem and a text from one of their other 
classes use discourse in similar and different ways in constructing reality.  Students might be 
asked to collaborate with or interview scholars or students in other non-literature courses to find 
alternative ways of interpreting a poem and then explain the causes for or significance of the 
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 As I hope I have made clear so far, to say there is but one conceptualization of LIFE is akin to saying that there is 
one life.  Each person has an operating concept of LIFE that is influenced by a culturally-prevalent concept LIFE.  It 
is to that general, complex, schematic concept LIFE that I refer here. 
72
 This is not to say that the only significant claims that literary studies can make must be empirically-verifiable.  
Indubitably, literary studies has made important contributions to cultural studies, critical studies, and aesthetics; 
most of these have been qualitative in nature or contributions to intellectual labor in theory or interpretation.  My 
point here is to note that today there are ways to prove empirically that literature operates and affects us in the ways 
that we claim it does.  Conceptual metaphor theory and cognitive linguistics give us one such (at least relatively) 
empirical way of doing this, but they cannot be the sole method of literary analysis since they are not in and of 
themselves adequate for considering some cultural issues like, for example, the importance of a given text for its 
literary or historical moment.   
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differences in interpretation.  Some teachers foster this recursivity by assigning journals or 
commonplace books, wherein students make connections between the content of the course and 
their daily lives.  Each of these approaches help students see that they are constructing 
knowledge, just as their assigned literary readings also create, organize, and structure the context 
and reality in which they are read.  It foregrounds the fact that ―literature‖ is not an objective 
quality or phenomenon so much as it is a reading strategy.  Since so many of them have been 
told that ―literature‖ is an ethereal, mysterious thing beyond their grasp, we owe it to our students 
to demystify literature by emphasizing its constructed, recursive nature.  Once our students 
understand that literature is something they process as easily as metaphors but that also affects 
their ways of thinking and acting as profoundly as some metaphors do, they will at least be able 
to understand why the study of literature is important to their lives. 
Other subdisciplines within English studies would also likely be part of the 
interdisciplinarity (or, in this case, intradisciplinarity) and expansion of subjects in the 
rhetoricized literature class.  Insofar as rhetoricality emphasizes the significance of multi-modal, 
polyglottal human communication in considering how we use communication to act in and to 
construct reality, a rhetoricized literature classroom ought to ask students to consider the 
rhetorical nature of literature (e.g., the audience, author, purpose in a given social sphere, or 
communicative effects of any given text).  It might also ask students to use their own writing to 
understand the differences and similarities in compositional choices (e.g., rhetorical strategies, 
formatting choices, contexts, purposes) and those of what we have come to call ―creative‖ or 
―imaginative‖ writing.  If the disposition of the course is truly rhetoricized, students would be 
encouraged to see that there is no inherent difference between the creativity they use in their 
compositional process and that which writers of literature use, no reason that one form of 
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composition should be any more or less important than the other.  In this way, a rhetoricized 
literature course could also be a composition course so long as the instructor(s) would be 
appropriately trained in the disciplines of literary studies, composition studies, and creative 
writing studies.   
None of these approaches to the literature class demand a loss of specialization.  In fact, 
they assume that the only way to produce knowledge worthy of sharing with students is to create 
knowledge worth sharing.  This requires that we have specialists in the study of literature who 
have a comprehensive knowledge about particular genres, periods, and theories of literature.  
Without specialization, the body of knowledge that we create about literature and, in turn, about 
the English language, will undoubtedly be underdeveloped.  If literary studies is to make 
worthwhile contributions to the project of the modern university – if our interdisciplinary 
enterprises are to be worthwhile and the knowledge we share with students and the public to be 
useful – it must be granted the human and economic resources it needs to engage in specialized 
research.  Note that this justification for resources (and respect) is not predicated on the inherent 
value of literature itself or the necessity of maintaining a sort of priesthood that protects access to 
literature.  It is based in heteronomy rather than autonomy.  For such a justification to be taken 
seriously, a reckoning must come to the field of literary studies: the importance of literature and 
the study of literature must come to be seen in terms of their connections to other disciplines, to 
other bodies of knowledge, to other non-academic experiences rather than their autonomy from 
them.   
4.2.3.2 Conferences and Conventions 
 
Literary conferences and conventions are one site at which the need for a balance of 
specialization and interdisciplinarity is particularly pronounced.  A look at recent programs from 
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some of the more popular literary conferences
73
 indicate that literary scholarship is still cultural 
in its focus and that the study of literature continues to value the expansion of types of texts and 
occasions that accompanied the shift toward cultural studies.
74
  Arguably, literary studies may 
not belong properly to an ―English‖ department since the study of English literature today has 
increasingly to do with global Englishes.  All of this is in keeping with the interests of 
rhetoricality.  Particularly, the cultural studies approaches that still prevail at many large literary 
studies conferences help keep the pure aesthetic and autonomization at bay by emphasizing the 
value of research and knowledge from other fields (particularly the social sciences).  But more 
can yet be done to promote substantive, interdisciplinary research and dialogue at such literature 
studies conferences, and, consequently, to enact recursively the fundamental premise of our 
acceptance of cultural studies approaches to literature – an acknowledgement of our 
heteronomous context in an academic sphere in which that knowledge is created as well as in the 
socio-cultural context of that knowledge‘s creation and use. 
Take as an example the fact that the 2011 Modern Language Association convention was 
held at the same time as the Linguistic Society of America‘s annual meeting in January 2011.  
The date of the Modern Language Association‘s convention was moved for many reasons, not 
least of which was to avoid overlapping with Christmas celebrations (Redden), but it 
nevertheless meant that linguists or language studies scholars who might have considered 
proposing papers to both the MLA and the LSA or even attending one and proposing a paper for 
the other instead had to make an important (professional and disciplinary) choice about doing 
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 Specifically, I looked at the most recent conference proceedings from the Louisville Conference on Literature and 
Culture Since 1900, the American Comparative Literature Association‘s annual meeting, and the Modern Language 
Association‘s annual convention. 
74
 Of course, there lies a danger in assuming that the content or patterns of professional or disciplinary conferences 
identically reflect the intellectual and/or institutional disposition of a field.  Yet there is also a danger in asserting 
that such conferences are not relevant indications of the interests and practices of their respective fields. 
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one or the other.  In fact, given the bulk of the panels at the latest MLA convention and the 
relative imbalance of papers in literature versus rhetoric and composition, technical and 
professional writing, creative writing, and language or linguistics, one might think that the ―L‖ in 
the group‘s name stands for ―Literature‖ rather than ―Language.‖  Many opportunities for 
interdisciplinary research and knowledge-making are lost because of problematic institutional 
practices like that of the conflict between the MLA and the LSA‘s conferences. 
But if we accepted a rhetoricized definition of literature, then the approaches to literary 
research would be much more varied than they currently are, and our sites of sharing and shared 
literary study could not afford to exclude closely-related disciplines like language studies, 
linguistics, rhetoric and composition, and creative writing.  Scholars from these disciplines or 
from those that are farther removed from literature studies – sociologists, psychologists, 
engineers, biologists, physicists, etc. – might appear at these conferences as contributors to 
panels or papers.  Some might attend just to hear more about how (the study of) literature reveals 
something significant for their own interests and research regarding the ways that human beings 
perceive, interpret, and act in the world as they do.  One could imagine how a professor of 
physics might think of new ways to engage students in large introduction sections of physics 
courses by leading with a discussion of expressions of laws of physics in literature after hearing a 
talk about the physical world as represented in the works of Thomas Pynchon.  Of course, right 
now, the institutional or intellectual structural apparatus that makes such interdisciplinary 
connections possible is weak at best and purely hypothetical at worst.  Rhetoricizing literature 
would make it easier to see the value of heteronomy and to realize that specialized knowledge 
emerges from a shared body of knowledge.  Such a realization incentivizes scholars from all 
disciplines to create opportunities to work together and share the knowledge they create.  As it 
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is, literary studies largely seems content with knowing what it knows about culture, society, 
history, and literature, but so much more could be known and shared if we worked more often 
and more directly with scholars from other disciplines and invited them to be critical, engaged 
audiences of our own research. 
A new definition of literature can help us construct such bridges among literary 
scholarship and scholarship from other disciplines.  To redefine literature as a metaphorization of 
LIFE would ensure that new paths in literary scholarship are in line with the principles of 
rhetoricality because it encourages literary scholars to consider the findings, assertions, and 
methods of disciplines ranging from the hard sciences to other humanities disciplines such as 
rhetoric and composition.  This, in turn, would necessitate that literary scholars keep in mind the 
heteronomous, interdisciplinary context in which their knowledge is situated, and it would 
remind literary studies scholars of the heteronomous (e.g., material, cultural, physical, emotional, 
individual, social, historical) forces that influence their object of study.  The more autonomized 
the view of literature or the more autonomized the approach to literature (e.g., New-Critical style 
close reading for close reading‘s sake) the less welcome it would be at the conferences where 
rhetoricized scholarship and research are shared.   
Research that proceeds from the notion that literature metaphorizes LIFE need not be a 
direct analysis of the ways that literature behaves metaphorically.  A paper on Pynchon‘s literary 
representations of the physical world could examine how Pynchon or his readers use those 
representations to understand or reinterpret extra-textual reality through more or less empirical 
methods, including the use of neural imaging to see, in a literal sense, the connections that 
readers make between Pynchon‘s text and their extra-textual experiences of physical phenomena.  
Or perhaps the paper used discourse analysis or more traditional literary analysis to compare 
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Pynchon‘s representations of physical phenomena with descriptions of the same or similar 
phenomena by a given cultural or social group.  Regardless, the ultimate objectives would be the 
same: to contribute to a body of knowledge wherein what we know about literature, human 
beings, and the world as we perceive and interpret it influences how we study them, thereby 
making the study of literature significant beyond itself.  
4.2.3.3 Around and Beyond Campus 
 
Literary scholars would increasingly seek out direct partnerships with scholars in other 
disciplines, including the subdisciplines of English studies.  In particular, they might cooperate 
with these scholars in a range of activities like discussing ideas for their own research or on 
developing co-authored research, attending or presenting at conferences or symposia in other 
disciplines (perhaps as the result of cooperative research), or planning co-taught courses with 
these colleagues.  All this would go a long way to improving not just literary studies research but 
also that of our collaborators, whose own research might benefit from the insights and input of 
literary scholars.  In so doing, it would also help promote the value of and need for literary 
studies in the academy to our colleagues, administrators, and students.    
One reason for literary scholars to leave the enclaves of their offices and to create 
opportunities to work with colleagues and administrators outside literary studies is to lead the 
way in petitioning administrators for support in developing resources and infrastructure to 
support interdisciplinary research.  These include support for faculty colloquia, interdisciplinary 
seminars, common research space, and other human and technological resources.  At the 
University of Kansas, for example, the KU Libraries houses a Center for Digital Scholarship 
with a large, well-appointed lab where scholars can work with Center staff on various projects, 
such as digitizing and creating multimedia and primary source materials and consulting about 
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copyright in the digital age (―KU to Launch‖).  This Center also houses an Institute for Digital 
Research in the Humanities, which was itself developed through the work of the KU Libraries 
and the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences.  Such opportunities to create digital humanities 
projects are going to arise much more often in the future and humanities scholars need to be 
engaged in creating these opportunities and steering their development.  If literary scholars want 
to ensure that such opportunities for creative partnerships or innovative research will be 
beneficial for literary research, they will have to eschew autonomization and take the initiative to 
mold these opportunities by working with others outside their field. 
Consider Google‘s digitalization of books and its creation of a searchable, albeit flawed, 
open-access corpus.  Many in the academic and non-academic community hailed the searchable 
corpus as ―a new landscape of possibilities for research and education in the humanities, (Cohen, 
―In 500 Billion‖).  But some prominent linguists, including Mark Liberman and Geoffrey 
Nunberg, criticized the quality and usefulness of the corpus.  These criticisms, however, only 
came after
75
 scholars in the humanities had already undertaken projects and declared as fact the 
seemingly empirical findings of their Google-based research (Nunberg; see also Wootton).  
Undoubtedly, this ought not to have been the case: why didn‘t Google consult (more) linguists 
before launching this tool?  Why weren‘t linguists more vocal about their concerns with the 
system earlier?  Perhaps because it didn‘t matter.  Those outside the academy are perhaps 
accustomed to being separated from those within, and those within forget that others outside 
their disciplines may be interested in or may have a need to know what the academicians know 
and how they know it.   
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Nearly a year and a half pass between Wootton‘s article in The London Times and Nunberg‘s article in The 
Chronicle of Higher Education. 
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A similar problem faces literary scholars: if we can use the Google Books corpus to 
prove empirically that, for example, Victorian literature used certain words more often than 
others, then can‘t we say that we‘ve empirically proved that they value the things associated with 
those words more than other words?
76
  Of course not; the only thing proved in this scenario is 
that certain words are used more often than others.  It is beyond Google‘s reach to create a tool 
that allows us to gauge what literary scholars gauge, though one could imagine such a Value 
Detector or a Interpretive Analysis gadget.  It would still be up to experts in Victorian literature 
and culture to do the work of interpreting the data yielded by the corpus.  As Patricia Cohen of 
The New York Times writes, quoting literary scholar Professor Alice Jenkins of the University of 
Glasgow, many professionals in the field of literary studies think that ―large-scale, quantitative 
research is likely to highlight ‗the importance and the value of close reading; the detailed, 
imaginative, heightened engagement with words, paragraphs and lines of verse‘‖ (―Analyzing‖).  
True as this may be, it is still the burden of literary scholars to be leaders in the development of 
new opportunities for research in the humanities, across academia, and between academia and 
the non-academic world.  Then, when it comes to issues such as whether (and which) claims 
about literature can be proven empirically, literary scholars may not have to sprint to catch up 
with this data zeitgeist in both academic and non-academic culture and that has begun to 
influence research in and thinking about literature.  They could help steer the course of such 
research and knowledge because they would have been locating themselves outside their own 
offices and inside the offices of administrators and fellow scholars more often. 
Connections with the non-academic world would also be important for a rhetoricized 
study of literature because literature is not created or used exclusively in academic contexts.  
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 For more information on an ongoing research project along these lines, see Cohen, ―Victorian.‖ 
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Literary scholars are already educating the public by teaching and by holding lectures, symposia, 
and colloquia that are open to the public.
77
  But if the study of literature is to be recursive and if 
it is acknowledges that all knowledge is constructed, then research about literature ought to 
involve more direct engagement with the people whose use of literature is under investigation.  
In order to fully understand the ways that people create and use literature and its significance for 
the socio-cultural contexts in which it is found, literary scholars must create opportunities both 
on and off campus to interact with the public by educating and learning from them.   
Another way to foster these connections is by conducting more group-specific or 
ethnographic research into the ways that groups of people construct their worlds and/or their 
understanding(s) of literature.  The previous chapter, on the metaphorization of LIFE in 
autobiographical writing, was largely a matter of literary analysis and cultural speculation.  
These are the tools most often used in literary studies today, and they have sufficed for our 
purposes.  But I could also have consulted experts from Sociology or American studies to discuss 
what research has already been done regarding the values of the cultures about which I was 
making claims.  Or, if insufficient data were available, we could conduct our own ethnographic 
research of these groups.  In so doing, I would be taking my literary knowledge and intellectual 
labors
78
 far beyond my office to other scholars, and I would be constructing knowledge about the 
ways that people use and think about literature that is recursively based on their actual practices.  
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 Ostensibly, these forums offer opportunities for the public to do more than passively take in the knowledge of 
scholars.  Ideally, for a rhetoricized literary studies, the public has the chance to weigh in on the ideas presented at 
these forums and thus to influence the research and analyses of literary scholars.  This is one way to recognize and 
capitalize on the recursive nature of the literary object and the study of literature. 
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 See Shapiro for more on the value of intellectual labor in academia.  Intellectual labors should not necessarily be 
considered more valuable because they involve empirical or lab-based research.  The intellectual labor of working in 
theory and abstraction is no lighter or less necessary a labor than whatever research goes on before that theory work.  
The intellectual products of the labor of a literary studies scholar are no less valuable if they are not predicated on 
scientific data; they will be less valuable if they reveal nothing new or insightful about the world or their subject(s).  
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Ultimately, the way for literary studies to justify its existence on college and university 
campuses is to prove to students, taxpayers, administrators, and higher education policymakers 
that literary studies contributes something unique to a well-rounded education and to the body of 
knowledge created in the university.  The way that literary studies scholars can show that they 
have worthwhile contributions to make to academia and to the public is by stepping outside of 
their departments and beginning dialogues with those interested parties.  Instead of being 
weakened by heteronomy, the recursive and constructed nature of literature and literary study, 
and interdisciplinary work, rhetoricization makes it easier for the discipline of literary studies to 
argue for the resources and respect it deserves in academia. 
4.3 Rhetoricizing English Studies 
 
4.3.1 Locating Rhetoricization in English Studies 
 
In many ways, the sketch of a rhetoricized literary studies will resemble the sketch of a 
rhetoricized English studies that follows here.  But the two rhetoricizations must be considered in 
slightly different ways in part because English studies is perhaps more fundamentally an 
institutional/administrative unit and secondarily an intellectual/disciplinary field, while literary 
studies is perhaps more fundamentally an intellectual/disciplinary field and secondarily the 
institutional structure of that field.  If it is fair to say that defining ―literature‖ and  its 
corresponding discipline of ―literary studies‖ is challenging, then it would be fair to say that it is 
even more challenging to define ―English‖ and what appropriately belongs to ―English studies‖ 
as a discipline since these often include ―literature‖ and ―literary studies.‖  In the following 
section, I outline what rhetoricizing English studies might involve with the qualification that, as 
there is no monolithic literature or literary studies about which I could make universal claims and 
offer universal suggestions, there is no monolithic discipline of English studies or English studies 
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department on which I can base my suggestions for rhetoricization.  My suggestions will not fit 
every single situation and context in which we find English studies, though they may be taken as 
an indication of the guiding principles of rhetoricizing English studies, both as a development of 
a rhetoricized reconceptualization of literature and from a more general rhetoricization of the 
field of English studies. 
4.3.1.1 The English Department 
 
By ―English departments,‖ I mean any institutional structure within a larger college or 
university that houses mostly English studies scholars and instructors.  I do not wish to make any 
commentary on departments wherein there are a handful of English studies scholars and 
instructors among faculty from other disciplines as well, such as with English and Philosophy 
departments or Humanities departments that exist in some smaller colleges and universities.  
English departments are often given other names that acknowledge the diversity of subjects 
pertinent to English studies (such as a Literature and Writing department) and of the subject 
areas covered by its faculty.  For the sake of ease, however, I will simply use the term ―English 
department‖ to refer to a schematized institutional body under the aegis of which English studies 
scholars are sanctioned to work within a college or university. 
The potential objects available for research in English studies are found throughout the 
university, and so not all research and teaching related to English studies will be found in 
English departments.  Examples of such related work include Writing Centers and writing 
courses in degree programs where English is still the primary language (e.g., business degree 
programs).  Right now, there is little clarity about what the proper purview of English 
departments ought to include, but that becomes less problematic in a rhetoricized English 
studies.  A rhetoricized English department would house scholars and scholarship that 
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investigates how and why people use the varieties of (Anglophone) communication that they do 
to construct their realities.  ―Anglophone communication‖ studies today includes world 
Englishes, works translated into English, and non-linguistic communication used by English 
speakers; sometimes, there need be no ―English‖ element of the texts and occasions English 
studies scholars investigate.  A rhetoricized English department would welcome this sort of 
diversity in the texts and occasions its faculty research.  It would be able to articulate a need, 
even, for this diversity since its charge would be to develop a refined and extensive body of 
knowledge about English-based communication in all its forms. 
The number of faculty per subdiscipline within an English department would be an 
important matter for a given English department to contend with.  If we take seriously the 
assertion that the business of English departments ought to be the study of the English language 
in use, then we cannot condone any special emphasis on one area by stacking the faculty deck in 
the favor of literature, rhetoric and composition, creative writing, or any other subdiscipline.  For 
many English departments today, this would require a reduction in the number of literary studies 
faculty and an increase in English language, rhetoric and composition, technical writing, and 
creative writing faculty.  This would not be an uncomplicated change: one potential contention 
with a reduction in literary faculty might be that the breadth of all that literary studies 
encompasses warrants a disproportionate number of faculty to cover all relevant areas.  If that 
were truly the case, however, no small college or university could have any sort of literary 
studies program since they can only accommodate a small number of literary studies faculty.  In 
a rhetoricized model, it could be that fewer departments are able to offer degrees in as many 
areas of literary scholarship as they currently do.  That seems fitting, given the current crisis in 
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the job market for professors of literature.
79
  Moreover, each of the other subdisciplines could 
make the same argument about the breadth of their field and need for more faculty within the 
department to cover those areas in teaching and research.  In other words, English departments 
might be smaller with equal representation among the subdisciplines and deeper specialization 
within those represented subdisciplines. 
Another contention might be that if the number of literary studies faculty in an English 
department decline, so too will either specialization or interdisciplinarity in all of English 
studies.  That is, English departments that offer only, say, MA or PhD degrees in Shakespearean 
literature or contemporary American literature may produce graduate students who only know 
those areas of literary studies; we will have produced scholars of very limited scope who cannot 
easily work outside the confines of that specialization.  Or, if an English department had fewer 
literature faculty, they might be able only to offer a very generalized MA or PhD but with no 
depth since perhaps there would only be one or two scholars from a given area of specialization 
to teach graduate students.  These are contentions that should be taken seriously, and perhaps it is 
that the balance between specialization and interdisciplinarity is one that all English departments, 
by their very nature, will struggle with regardless of whether or not they operate with a 
disposition of rhetoricality.   
What is more important, perhaps, is that in a rhetoricized English studies, the lines 
between ―literary studies‖ and ―writing studies‖ and ―rhetoric studies‖ and other areas of 
scholarship in English studies would not be so clearly cut as they are now.  Someone who 
graduates from a rhetoricized English department could have a specialization in a certain area of 
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 According to research by the MLA, there are substantially fewer tenure-track positions for English faculty than 
there were in 1995 while part-time and non-tenure track positions have increased (Laurence).  The only area of 
specialization to have an increase in the number of jobs advertised with the MLA in the 2009-2010 hiring season 
was rhetoric and composition (MLA Office of Research). 
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literature but could also teach introductory composition and language courses.  Another graduate 
might have a specialization in composition studies but also publishes research in rhetorical 
approaches to (teaching) literature or technical writing.  Many current graduate students in 
English studies are already taking this rhetoricized, multidisciplinary approach, and the already-
multidisciplinary field of English studies will benefit from having scholars who have such 
expansive talents and interests. 
It could be that a rhetoricized English department would no longer exist as an ―English 
department.‖  Perhaps if communication more broadly is its focus, English studies would be 
more appropriately located in a communication department.  Or, English studies might be 
included with communication, art, and music in something more akin to a Text Studies 
department that houses all intellectual issues related to understanding the creation and use of 
texts composed in various modes.  Rhetoricized English departments could undergo any number 
of similar permutations, and these are but some of the possibilities.   
4.3.1.2 Around Campus 
 
If ―English studies‖ refers to the study of more than English literary communication – to 
the study of English language, composition, and literature – then English studies has a vested 
interest in English texts written within other disciplines and situations outside of the English 
department.  Consider writing centers as examples of institutional and intellectual bodies that are 
often separate from English departments and where important scholarly and instructional work 
related (in at least some respects) to English studies takes place: there is no reason that a 
rhetoricized English department should insist that a writing center come under its jurisdiction, 
but scholars from all areas of the English department should find ways to foster working 
relationships with the writing center.  English department faculty should be aware of the services 
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and philosophy of their college‘s or university‘s writing center so that they can lend their input 
about those services and philosophies, where they intersect with the faculty‘s work, to help make 
our students the best writers they can be, no matter what the situation.  Similar sorts of outreach 
and cooperation could happen with writing courses and writing programs in other areas of the 
college or university.  For example, when faculty from the business school need to teach classes 
on business writing, they could consult with certain English faculty regarding things related to 
English language, style, and rhetoric.   
Such cross-disciplinary classes underscore how much English studies has to contribute to 
the quality of students‘ education and to the work of academia.  Our colleagues in other 
departments who might otherwise think that English departments only concern themselves with 
the study of ―good‖ or ―important‖ writing and (somewhat paradoxically) basic composition and 
grammar would begin to reconfigure their concept of what an English department is interested 
in.  Students would come to see the English department as an important part of their academic 
careers, since they would be exposed to the input, expertise, and service of the English 
department about the various texts that they have written and read in each of their disciplines.  
Administrators would also be hard-pressed to ignore the value of English departments that 
eagerly seek out opportunities to make contributions to the work that students and other scholars 
do with English communication across the university.  By highlighting the value of their input 
throughout the academy – not just as a service to the university but as a source of expertise and 
assistance in things related to English communication – English departments can clarify the 
significance of our contributions to academia for anyone with an interest in higher education. 
Of course, when English studies scholars find themselves in the offices of administrators 
or in college- or university-level meetings about budgets, hiring priorities, program outcomes, 
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strategic planning, and student life programming, they must keep in mind the heteronomous 
nature of their relationship to various bodies within this academic context.  That is, we must 
work with administrators and scholars in other disciplines rather than issue demands about the 
needs of the English department without considering the questions, interests, and input of those 
who have some interest in our practices.  If, for example, college or university administration 
calls for an assessment of each academic program, English studies scholars should welcome the 
opportunity to work with administrators in developing an assessment that is appropriate and fair 
and that discovers information that is relevant and of interest to all parties concerned.  We should 
not ignore such calls for assessment or accountability; these are opportunities to demonstrate the 
benefits, scope, range, and importance of the study of English in the university, so long as we do 
not have to concede direction of the assessment to those who are unfamiliar with our subjects 
and pedagogical practices.  Ignoring or rebuffing calls for assessment is an autonomizing move, 
one that suggests to administrators, colleagues in other disciplines, students, and the public that 
we think of our discipline as the whole puzzle rather than as one piece of the whole. 
4.3.1.3 English Classrooms 
 
As I suggested above, the rhetoricization of English studies may have some implications 
for who teaches what in English departments.  If scholars in English departments specialize in 
one area but have sufficient experience with or training in other areas of specialization, then 
English courses may themselves be more intradisciplinary if not interdisciplinary than they 
currently are.  English departments would offer more courses that blend areas of linguistic or 
communications-focused inquiry with areas of rhetorical or literary inquiry.  A course in digital 
or new media communication in English might examine the ways that fan fiction or hyperlinked 
versions of canonical literature influence reading habits, cultural shifts, or intended and actual 
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audiences.  More courses in English departments would be cross-listed or co-taught with 
instructors from other disciplines.  We might see more Writing Across the Curriculum programs, 
too, because of the opportunities for expanding critical literacy skills across and within the 
disciplines.   
Ultimately, full-time and tenure-track faculty may find themselves teaching 
undergraduate courses if the number of graduate students admitted into a rhetoricized English 
department decreases.  Faculty could use those lower-level courses as opportunities to work with 
colleagues from other disciplines in courses that focus on the foundations of those fields.  First-
year composition, introductory English language, and introductory literature courses would not 
be seen as drudgery either to teach; they would be seen as opportunities to guide the first steps of 
our students‘ education in English, not hurdles to clear before being allowed to teach a(n 
advanced) literature course.  Students would come to understand literature as but one way that 
human beings use communication to negotiate their worlds, but they wouldn‘t see it as inherently 
superior to other forms of communication.  Rather, English studies classes would help students 
to develop a rhetorical, cultural, and linguistic awareness of all the (Anglophone, at least for an 
English department) texts they encounter in their studies and in their everyday lives, not just the 
literary texts they encounter.   
4.4 Rhetoricality as an Answer to Present and Future Questions 
 
The benefits of rhetoricizing literary and English studies are numerous.  Within English 
departments, they help scholars to articulate a valid, coherent theory about the nature of literature 
and language-in-use.  They also give us a basis for accepting the heteronomous nature of our 
object of study and the institutional context in which we study it.  In turn, they encourage us to 
understand the constructed nature of our world, pursue an expansive understanding of human 
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activity that spans disciplinary boundaries, recognize the recursive relationships between how we 
act and what we know, and sanction us to apply that knowledge to a wide variety of texts.  This, 
in turn, helps us face some unwelcome truths about the untenable practices of privileging literary 
studies and predicating the necessity of English studies in academia on tenuous or at least 
unproven claims that our value is connected to something as nebulous as ―critical thinking‖
80
 or 
that our value is self-evident and in need of no justification.   
Outside English departments, they give us opportunities to seek new cooperative 
partnerships with scholars in other fields for constructing and refining knowledge about the 
world.  Our research in that respect would reinforce and explore the fact that our world is 
constructed from our objective, cultural, and individual experiences and interpretations of those 
experiences.  This disciplinary disposition would make clear for those outside the English 
department that we wish to work with others and consider their interests and questions in 
formulating what we know about the English language in its various uses.  English departments 
need to cultivate this sort of heteronomy, transparency, and a more accurate and worthwhile 
understanding of our object of study – the English language – if they wish to be taken seriously 
in contemporary higher education. 
This is a timely issue for English studies in the wake of the Spellings report and 
subsequent attempts by those in academia to justify their current practices.  Consider the case of 
the Texas A&M University system, where in 2010 a list of the profitability of each professor at 
the university was published in an attempt to increase transparency in higher education spending 
(a key element of the Spellings report‘s recommendations).  As it turns out, the English 
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 See Fish and Berubé for further discussion of whether teaching critical thinking is a valid justification for English 
studies.  Critical thinking can be a way for English studies scholars to have their cake and eat it, too, by satisfying 
the demands of those who see college as a place for acquiring job skills and of those who see college as a place to be 
exposed to new ideas and to learn to articulate one‘s own insights.  
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department was in the black, while such departments in the hard sciences such as oceanography, 
physics and astronomy, and aerospace engineering were in the red (Simon and Banchero).  While 
the profitability of English is no doubt due in part to intradepartmental labor issues since the 
burden of teaching many undergraduate students is largely put upon under-paid graduate 
teaching assistants rather than full-time or tenure-track faculty, it ultimately doesn‘t matter that 
the Texas A&M English department, like many other English departments across the nation, has 
managed to avoid dealing with that labor issue.  What matters more is that much of the work that 
goes on in English is perceived as being non-essential.  For example, in a Wall Street Journal 
article about the profitability list, Bill Peacock, vice-president of the Texas Public Policy 
Foundation, is quoted as saying that taxpayers should determine whether ―they should be 
spending two years paying the salary of an English professor so he can write a book of poetry 
simply to add to the prestige of the university or the body of literature out there‖ (Simon and 
Banchero).  When asked about his response to criticisms along these lines, Chester Dunning, 
history professor at Texas A&M, said that ―if you want me to explain why a grocery clerk in 
Texas should pay taxes for me to write those books, I can't give you an answer. … We've only 
got 5,000 years of recorded human history, and I think we need every precious bit of it‖ (Simon 
and Banchero). 
English studies must come to terms with the fact that its current intellectual and 
institutional practices may only be reinstating a history that the discipline may have thought it 
abandoned long ago.  We must be committed to an honest appraisal of our current practices in 
the hopes of improving on shortcomings and creating an honest, coherent picture of what English 
studies can and does contribute to its academic and social context.  We have much to offer those 
who would reduce higher education to the transmission of skill sets for jobs, not on their terms 
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but in terms of what is necessary in order to say that the body of knowledge created and refined 
in the university is comprehensive, accurate, and worthwhile.   
Afterword – Literature as a Conceptual Blend? 
 
This project emerged from two courses I took during the fall of 2006 as a graduate 
student at the University of Kansas.  These were a topics course about rhetorical approaches to 
literature and a metaphor theory seminar.  In the first weeks of the topics course, we students 
read and discussed some well-known works by Terry Eagleton, S. Michael Halloran, and others 
about the nature of literature.  As the semester wore on, it was clear that this debate hadn‘t yet 
been settled and that perhaps it never could (or should) be.  At the same time, in the metaphor 
theory seminar, I began to read Paul Ricoeur‘s Rule of Metaphor.  Ricoeur‘s claim that metaphor 
is the assertion – however conscious or unconscious – that some phenomenon is that which the 
speaker and audience knows it is not was particularly convincing to me as an elegant expression 
of the fundaments of conceptual metaphor theory, which had been validated by nearly twenty 
years of qualitative and quantitative data.   
I began to see overlaps between the description of (conceptual) metaphor that Ricoeur‘s 
tension theory made possible and the description of literature espoused by many Western literary 
scholars, philosophers, linguists, and rhetoricians for centuries (I summarize some of these 
overlaps in chapter two).  In other words, it proved helpful to think of literature as a metaphor for 
the following reasons: 
 It provides a way to talk about how fictive reality can so automatically and consciously or 
unconsciously make sense to readers. 
 It situates meaning in language, cognition, rhetoric (or the use of words to address 
interpersonal and inter-situational exigencies), experience, and culture rather than in an 
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unknown or inexplicable realm (or ignoring the question of meaning-making altogether).  
This makes the study of literature something that is more fully in line with current 
interdisciplinary trends in the (post-)cultural-studies field of literary studies.  In short, it is 
already rhetoricized. 
 It highlights the tension between a reader‘s individual experience of or cultural 
knowledge about LIFE and the concept of LIFE that is expressed in an artistic work.  It is 
comfortable with the inherent and inevitable conflict, as well as the ambiguity that will 
obtain between the reader, the text, and the socio-cultural context in which both are 
situated. 
 It gives us a way to explain the significance of literature – that it affects people as 
individuals and as members of a culture – on an interpretive, analytic basis as well as on a 
scientific, empirical basis.  This makes it easier to explain to anyone from the layperson 
to scholars in the hard sciences what literature is, how it functions, why we use it, and 
why it‘s a valuable area of study in higher education. 
 
Conceptual metaphor theory is not the only possible way to explain the nature of literature, 
though.  It is one possible way to understand literature as a phenomenon that elegantly 
summarizes and entails most of what literary scholars assert literature is and does. 
Another possible explanation of the nature of literature that operates on the same 
premises as conceptual metaphor theory and that offers many of the same benefits is that 
literature operates as a conceptual blend rather than a conceptual metaphor.  Conceptual blends, 
also called conceptual integration (Fauconnier and Turner 18), are similar to metaphors in that 
they involve mapping similar or salient properties between at least two distinct conceptual 
domains.  With metaphor, there are only two domains, though this complexity may be multiplied 
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by entailed or associated metaphors.  Conceptual blends, on the other hand, can involve more 
than two conceptual domains.  They aid us in understanding or imagining that which we haven‘t 
yet experienced or conceived of, such as counterfactual assertions like If I were you, I would 
have done it (Kövecses 228).  To understand this example phrase would require imagining the 
speaker as being someone whom she is not and then acting as if she were that person.  In 
conceiving of such a counterfactual, we use a network of many domains that are blended in a 
cognitive blended space.  That is, in mapping elements of I [THE SPEAKER] onto the 
conceptual domain YOU [THE INTERLOCUTOR], we create a new domain, I/YOU, in which 
the speaker and her interlocutor are one and the same person; in this blended space, we can 
imagine the speaker behaving as and actually being her interlocutor.  ―We can say, then,‖ 
metaphor theorist Zoltan Kövecses explains, ―that there are two input domains that yield a third 
one, [the] blended space‖ (228-9, italics in original).  This emergent structure – the output of the 
conceptual blend – isn‘t part of the cognitive function of metaphor.  In that formulation, we 
understand one domain in terms of another, drawing from the source (FIRE, for example) to 
understand the target (ANGER, in the case of ANGER IS FIRE) but not to produce a new 
concept, ANGER/FIRE.
81
  Because blends can be multi-directional, they can produce blended 
concepts, like I/YOU. 
                                                 
81
 I affirm that conceptual blends have this capacity while metaphor lacks it.  But I think that metaphor can be seen 
as having emergent functions.  In thinking and talking using metaphor, for example, speakers develop ―entailed‖ 
metaphors – metaphors that derive from a superordinate metaphor.  For example, the conceptual metaphor 
COMPLEX ABSTRACT SYSTEMS ARE PLANTS (as in Please turn to the local branch of the organization) 
produces the entailed metaphor REDUCING COMPLEX SYSTEMS IS MAKING PLANTS SMALLER 
(PRUNING, CUTTING), as in They selectively pruned the workforce (Kövecses 98-9).  Perhaps metaphor is seen in 
this reductive manner because conceptual metaphor theorists deny the bidirectionality of metaphorical mapping.  If 
metaphor is seen as only a matter of drawing from a source to elaborate on a target, then only the target and source 
matter, to the exclusion of possible entailments and elaborations on that metaphor that may not be fully contained 
within the source and target concepts. 
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It could be the case that we process literature as a conceptual blend rather than a 
conceptual metaphor, that literature blends our experiences of LIFE with those presented in the 
literary texts we read rather than metaphorizes them in terms of the depiction of LIFE in the 
literary text.  To talk about literature as a metaphor as I have is to assert that our concept 
LITERATURE is structured by the knowledge that a work of literature will depict the experience 
of LIFE, where LIFE is our concept of what the prototypical lived human experience entails.  In 
reading literature, we use our concept of LIFE, which we‘ve cultivated from our cultural 
knowledge and personal experiences, as a source domain to help us understand the target 
concept(s) of LIFE depicted in the literary text; we also use the concept(s) of LIFE depicted in 
the literary text as sources for understanding the target domain of our own concept(s) of LIFE.  
Conceptual blend theory would treat each of these domains as input domains; that is, each 
domain adds something unique and necessary for the blended space of LITERATURE (as a 
blend of the reader‘s experiences of LIFE with the literary depictions of LIFE). 
The benefits of conceptualizing of literature as a blend in this way include the ease with 
which it would be possible to talk about the multi-directionality of the influence of one concept 
on another and, thus, of literature on its readers and the socio-cultural context on literature.  If 
metaphor theory holds that metaphoric mapping is unidirectional,
82
 then we must address each of 
the cognitive moves – from the reader‘s individual experience to a character‘s experience and 
vice versa, and from the reader‘s cultural experience to a character‘s experience and vice versa, 
and from the reader‘s individual experience to the overall characterization of LIFE in the text 
and vice versa, from the reader‘s cultural experience to the overall characterization of LIFE in 
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 For more about the directionality of metaphor, see section 2.2, above. 
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the text and vice versa – individually.  Blend theory can streamline this process without reducing 
the complexity of the process. 
But there are complications with a blend theory approach.  A blend suggests that two 
things that were not unified are now unified.  Metaphor, following Ricoeur‘s formulation, 
preserves the tensive nature of the unification being asserted.  For literature, this is of the utmost 
importance, because our experiences of LIFE do not and often are not supposed to precisely 
mirror those depicted in the literary text.  To suggest otherwise is to ignore the very real contexts 
that our concepts of LIFE and LITERATURE emerge from.  Furthermore, to conceptualize of 
literature as a metaphorization of LIFE gives us a way to reassess what we thought we knew 
about the unidirectionality of metaphor.  Blend theory only provides a different way of thinking 
and talking about the same issues that a metaphor theory approach brings to light, but I think that 
we will find that it doesn‘t provide conceptual metaphor theorists with a way around the issue of 
unidirectionality. 
Both conceptual metaphor theory or conceptual blend theory give us new and much 
needed insights into the linguistic, aesthetic, and rhetorical aspects of literature and the literary 
experience.  Either could be profitably pursued and should be. 
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